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Abstract 
The growth of the Internet attracted many users either as merchants or customers. 
Merchants have products and services to sell whereas customers have money to pay for 
these products and services. Customers normally do not trust merchants and also 
merchants do not trust customers. When a customer is willing to buy any product or 
service, they want be sure that the merchant will send them the product that they want 
after they make the correct payment. Similarly, a merchant will not take the risk by 
sending the product before the customer makes the correct payment. Therefore, the party 
(customer or merchant) who send their item (payment or product) first will be at risk of 
the misbehaviour of the other party. This problem is known as the fairness problem. 
The aim is to study the existing fair exchange protocols that solve the fairness problem. 
Then, propose more efficient protocols to solve the fairness problem. 
The original idea in this thesis is enforcing honesty in fair exchange protocols. The idea 
of enforcing honesty is applied to produce a fair exchange protocol that encourages the 
merchant to be honest and enforces the customer to be honest and vice versa. The thesis 
shows that it is not possible to enforce both the customer and the merchant to be honest 
at the same time. Hence, it proposes a third fair exchange protocol that encourages the 
customer and the merchant to be honest. The protocols make use of a Trusted Third 
Party JTP) but its use is kept to minimum when disputes arise. In this respect they are 
optimistic fair exchange protocols. 
The proposed protocols have the following features: (1) only three messages are 
required to be exchanged between a customer and a merchant that apply the idea of 
enforcing a party to be honest; (2) the protocols guarantee strong fairness for both 
customer and merchant; (3) they allow both parties (customer and merchant) to check 
the correctness of the item of the other party before they send their item; (4) disputes are 
resolved automatically online by a Trusted Third Party (TTP); and (5) they are efficient 
in that they have a low number of modular exponentiations (which is the most expensive 
operation). 
Applying the idea of enforcing a party to be honest has helped in proposing efficient fair 
exchange protocols for the exchange of payments and digital products between 
customers and merchants. 
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Glossary and Notations II 
Glossary and Notations 
The following presents the notations used in the proposed protocols i. e. 
the notations are used in ECH protocol, EMH protocol and ECMH protocol. The 
notations are as follows: 
9 C: Customer 
9 M. Merchant 
* TTP: Trusted Third Party, a party that is neither M nor C and is trusted by 
all parties 
" D: Digital product 
" P: Payment 
" CA: Certificate Authority used to certify digital products 
" CB: the Customer's Bank 
9 desc.: description of digital product specified by C 
* h(X): "a strong-collision-resistant one-way hash function, such as SHA- 
I" [Schneier96] 
9 pkx = (ex, nx): RSA [RiShAd78] Public Key of party x (x C{C, M, TTP, 
mt, ctj), where nx is a public RSA modulus and ex is a public exponent 
9 skx = (dx, nx): RSA [RiShAd78] Private Key of party x, where nx is a 
public RSA modulus and dx is a private exponent 
kx: asymmetric keyusedbypartyx(xCIC, M, TTP)) 
P-Cert: Payment Certificate issued by CB. The contents of P-Cert are: 
o amount., the amount of payment 
0 payee: the name of the receiving party i. e. name of the merchant 
0 hP. - hash value of payment 
0 heP. - hash value of encrypted payment with kc 
0 heKc. - hash value of encrypted kc with pkct 
0 Sig. CB: CB's signature on P-Cert 
e D-Cert: Digital-product's Certificate issued by CA. The contents of D- 
Cert are: 
o Price: price of D 
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o d: Description of D, the description may be the ID of the digital 
product 
o hD: hash value of D 
o heD: hash value of encrypted D with km 
o heKm. - hash value of encrypted km with pkmt 
o Sig. CA: CA's signature on D-Cert 
9 DG-Cert: another version of the digital product certificate used in the 
EMH protocol. The content of DG-Cert are: 
c Price: price of D 
o d: Description of D, the description may be the ID of the digital 
product 
o hDG: hash value of D 
o Sig. CA: CA's signature on DG-Cert 
9 Cmt: the certificate for the shared public key between M and TTP; C. mt 
is issued by TTP. A standard X. 509 certificate can be used to implement 
Cmt [X. 509] 
0 Cct: the certificate for the shared public key between C and TTP; C. ct is 
issued by TTP. A standard X. 509 certificate can be used to implement 
Cct [X. 509] 
* enc. pkx(Y): an RSA encryption [RiShAd78] of Y using the public key pkx 
(ex, nx) i. e. enc. pkx(Y) =r mod nx =Z 
0 enc. skx(Z) is an RSA decryption [RiShAd78] of Z using the private key 
skx (dx, nx) i. e. enc. skx(Z) =Z 
dx 
mod nx =Y 
& enc. kx(Y) : encryption of Y using a symmetric key kx (kx can be used for 
decrypting enc. kx(Y)) 
9 Sig. x (A): the RSA signature [RiShAd78] of party x on A i. e. encrypting 
the hash value of A using the private key sIbc (dx, nx) as follows: 
Sig. x (A) = (h(A))"'mod nx 
9A -4 B: X: A sends message X to B 
+: the concatenation operation 
ECH: Enforcing Customer Honesty protocol 
EMH: Enforcing Merchant Honesty protocol 
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ECMH: Encouraging Customer and Merchant Honesty protocol 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter One 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
14 
The research question to be addressed in this thesis is as follows. The way in 
which the current optimistic fair exchange protocols (which are the best type of fair 
exchange protocols, as will be discussed later) work is by, first, letting the parties 
exchange their encrypted items then the exchange of the decryption keys will take 
place afterwards. This exchange requires at least four messages to be exchanged 
between the parties. Therefore, is there a way of reducing the number of messages in 
the optimistic fair exchange protocols in order to have more efficient protocols? 
E-commerce has grown dramatically in the last decade and many merchants 
now conduct their business online. That is, more and more merchants use the Internet 
to sell their products and services to people who live in different parts of the world. 
Therefore, their products and services are not limited to people in their areas. A recent 
national survey shows that the value of Internet sales by UK businesses grew from 
F-101bn in 2005 to E130.4bn in 2006 [Stat07]. The growth of e-commerce has also 
changed the way in which some customers buy products and services. More and more 
customers rely on the Internet for buying. This is for many reasons. Firstly, it is much 
easier to make a purchase using the Internet because a customer does not need to wait 
in traffic jams and go to shops. Secondly, customers can compare prices with different 
merchants in seconds. Thirdly, customers can buy from anywhere in the world at any 
time that suits them. Fourthly, the product that a customer buys from the Internet will 
be delivered to the customer's home. 
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Using traditional commerce, a customer goes to the merchant's shop, finds the 
product they want, pay for it, and finally collects the product. In this scenario, the 
customer will not worry that they will not be given the product when they pay the 
money. Additionally, if the customer pays in cash then they will not worry that their 
financial information will be revealed to any other party. Furthermore, customers can 
be anonymous to merchants. In other words, if the customer does not want the 
merchant to trace them or to know their purchase habits then they can pay by cash by 
which merchants cannot trace customers. 
The issues discussed in the traditional commerce can be problematic when 
using e-commerce. Customers need to trust the merchant from whom they buy. This is 
because if the merchant is dishonest then they may not send the product to the 
customer or they might send an incorrect product. Customers also need to be 
concerned when they make payment online because their financial information might 
be stolen if it is not encrypted while it is sent to the merchant. Additionally, even if the 
customer's financial information is sent securely from the customer to the merchant, 
the merchant must have mechanisms in place to secure the customers' financial 
information. In e-commerce, the anonymity of customers is not always protected. That 
is, when a customer uses a credit/debit card for the payment, their name is associated 
with the card. Therefore, information on the customer's purchase behaviour can be 
constructed by merchants. 
Although the use of the Intemet eases buying and selling of products and 
services, it also requires more attention to be paid for issues such as trust, security, 
anonymity, and privacy. Hence, there must be protocols to protect both customers and 
merchants when they use the Internet for buying and selling products and services. 
1.2. Fair Exchange Protocols 
A customer and a merchant are two parties who possibility do not know each 
other (and more likely they do not trust each other especially if they have not 
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previously dealt with each other). The customer wants to buy a digital product (such 
as a piece of music or software) online from the merchant. The merchant needs to 
receive the correct payment from the customer in order to send the digital product to 
them. The customer wants to be sure that they will receive the correct digital product 
when they send the payment to the merchant. That is, when the customer sends the 
payment, the merchant will not disappear without sending anything or sends the 
wrong digital product and disappears. This problem is called fair exchange of items in 
which both parties must receive each other's items or no party gets anything. 
Therefore, the first problem that fair exchange protocols address is how to ensure fair 
exchange of items between the parties. The second problem they must address is that 
if any disputes arise between the parties then the fair exchange protocol should be able 
to provide an online and automated dispute resolution that satisfies both parties. 
Two types of fair exchange protocols exist: those that do not involve a Trusted 
Third Party (TTP); and those that do. The use of the TTP helps the parties to exchange 
their items fairly. The protocols that do not involve a TTP are based on dividing the 
items to be exchanged into parts. Then, each party sends a part of its item to the other 
party until the whole items are. exchanged. 
Protocols that involve a TTP can be divided into three types: 
1. The first type uses a TTP for delivering the exchanged items, this is called an 
inline TTP based protocols. This involves each party sending their item to the 
TTP and the TTP delivering them to the parties. Involving a TTP will 
Parantee the fair exchange of items 7-- 
2. The second type is the protocols that use online TTP. The online TTP is only 
used for validating the items to be exchanged. Therefore, the involvement of 
the TTP is reduced. 
3. The third type is the protocols where there is minimal use of the TTP, usually 
when something goes wrong. In these protocols the two parties directly 
exchange their items and the TTP only gets involved to resolve disputes. This 
type of protocol is called optimistic fair exchange protocols. 
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Both types of fair exchange protocols (the one that involves a TTP and the one 
that does not) aim to ensure the fair exchange of items for all parties involved in the 
exchange. The protocols that do not require a TTP are not efficient in that they require 
many rounds to complete the exchange. Additionally, the parties must have the same 
computational power for the fairness to be ensured. The protocols that involve an 
inline TTP suffer from drawbacks such as the TTP could be the source of a bottleneck, 
it must always be available, and if the TTP crashes, the protocol will not deliver the 
items to the parties. Although the protocols that are based on online TTP reduce the 
involvement of the TTP, they have similar drawbacks as the protocols that use inline 
TTP. The optimistic fair exchange protocols seem the best way to solve the fairness 
problem. This is because the TTP is not involved in the protocol unless a problem 
anses. 
This thesis has studied the existing fair exchange protocols in the literature and 
proposes three efficient optimistic fair exchange protocols that can be used for 
exchanging digital products (such as software) and payments between customers and 
merchants. The proposed protocols ensure fairness for all parties involved in the 
exchange and resolve disputes automatically online. 
1.3. Criteria for Success 
The following criteria for success are set: 
1. Development of efficient optimistic fair exchange protocols 
A number of optimistic fair exchange protocols have already been developed. 
This thesis will analyse them and develop new protocols that overcome some of the 
issues identified. Then, the new protocols will be compared against the relevant fair 
exchange protocols. 
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2. Specification of the efficient optimistic fair exchange protocols 
The new protocols will be specified, the number of messages needed will be 
identified, and the content of these messages will be specified. 
3. Built in automatic dispute resolution 
Disputes between the merchants and customers are bound to arise. These are 
usually resolvable in a court of law. The new protocols should minimise the instances 
of disputes and should also enable their automatic resolution. 
4. The protocols should ensure strong fairness for all parties 
The new protocols should ensure that by the end of executing the fair 
exchange protocol then each party will get the item of the other party or none do. 
5. Analysis of the new protocols for completeness 
The new protocols should be analysed so that strong fairness is ensured in all 
possible scenarios, the ability of each party to check the correctness of each other's 
items, all dispute scenarios to be identified, and the new protocols to be formally 
verified. 
6. A proof of concept implementation 
A prototype proof of concept is needed to make sure that the new protocols are 
viable, implementable, and work correctly. 
1.4. Thesis Structure 
The thesis structure is as follows. Chapter 2 presents general background on 
electronic commerce (e-commerce). Chapter 3 studies the types of fair exchange 
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protocols, presents examples of fair exchange protocols, and discusses dispute 
resolution. Chapter 4 presents some cryptographic concepts and assumptions for the 
proposed protocols. Chapter 5 presents and analyses the Enforcing Customer Honesty 
(ECH) protocol. Chapter 6 presents and analyses the Enforcing Merchant Honesty 
(EMH) protocol. Chapter 7 presents and analyses the Encouraging Customer and 
Merchant Honesty (ECMH) protocol. Chapter 8 compares the ECH, EMH, and 
ECMH protocols against each other, and then compares the three protocols against the 
related fair exchange protocols from the literature. Chapter 9 fon-nally verifies the 
proposed protocols. Chapter 10 presents the design and the implementation of the 
prototype of the proposed protocols. Finally, chapter 11 presents the conclusions and 
the future work. 
Summary 
In this chapter, a brief introduction to the e-commerce has been presented. The 
fairness problem is discussed. The criteria for success are presented. The thesis is 
outlined. 
Chapter 2: Electronic Commerce 
Chapter Two 
Electronic Commerce 
Introduction 
20 
Electronic Commerce (e-commerce) is defined as "the sharing of business 
information, maintaining business relationships and conducting business transactions 
by the means of telecommunication networks" [TsiakisStheph05]. E-commerce is 
performed using electronic communications such as computer networks, including the 
Internet, and are used by both a customer and a merchant, to carry out all their 
transactions. These transactions include buying, selling, transferring or exchanging 
products, services or information. A typical trade cycle that can be applied in the 
world of e-commerce is as follows: 
I. a customer searches the web for products; 
2. they place an order for the found product with a merchant; 
3. the customer pays the price of the product to the merchant; 
4. the merchant sends the product to the customer either by shipping it or 
through the Intemet if it is a digital product such as a piece of music or 
computer software; 
the customer can obtain after-sales services such as warranties 
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Figure I illustrates this process. 
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In Figure 1, the primary objective that a customer needs to get is the ordered 
product (whether it is a digital product or not) that a merchant has and at the same 
time the primary objective that a merchant needs to get is the payment that the 
customer has. Of course other services that the merchant offers for customers such as 
the ease of ordering and after-sales services are important but the primary objective is 
to have the correct product that the customer wants. Therefore, the customer and the 
merchant exchange their items which are the product (whether it is digital or not) and 
the payment. This exchange of items needs to be fair. That is, by the end of the 
transaction, both the customer and the merchant must have each other's items or 
neither of them gets anything. The process of fairly exchanging items is called a fair 
exchange protocol which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
There are many types of e-commerce. The most common types are 
summarised as follows [WhiteleyOO]: 
1. Business-to-Consumer (B2Q: the online transactions made between business 
and individual consumers. 
Figure 1: E-commerce Facilities (Adopted from [WhiteleyOOI) 
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2. Business-to-Business (B2B): the online transactions made between business 
and another business, such as suppliers. 
3. Consumer-to-Business (C2B): individual consumers who sell products or 
services to organizations. 
4. Consumer-to-Consumer (C2C): individual consumer sells directly to another 
consumer. 
Figure I represents B2C e-commerce as there is a merchant (business) and a 
customer who interact with each other. However, the processes that appear in Figure I 
can be applied to all four types of e-commerce. Therefore, in B2B e-commerce there 
are searching for the wanted products, placing orders, paying the price of the ordered 
products, delivering the products and providing after-sales services. In the same way 
these processes can be applied to the rest of e-commerce types. 
2.2. Advantages, Disadvantages and 
Limitations 
E-commerce has many advantages and benefits to customers and merchants; it 
also has some disadvantages and limitations. These advantages, disadvantages and 
limitations will be surnmarised in the following sections [TuKiLeVi04] and 
[WhiteleyOO]. 
2.2.1. E-commerce, Advantages 
0 Shopping from home: customers can shop from their homes using the 
Internet. Hence, they avoid travelling; traffic jams, and pollutions 
0 Shopping at any time: there are no opening and closing times for e- 
commerce websites. As a result, customers can shop at any time they like 
day or night. This feature of e-commerce is beneficial for merchants as 
well because they can sell their products at any time 
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0 Cheaper prices: products sold via the Internet usually have cheaper prices 
than products sold in traditional shops because for example traditional 
shops usually employ more people and hence there are higher running 
costs 
0 Home delivery: free home delivery is provided by most of e-commerce 
websites if the customer spends over a certain amount of money 
0 Online sales support: information on products is available on the e- 
commerce websites if customers need it 
0 Global reach: using e-commerce, geographical barriers are ignored as 
merchants can sell their products to any customer in the world 
0 The number of employees is reduced: in e-commerce, most of the 
operations are automated so the number of employees will be reduced 
0 Instant delivery: if the product to be bought from the merchant using the 
Internet is a digital product (such as software, movie) then it will be 
delivered to the customer immediately via a link in the merchant's website 
or e-mail 
0 Shopping for all people: all people can do shopping even those who live 
in rural areas or people who have special needs 
2.2.2. E-commerce Disadvantages 
Although e-commerce has many advantages, it has disadvantages which 
include the following: 
0 Privacy and security: they are the major concern for both customers and 
merchants. Customers want their privacy to be protected when they buy 
using the Internet. The security of their financial information is the most 
concern for customers. Merchants are also concerned about the security of 
their systems because if it is not well secured then this will affect their 
reputation 
0 Delivery: buying from the Internet may result in the delay of delivering the 
bought products. Sometimes it may result in not delivering the products to 
Chapter 2: Electronic Commerce 24 
the customer at all or delivering wrong products. This might occur if the 
merchant is dishonest. This problem is called fair exchange problem which 
is the main focus of this thesis. Hence, it will be discussed in the next 
chapter and in the rest of this thesis 
Inspecting products: buying from the traditional shops will allow 
customers to inspect and feel the products whereas this inspection is not 
available when buying from the Internet. Instead, a picture of the products 
will be displayed for customers 
0 Social interaction: buying from the traditional shops allows people to 
communicate with each other. On the other hand, buying from the Internet 
will keep people away from other people as customers will rely on 
computers for performing their purchases. Therefore, this might result in 
long term social problems 
0 Returning products: returning the products that have been bought via the 
Internet is more restricted, especially if the merchant is located in a 
different country from that of the customer 
2.2.3. E-commerce Limitations 
Some authors agreed that the e-commerce limitations can be classified into 
technological limitations and non-technological limitations [AhRyHa04], 
[KimKim05] and [TuKiLeVi04]. These limitations will be discussed as follows. 
The technoloLAcal limitations 
The technological limitations are about the limitations that exist in the 
technology that has been used in e-commerce. These include the following: 
0 The universal standards of quality, security and reliability are not yet 
agreed 
The cost of Internet accessibility is still expensive in most counthes 
0 The quality measurement factors are varied and yet there is no agreement 
on them 
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The non-techno logical limitations are about the threats that users have 
experienced when they used e-commerce. These include the following: 
0 Security and privacy threats are the major concerns for most customers 
who buy products and services online. This is because of the number of 
incidents that have happened as a result of online payments (see E- 
Commerce Security section) 
0 Lack of trust in e-commerce because if customers do not trust the 
merchant, then they will not buy products online from them (see E- 
Commerce Trust section). Some customers also do not trust the technology 
because they want paper-based commerce 
9 The amount of fraud on the Internet prevents some customers from using 
e-commerce. 
2.3. E-Commerce Security 
The security element in e-commerce is crucial. Customers will buy products 
and services from merchants who have systems that are known to be secure. 
Therefore, merchants must spend a lot of money on securing their systems in order to 
encourage customers to buy from them. $6.2 billion was spent on security around the 
world in 1999; whereas $25 billion was spent in 2002 [TuKiLeVi04]. This indicates 
that merchants are aware of the security problem and they are spending a lot of money 
to solve it. It also indicates that the threats are growing as well. 
E-commerce systems are vulnerable to abuse, misuse and failure 
[FordBaum97]. The consequences of these things on e-commerce systems will affect 
both merchants and customers, These consequences can be identified as follows 
[ibid]. Firstly, lots of money will be lost from both customers and merchants. In 2000, 
well-known e-commerce websites (including amazon. com, Buy. com, and eBay. com) 
were attacked and as a result the loss of money was about $1.7 billion [TuKiLeVi04]. 
Secondly, confidential information such as credit/debit card numbers might be stolen. 
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As an example of this, an attack targeted "TK Maxx" stores in 2007 and led to stealing 
information from 45.7 million payment cards (debit and credit) [BBC08]. Thirdly, the 
customers' trust in the e-commerce system will be compromised if it has any security 
breaches. As a result, customers will not buy from a merchant if they know that the 
system is not secured. Finally, resources in the system might be used by unauthorized 
people. 
As can be seen from the consequences, the need to have secure e-commerce 
systems is crucial. By having secured e-commerce systems, customers will be 
encouraged to use them. At the same time, merchants will increase their profit if more 
and more customers use their systems to buy products and services. 
Two kinds of attacks might compromise e-commerce systems [TuKiLeVi04]. 
The first type is the non-technical attack. This attack can be performed by persuading 
people who work with the system to reveal sensitive information or to perform actions 
that compromise security. The second type is the technical attack. To perform the 
technical attack, software and systems expertise are involved. Computer viruses, 
worms and Trojan Horses are examples of technical attacks. 
Three fronts must be addressed in order to get secure e-commerce systems 
[Ghosh98]. These fronts are described as follows: 
1) Customer's side security 
The software (such as the Internet browsers) used by customers to purchase 
products and services from the Intemet may compromise the security of the e- 
commerce if they are not well secured. 
2) Data transport security 
Customers need to pay money via the Internet or send confidential information 
when they use e-commerce systems. The sensitive information to be sent from 
customers to merchants via the Internet must be secured. Many approaches can be 
applied to secure the infonnation; they include: 
Public key infrastructure (PKI): this includes private and public key 
encryption, digital signature and digital certificates 
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Secure socket layer (SSL) protocol [SSL] 
Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) protocol [SET] 
Merchant's side security 
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Securing the merchants' systems is very critical as very sensitive information 
(for both customers and merchants) is stored on these systems. Therefore, if the 
merchants' systems are not secured, the customers trust in the merchants will be 
compromised. 
To sum up, an e-commerce system is used to perform buying and selling 
products (whether they are digital or not) between a customer and a merchant online. 
Therefore, in order to get secure e-commerce systems that are used by customers and 
merchants, the customer side should be secured as it is used for sending payments and 
confidential information, the merchant side should be secured as it is used for sending 
the digital products that the customer ordered and also used for storing customers' 
information; and the communication channel between the customer and the merchant 
should be secured to protect the sent items between the customer and the merchant. 
The customer side can be secured by using secured software. The merchant side can 
be secured by using a secured web server and a secured operating system for the 
network server. Finally, the communication channel can be secured by using strong 
security infrastructures and protocols such as SSL, SET, and PKI. 
The other security problem is how to secure both the customer and the 
merchant from each others i. e. how to protect an honest customer from dishonest 
merchant and vice versa. This issue is the main focus of this thesis and will be studied 
starting from the next chapter. 
2.4. E-commerce Trust 
Trust is an important element in business. The importance of trust increases 
when the business is done online because it is more likely that both customers and 
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merchants do not know each other. Trust and security are seen as the most important 
issues emerging with regard to the development of e-commerce [RuUnHa03]. Lack of 
trust in merchants prevented customers from buying products online [CookLuo03]. A 
survey of 60 agents at U. S. companies shows that 45% of the agents said that a lack of 
trust prevented them from buying goods and trading online more frequently 
[Violino02]. The more customers trust merchants, the more they buy from them. 
Trust has been defined as "the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the 
actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or 
control that other party" [TsiakisStheph05]. Therefore, if each party trusts the other, 
each of them will act as the other party expects. When a customer trusts a merchant, 
they will be confident that the merchant will send the same product that they have 
paid for, within the agreed time. 
In e-commerce, trust can be divided into two types. The trust in the technology 
used and the trust in the partner with whom a user will interact. The trust in the 
technology used is built through the reliability of the system. A lack of the reliability 
of the technology can affect the trust in the e-commerce [CoThYi03]. The trust with 
the partner is difficult to build but easy to lose and has cost implications 
[CookLuo03]. So, trust is something that can be built over the time. For example, for a 
customer and a merchant, the customer needs to deal with the merchant many times to 
have this kind of trust. The same for a merchant, there are customers who are trusted 
by a merchant and there are customers who are not trustworthy. Therefore, the 
previous experience will play an important role in building trust with the other party. 
Trust can also be earned from the experience of other people. For example, if a 
customer has a good experience with a merchant who is trustworthy, then this 
customer will suggest this merchant to other customers. So, the trust can be gained by 
having a good reputation. 
Srinivasan [Srinivasan04] identifies five factors that contribute to customer 
trust in a merchant in e-commerce: 
1. the ease of access to the description of products and services in a merchant's 
web site 
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2. an order can be placed in an easy way 
3. when a customer placed an order, they receive order confirmation 
4. customers are able to track their orders 
5. customers are supported by after-sales services 
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These factors will give a customer confidence that a merchant is trustworthy 
especially when a customer is dealing with a merchant for the first time. After the 
customer has experienced the merchant whether they are trustworthy or not, they will 
be more confident to deal with them for the next time or even suggest them to other 
customers. Therefore, the trust can be built by past experience or by other factors such 
as good reputations. 
Many methods can be used to increase the trust level between customers and 
merchants. In e-Bay [EBay], customers are allowed to add comments when they buy 
from a merchant. This is a manual process. These comments represent buyers' 
(custorners') view of a merchant who sold items to them. The comments can be seen 
by any visitor of the e-Bay's website, Using this, merchants will do their best to have a 
good reputation which will encourage new customers to buy from them, 
The idea of increasing the trust level used by e-Bay can be called a trust profile 
for a merchant. The same can be done for customers. So, when customers buy from a 
merchant, the merchant can view the trust profile of a customer in order to know 
whether they are trustworthy or not by viewing the previous actions of the customer. 
The trust profile is done manually and there is scope for automation, possibly through 
the use of fair exchange protocol or some other mechanisms. 
As can be seen, the trust factor is very important for both a customer and a 
merchant. Trust in the partner with whom a user (a customer or a merchant) will 
interact can either encourage or discourage the user from using e-commerce systems. 
Therefore, there is a crucial need for having well designed e-commerce protocols that 
increase the trust between customers and merchants. Although there are users 
(customers and merchants) who are not trustworthy, e-commerce protocols should 
ensure fair exchange of payments and digital products between customers and 
merchants. 
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2.5. E-payment 
Electronic payment (e-payment) is described as t he transfer of payment from 
the payer to the payee using electronic means. E-payment systems imitate the payment 
mechanism in the real world as well as inventing new mechanisms for implementing 
the transactions [TsiakisStheph05]. 
There are at least four parties involved in any e-payment system. They are a 
payer (customer), a payee (merchant), an issuer, and an acquirer. The issuer is a third 
party such as a bank which processes payer's transactions i. e. the customer's bank. 
The acquirer is a third party such as a bank which processes payee's (merchant) 
transactions i. e. the merchant's bank. 
Asokan et al [AsJaStWa97] identified two models of e-payment systems. They 
are "cash-like" e-payment systems and "check-like" e-payment systems. It seems that 
the reason for this classification is that in the "cash-like" e-payment systems the 
parties (payer and payee) do not have to have bank accounts i. e. the same as in the real 
cash money where payer directly gives the money to the payee; whereas in the "check- 
like"' e-payment systems both parties (payer and payee) need to have bank accounts 
either with the same bank or in different banks. 
In the "cash-like" e-payment system, a payer withdraws the money from the 
issuer before they use it for purchasing over the Internet. When the payer wants to buy 
something online, they send the money (that was previously withdrawn) to the payee. 
The payee then deposits the money using the acquirer. The acquirer then settles the 
money from the issuer [AsJaStWa97] 
In the "check-like" e-payment system, the payer needs to get a card (either 
debit card or credit card) to be used for making payments and also the payee need to 
have a bank account. A credit/debit card can be defined as an electronic readable card 
that contains unique information for every card that is used for payment. The 
difference between a debit card and a credit card is as follows. In the credit card the 
card holder (payer) borrows the money from the issuer of the card and later the payer 
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pays the money back. In the debit card, the card holder (payer) uses the money that is 
aval able in their bank account. 
The way in which the credit card e-payment system works can be summarised 
as follows [TuKiLeVi04]. When the payee (card holder/customer) fills in the payment 
form and submits it, the page will be transmitted to the payee (merchant). After that, 
the payer's credit card information and the payee identification number will be passed 
to the acquirer. Then, the acquirer sends the information to the credit card issuer in 
order to approve it. Subsequently, the credit card issuer sends back the response 
through the acquirer stating whether the transaction is approved or not. The payer 
(cardholder/customer) will be informed of all their transactions by the card issuer 
using card statements. The money flow in the credit/debit card e-payment system is 
shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Money flow in credit/debit card-based e-payment systems (Adopted from 
[AsJaStWa971) 
The customer's credit card infon-nation may be entered in three options 
[Wright02]. The first option is to enter the card infori-nation using a form that is 
provided by the merchant. Therefore, the card information will 
be accessed by the 
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merchant. The merchant may store the card information in their database. This may 
result in stealing the customers' cards information by hackers if the database is not 
very secured. A recent incident of such hacking into customers' cards information 
stored in the merchant's database, is the one targeted "TK Maxx" stores in 2007 and 
led to stealing information from 45.7 million payment cards (debit and credit) 
[BBC08]. The second option is to enter the card information using a form that is 
provided by a payment service provider. The payment service provider is not the 
merchant; it is a company that is specialised in providing e-payment services for 
merchants. An example of the e-payment service provider is "PayPal" which will be 
discussed later. In the second option, the merchant will not be able to view the card 
information and hence will not store it in their database. The third option is to use the 
Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) [SET]. In this option, the customer enters the 
card information and encrypts it using the public key of the card issuer. Then the 
customer sends the encrypted card information to the merchant who in turn sends it to 
the card issuer. The merchant cannot read the card infonnation because it is encrypted. 
Therefore, the merchant will not be able to store the card information on their 
database. 
An example of an e-payment system that is popular in recent years is called 
PayPal [PayPaIO8]. The PayPal is an e-payment service provider. PayPal uses email 
for paying money when buying products online. Each user (customer and merchant) 
needs to have an account in PayPal. In the registration phase, the user will be asked to 
provide an email address that will be used for sending and receiving money. When a 
user wants to send money to another user, they need to fill an online form in which 
they put the amount of money they want to transfer as well as other information such 
as the credit card details or bank account details, and the email address of the 
recipient. If the recipient is a registered user in PayPal then they will receive an email 
saying that they have been sent money through PayPal and they can find it by logging- 
in to their account in PayPal. If the recipient is not a registered user in PayPal, then 
they need to set up an account in PayPal in order to receive the money. The money in 
the users' accounts can be used to be transferred to other users. Users can withdraw 
money from their PayPal accounts by requesting a cheque from PayPal or by 
requesting a deposit to their bank accounts [JonesO 1], [Guadamuz03]. 
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As can be seen, using PayPal payer card infonnation (or bank details) will not 
be shown to the payee [PayPaIO8]. Hence, it gives more protection for payers from the 
distrusted payees. This encourages users to pay online since their information will 
only be dealt with by PayPal. 
The major problems for e-payment systems are that of maintaining the security 
of the card information while sending it over a network and while it is stored in a 
database [HsiehOl, Wright02]. The security is the major concern for customers, 
merchants, card issuers and e-payment service providers. Another issue that concerns 
customers is their privacy when using e-payment systems. That is, some customers 
prefer to be anonymous to merchants. The anonymity of customers prevents 
merchants from tracing customers in order to build a profile of their purchases. 
2.6. Summary 
When a customer buys a product from a merchant, they are, actually, 
exchanging their items which are the payment that is held by the customer and the 
product that is held by the merchant. Therefore, at the end of the purchase, the 
customer wants to have the ordered product and the merchant wants to have the right 
payment. This is called fair exchange of items. 
In this chapter, an introduction to the e-commerce has been presented. E- 
commerce advantages, disadvantages and limitations have been discussed; and some 
important issues have been raised such as the security of e-commerce. It has been 
shown that three things must be secured in order to get secure e-commerce systems. 
They are the software that is used by a customer, the channel that is used to send and 
receive information between a customer and a merchant, and finally the server on the 
merchant side. 
The importance of trust between a customer and a merchant has also been 
discussed. Users of e-commerce need to trust two things. They are the technology by 
which the e-commerce has been implemented and the partner with whom a user will 
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interact. The later can be built over time and is difficult to build but easy to lose. E- 
payment has been discussed as well and the credit card example has been used to 
show how its information is exchanged between customer, merchant, and the credit 
card issuer. 
One way to build trust between customers and merchants is to use protocols 
that ensure fair exchange of payments and products. 
Chapter 3: Fair Exchange Protocols 
Chapter Three 
I Fair Exchange Protocols 
Introduction 
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In e-commerce, protocols are needed to manage the interaction between parties 
involved in a transaction. E-commerce protocols should be well designed and secured 
to encourage users to use them for buying and selling products and services. Having 
such protocols will protect honest users from dishonest users; and-as a result more 
people will use e-commerce systems. There is a set of protocols that can be used for 
fairly exchanging items between parties. These protocols are termed fair exchange 
protocols. 
In this chapter, a discussion of e-commerce fair exchange protocols is 
presented. Additionally, some example protocols are analysed and discussed. Dispute 
resolution will also be identified in the context of e-commerce fair exchange 
protocols. 
A Trusted Third Party (TTP) is a neutral party (entity) used in fair exchange 
protocols to ensure fairness for all parties involved in the exchange of items. The TTP 
is assumed to be available, trusted by all parties and will not collude with any party. 
There maybe more than one TTP involved in any exchange. Therefore, the TTP takes 
all or some of the following roles [NeZh03]: 
Ensures fairness in the exchange 
Acts as a delivery agent i. e. deliver items to parties 
Acts as an authority that is trusted by all parties 
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9 Resolves disputes 
0 Validates items and issues certificates 
3.2. Fair Exchange Protocols 
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The problem of fair exchange is concerned with exchanging the items of each 
party fairly. The parties probably do not know each other and (or) do not trust each 
other. Therefore, by the end of the exchange each party wants to have the item of the 
other party; or neither of the parties receives the other party's item. The fair exchange 
protocols are designed to ensure such fairness. That is, to protect honest parties from 
the dishonest ones. 
There are two types of fairness that fair exchange protocols can ensure 
[AsScWa97] (1) strong fairness; and (2) weak fairness. If there are two parties 
involved in the fair exchange protocol then strong and weak fairness can be defined as 
follows. The fair exchange protocol ensures strong fairness if by the end of executing 
the fair exchange protocol the two parties will receive each other's items or none do. 
The fair exchange protocol ensures weak fairness if it either ensures strong fairness or 
provides the party (who has not received the other party's item) with proof that the 
other party received their item. This proof can be used later (i. e. not within the 
protocol) for dispute resolutions. 
Fair exchange protocols appear in different contexts. These contexts are 
certified e-mail, certified delivery, contract signing, and fair purchase. However, the 
main concern for all of them is how to fairly exchange the items between the parties 
involved in the exchange. These contexts differ according to the items to be 
exchanged between parties. The following summarises these contexts [SchunterOO]. 
Certified email 
in the certified email fair exchange protocols [NeZhSh05,. NeZhBa04, 
AtMeGoOO, DeGoLaWa96, AbGlHoPi02, Micali03] the items to be exchanged 
between parties are the email and the receipt, That is, the sender of the email wants to 
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receive a receipt from the receiver of the email to avoid them denying they received 
the email. 
Nenadic et al [NeZhBa04] proposed an optimistic fair certified email protocol 
that comprises of four messages to be exchanged between a sender (Party A) and a 
receiver (Party B) of the email. Their protocol is based on RSA [RiShAd78] and starts 
by Party A sending their first message to Party B. The first message includes the hash 
value of the email and the signature of the Party A on the email. On receiving the first 
message, Party B verifies/check if the signature of Party A is correct. This verification 
is done by decrypting Party A's signature using the public key of Party A, then 
comparing the hash value of the email included in the signature with the hash value of 
the email included in the first message, If this comparison is correct then Party B 
sends the second message to Party A which includes their encrypted receipt of the first 
message. If Party A finds that the second message is correct then they send the un- 
encrypted email to Party B. When Party B receives the email, they send the fourth 
message to Party A which includes the decryption key to decrypt the encrypted 
receipt. The TTP is contacted if one party misbehaved. 
Certified delivery 
The certified delivery fair exchange protocols [NeZhChGo05] are very similar 
to the certified email fair exchange protocols. The difference is that the received item 
to be certified is not an email but any digital product or payment. The following is an 
example protocol for the certified delivery. 
Nenadic et al [NeZhChGo05] proposed an optimistic fair exchange protocol 
that makes use of TTP in the case of disputes. Their protocol is for the exchange of 
digital product (that is held by a merchant) for its receipt from a customer when they 
receive the digital product i. e. the customer will send to the merchant a signature that 
represents a receipt of receiving the digital product. The protocol is called 
Certified 
Digital Product Delivery where the merchant sends the digital product to the customer 
and then the customer sends a confirmation to the merchant stating that the 
digital 
product was received. 
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The exchange phase of the Nenadic et al protocol comprises of four messages 
to be exchanged between the customer and the merchant. The merchant starts the 
exchange by sending the first message to the customer. The first message includes the 
encrypted digital product, the digital product's certificate and the merchant's signature 
on the digital product. On receiving the first message, the customer verifies it and if 
satisfied they send the second message to the merchant. The second message includes 
the customer's encrypted signature which represents the receipt of receiving the 
digital product. On receiving the second message, the merchant verifies the 
correctness of the encrypted signature. If it is correct then the merchant sends the third 
message to the customer. The third message includes the decryption key. On receiving 
the third message, the customer decrypts the digital product and sends the fourth 
message to the merchant which includes the decryption key to decrypt the customer's 
signature. By the end of executing the protocol, the merchant and the customer have 
fairly exchanged the digital product and the receipt (the customer's signature). The 
TTP should be contacted to resolve any disputes. 
Contract sinin2 
In the contract signing fair exchange protocols [Wang05, AsShWa98, 
Micali03, 'PaChSiO3] the items to be exchanged between parties are the signature of 
parties on a contract. That is, if there is a contract to be signed by two parties then 
each party wants to receive the signed contract by the other party. 
Asokan et al [AsShWa98] proposed an optimistic fair contract signing protocol 
between two parties, lets say A and B. The contract (N) to be signed is previously 
agreed to between the parties. The protocol comprises of four messages. Party A starts 
the protocol by, first, generating a random number ra and then computing the hash 
value of ra. Then, A sips both the hash value of ra and the contract N 
i. e. A's 
signature on fN and hash value of ra). Then, A sends the signed message 
(me]) to 
party B. On receiving me], B verifies it and if it is correct then B generates a random 
number rb and then computes the hash value of rb. Then, B signs both me] and the 
hash value of rb; and then sends them to A (B sends to A the message me2). On 
receiving me2, A verifies it and if it is correct then A sends to B the random number 
ra. On receiving ra, B sends to A the random number rb. By the end of executing the 
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protocol both A and B have a signed contract that includes (me], ra, me2, rb). If 
anything went wrong, the TTP can be contacted to resolve any disputes. 
Fair purchase 
The fair purchase exchange protocols [SchunterOO, AsScWa97, Ketchpel95, 
RaRaNaOO, RayRay0l, RayRayOOa, RaRaNa05, ZhMaMa06, DeChPh07, 
AlarajMunro07a, AlarajMunro07b, AlarajMunroO8a, AlarajMunroO8b] are concerned 
with the exchange of digital products and payments. That is, one party (such as the 
merchant) has the digital product and the other party (such as the customer) has the 
payment. The fair purchase exchange protocols ensure the fair exchange of a digital 
product and a payment between the two parties. 
The focus in this thesis is on fair exchange protocols that are for the exchange 
of payments and digital products (i. e. fair purchase exchange protocols) between 
customers and merchants. 
3.3. Types of Fair Exchange Protocols 
The fair exchange protocols (whether they are for certified email, certified 
delivery, contract signing or fair purchase) can be divided into two types according to 
the involvement of the TTP. The first type is the protocols that do not involve the TTP 
and the second type is the protocols that involve the TTP [RaRaNa05, SchunterOO, 
and Nenadic05]. The two types are discussed in the following sections. 
Protocols that do not involve a TTP 
This type of protocol implements the exchange of items between two parties 
directly without any involvement of any other parties. 
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The gradual exchange protocols [Blum, 83, EvGoLe85j are applicable to items 
that are easily decomposable into the same number of parts. This type of protocol is 
based on having a number of rounds to complete the exchange of items between the 
parties. In each round, each party sends a part of its item to the other party. The 
number of rounds equals the number of parts into which the items are divided. The 
sending of these parts will continue until each party receives the other party's item. 
Therefore, in each round each party sends a part of its item and also receives a part of 
the other party's item, see Figure 3. At any given moment the number of parts received 
by both parties is approximately the same [ShmMit99]. 
Party A Party 6 
M- Round 1 
Party A Party B 
Round n 
Figure 3: Gradual exchange protocols 
One problem of this type of protocol is that many rounds are required to 
complete the exchange. Therefore, when the number of rounds is too 
large, there will 
be a possible load on the communication channel to be used for the exchange of the 
two items between the two parties. The items to be exchanged between the two parties 
are assumed to have the same size [KrMaZh02]. Therefore, items of 
different sizes are 
not supported in this type of protocol. Another problem is that this type of protocol 
does not involve a TTP, it is impossible to ensure fairness without recourse to a TTP 
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to resolve disputes [PaVoGa03]. To explain the reason why this type of protocol will 
not ensure fairness, consider the following scenario. 
The first party (A) sends the first part of its item to the other party (B). Then B 
sends its first part to A. Then the exchange of parts will continue. If A sends its last 
part to B but B disappears before it sends its last part to A, then B will have the A's 
complete item but A will not have the complete item of B. So, there is a possibility 
that the fair exchange protocol will end in an unfair situation [PaVoGa03]. 
In the case of exchanging a payment for a digital product without any 
involvement of a TTP then it can be described as follows [SchunterOO]. A customer 
sends a small amount of payment to a merchant and in turn the merchant sends a small 
part of the digital product to the customer. This process continues until both the 
customer and the merchant receive the complete items from each other i. e. the 
customer receives the complete digital product and the merchant receives the 
complete payment. There is a possibility, however, that the merchant does not send 
the last part of the digital product after receiving the last part of the payment. Hence, 
the fairness is not ensured. 
This type of the exchange (i. e. exchanging small parts of payment for small 
parts of digital product) can be performed using the micro-payment systems 
[SoKoTa02] [SchunterOO]. 
Jakobsson [Jakobsson95] proposed a new approach for fair exchange of a 
payment and a digital product without any involvement of a TTP. The protocol is 
based on splitting the payment into two parts. The two parts must be combined to be 
used i. e. the first part can not be used without the second part; and also the second part 
can not be used without the first part. 
The protocol of Jakobsson [Jakobsson95] starts by the customer sending the 
first part of the payment to the merchant. On receiving the first part, the merchant 
sends the digital product to the customer. On receiving the digital product the 
customer sends the second part of the payment to the merchant. When the merchant 
receives the second part of the payment they combined it with the first part to 
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construct the whole payment. This protocol does not ensure fairness because the 
customer may disappear before sending the second part of the payment. That is, after 
the customer receives the digital product they do not send the second part of the 
payment. Therefore, the fairness is not ensured as the customer received the digital 
product but the merchant did not receive the second part of the payment to be able to 
construct the whole payment. 
3.3.2. Protocols that involve a TTP 
There are three kinds of this type of protocol according to how they use the 
TTP. These kinds are [KrMaZh02]: 
(1) Protocols that are based on inline TTP, 
(2) Protocols that are based on online TTP, and 
(3) Protocols that are based on offline TTP 
The three kinds of protocols will be discussed separately in the following sections. 
3.3.2.1. Protocols that are based on inline TTP 
The protocols based on inline TTP (such as [BuPf9O, RaRaNaOO, ZhGo96a]) 
use the TTP for delivering the exchanged items to the parties. That is, each party 
sends their item to the TTP, and then the TTP will verify the items and then will 
deliver them to the parties. For example, if the parties are a customer and a merchant; 
and the items to be exchanged are a payment (held by the customer) and a digital 
product (held by the merchant) then the way in which the protocol will work is as 
follows. The merchant sends the digital product to the TTP and the customer also 
sends the payment to the TTP. Then, the TTP verifies the received items then it sends 
the payment to the merchant and the digital product to the customer. Figure 4 shows a 
model of the fair exchange protocols that use inline TTP. 
The TTP is actively involved in the exchange process. The active involvement 
of the TTP in this kind of protocol ensures the fair exchange of items between the 
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parties. The inline TTP based protocols do not normally require direct communication 
between customer and merchant. 
Figure 4: Inline TTP based fair exchange model 
Although the protocols that use inline TTP ensure fairness for all parties as the 
TTP will deliver the items to all parties, they have some disadvantages. Firstly, 
protocols that use inline TTP require that the TTP be available during the execution of 
the protocol which will result in extra costs as the TTP is expensive to run [Micali03]. 
Secondly, this kind of protocols can lead to performance problems as the TTP may 
become a source of a communication bottleneck [LiNiJaOO, RaRaNa05, AsScWa97 
and ShmMit99]. This is because the exchange of items will be through the TTP. 
Thirdly, when the TTP crashes, the protocol will not be executed and the parties will 
not be able to receive the items that they want. Finally, the TTP will be the main target 
of attacks [LiNiJaOO], 
Burk and Pfitzmann Protocol 
Burk and Pfitzmann [BuPf9O] proposed a fair exchange protocol that is based 
on inline TTP. This protocol lets the parties who are willing to exchange their items 
(i. e. the parties are the customer and the merchant; and the items are the payment and 
the digital product) to agree on the items to be exchanged. Then, each party contacts 
the TTP to inform them of the agreement that they have with each other. The customer 
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then sends the payment to the TTP. On receiving the payment, the TTP checks 
whether it is according to the agreement that the parties agreed on or not. If it is 
according to the agreed price then the TTP sends to the merchant informing them of 
receiving the correct payment from the customer. The merchant then sends the digital 
product to the TTP. On receiving the digital product from the merchant, the TTP 
checks whether it is according to the agreement that the parties agreed on or not. If the 
digital product is according to the agreement then the TTP sends the payment to the 
merchant and the digital product to the customer. 
Ray Protocol 
Ray et al [RaRaNaOO] proposed a fair exchange protocol that is based on the 
theory of cross validation [RayZhang08]. The cross validation theory states that 
[RayZhangO8] "if a message is encrypted with the product key of two compatible keys 
and another message is encrypted with either of the two compatible keys and the two 
encrypted messages compare, then the two original un-encrypted messages must also 
compare if a message is encrypted with the product key of two compatible keys and 
another message is encrypted with either of the two compatible keys and the two 
encrypted messages compare, then the two original un-encrypted messages must also 
compare". Therefore, using the cross validation theory, the customer will be able to 
validate the encrypted digital product to be received from the merchant without 
decrypting it. 
The protocol is for the exchange of a digital product (held by a merchant) and 
a payment (held by a customer). The protocol is based on the use of inline TTP. The 
merchant advertises their digital products in the TTP's catalogue. The advertisement 
process is as follows. The merchant generates a key pair K1 (which is for encryption) 
and K1-1 (which is for decryption); and then sends the key pair and the digital product 
to the TTP. The TTP encrypts the digital product with K1 and then advertises it along 
with a description for the digital product in its catalogue (the same thing is done for 
each digital product that the merchant wants to exchange for a payment i. e. to sell). A 
customer who is interested in buying a digital product (i. e, exchanging a digital 
product for a payment) searches the TTP's catalogue and if they are interested in one 
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of the digital products then they download an encrypted digital product from the TTP. 
The exchange of the payment and the digital product between the customer and the 
merchant will then take place. 
The exchange phase of the protocol consists of six messages to be exchanged 
between the customer, the merchant, and the TTP. The exchange phase starts by the 
customer sending the first message to the merchant which includes the purchase order. 
On receiving the first message from the customer, the merchant validates it and if 
satisfied then the merchant does the following. The merchant creates another key pair 
K2 and K2-1. This key pair is mathematically related to the first pair (that is sent to the 
TTP). Then, the merchant sends the second message to the TTP. The second message 
includes the merchant's signature on the purchase order, and K2-1. In addition, the 
merchant sends the third message to the customer. The third message includes the 
encrypted digital product and the merchant's signature on the encrypted digital 
product. On receiving the third message, the customer compares the encrypted digital 
product that was received in the third message with the encrypted digital product that 
was downloaded from the TTP. If the two are compared then the customer sends the 
fourth message to the TTP. The fourth message includes the purchase order, the 
customer's signature on the encrypted digital product, and a signed payment. On 
receiving the fourth message, the TTP compares the hash value of the purchase order 
received from the customer (in the fourth message) with the hash value of the 
purchase order received from the merchant (in the second message). If they are 
compared then the TTP contacts the customer's banks for validating the payment. If 
the payment is valid, then the TTP sends to customer in the fifth message the 
decryption key for the encrypted digital product. Additionally, the TTP sends to the 
merchant the payment in the sixth message. If there are any disputes then the TTP is 
contacted. 
As can be seen in this protocol [RaRaNaOO], although the merchant sends the 
encrypted digital product to the customer in message three (i. e. there is a direct 
communication between the customer and the merchant), the inline TTP is used for 
delivering the items to the parties. That is, the inline TTP is used to deliver (1) the 
decryption key of the encrypted digital product to the customer (the encrypted digital 
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product was received from the merchant by the customer in message three), and (2) 
the payment to the merchant. 
3.3.2.2. Protocols that are based on online TTP 
The protocols that are based on online TTP (such as [DeChPh07, ZhMaMa06, 
ZhGo96b, AbGlHoPi02, and ZhSh96]) reduce the use of the TTP. In this kind of 
protocol, the TTP will be used during the protocol run but its use is not for delivering 
the parties' items. Rather, its use can be for validating an item, generating and/or 
storing evidence of a transaction [Nenadic05]. 
The following example illustrates the use of online TTP in the fair exchange 
protocols. If the items to be exchanged are a payment and a digital product between a 
customer and a merchant and the customer is the one who starts the exchange then 
after the merchant receives the payment from the customer then the merchant will 
validate it with the TTP (a bank for example) before they send the digital product to 
the customer. Therefore, the TTP must be online for the exchange to be completed. 
The TTP should be contacted if there is any dispute. Figure 5 shows a model of a fair 
exchange protocol that is based on online TTP. 
Although this kind of protocol reduces the involvement of the TTP, it requires 
the existence of the TTP during the exchange of items. This is seen as a disadvantage 
because the TTP may become a source of a communication bottleneck. Additionally, 
the TTP might be the main target of attacks. 
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Figure 5: Online TTP based fair exchange model 
Zhans! -O Protocol 
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Zhang et al [ZhMaMa06] proposed a fair exchange protocol that involves 
online TTP. The proposed protocol is for the exchange of a payment and a product 
which might be a physical product. Therefore, the payment is sent online (i. e. via the 
protocol messages) from the customer to the merchant whereas the product is 
delivered to the customer using a delivery agent i. e. the delivery of the product is not 
using electronic means. The protocol is based on the theory of cross validation 
[RayZhang08]. 
The customer starts the protocol by requesting a product from the merchant. 
Then, the merchant sends the invoice to the customer. If the customer is satisfied with 
the invoice then they, first, send an encrypted payment to the merchant and, second, 
send the encrypted payment to the TTP (the bank). The merchant is assumed to be 
able to download the encrypted payment (that was sent by the customer to the TTP) 
from the TTP (the bank). The merchant then compares the two encrypted payments 
(i. e. the one received from the customer and the one downloaded from the TTP). If 
they are compared then the merchant is sure that the encrypted payment is correct. 
After verifying the encrypted payment, the merchant sends the product to the delivery 
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agent. Then the customer collects the product from the delivery agent. When the 
customer finds that the product is the same as they expected, they send the decryption 
key to the merchant who will then decrypt the encrypted payment. 
Devane et al Protocol 
Devane et al [DeChPh07] (will be called hereafter Devane protocol) proposed 
a fair exchange protocol for the purchase of digital products over the Internet. The 
protocol ensures fair exchange of a digital product for a payment between a merchant 
and a customer, However, the protocol involves an online TTP which is a bank in 
which both a customer and a merchant have accounts. The exchange phase of 
Devane's protocol comprises of seven messages to be exchanged between customer, 
merchant, and the bank. 
The customer initiates the protocol by sending the first message that includes a 
signed purchase request by the customer. On receiving the first message, the merchant 
verifies it and if satisfied sends the second message to the customer. The second 
message includes a signed invoice in addition to the encrypted digital product. On 
receiving the second message, the customer verifies it and checks the signed invoice. 
If the customer is satisfied then they send the third message to the merchant. The third 
message includes a signed payment. On receiving the third message, the merchant 
verifies it and if satisfied then they send the fourth message to the bank. The fourth 
message includes the decryption key for the digital product and the message three that 
was received from the customer and singed by the merchant (i. e. the merchant signs 
the signed payment by the customer and sends it to the bank). On receiving the fourth 
message, the bank verifies it. If message four is correctly verified then the bank sends 
the fifth message to the merchant. The fifth message includes the bank's signature on 
the signed payment and the decryption key. On receiving the fifth message, the 
merchant forwards it to the customer. On receiving the sixth message, the customer 
gets the decryption key and decrypts the encrypted digital product that was received in 
message number two. If the customer found that the decrypted digital product is the 
one they specified in message one then the customer sends message seven to the bank. 
Message seven includes customer's acknowledgement about the digital product. On 
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receiving the seventh message, the bank transfers the payment from the customer's 
account to the merchant's account. 
3.3.2.3. Protocols that are based on offline TTP 
The protocols that are based on offline TTP (such as [AsSeWa97, RaRaNa05, 
RayRayOOa, ZhShMeAs06, NeZhBa04, NeZhChGo05, AsShWa98, KrMaOl]) allow 
the parties to directly exchange their items without any involvement of the TTP unless 
one party misbehaves. This kind of protocols is also called in the literature "Optimistic 
fair exchange protocols" [EzhShr05, RaRaNa05, AsScWa97, RayRay02, RayRayOOa, 
Micali03, and SchunterOO]. This kind of protocols will be referred hereafter as 
optimistic fair exchange protocols. 
The following example illustrates how the optimistic fair exchange protocols 
work. If the items to be exchanged are a payment and a digital product between a 
customer and a merchant then the protocol will work as follows. The two parties 
directly exchange the payment and the digital product; and if one party misbehaves 
the TTP will be invoked to resolve the disputes. Figure 6 shows a model of a fair 
exchange protocol that is based on offline TTP (optimistic fair exchange protocols). 
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Figure 6: Offline TTP based fair exchange model 
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The optimistic fair exchange protocol reduces the problems of using inline 
TTP and online TTP. This is because optimistic fair exchange protocols use the TTP 
very rarely and do not involve it in every exchange. Therefore, the problem of having 
the TTP as a source of a communication bottleneck that exists in the inline and online 
TTP based protocols is reduced. This is because the optimistic fair exchange protocols 
reduce the use of the TTP and let the parties exchange their items directly. Another 
advantage is that the problem of having the TTP as a single point of failure is reduced 
as the parties will not need the TTP unless something goes wrong. Additionally, as the 
TTP will not be actively involved the cost of running the TTP will be reduced. 
Ray et al Protocol 
Ray et al [RaRaNa05] proposed an optimistic fair exchange protocol. The 
protocol is based on the idea of the theory of cross validation [RayZhang08]. 
Some steps take place before the protocol starts. A merchant (M) needs to 
register with TTP. The TTP generates the key pair Kmj and Kmi-1. The TTP then 
provides M with Kmi and keeps Kmi-1 with itself. A customer (C) needs to have an 
account in a bank. The bank generates the key pairs Kci and Kci-1. The bank then 
provides C with Kcj and keeps Kci-1 with itself. The merchant needs to send the 
digital product, its description and its price to the TTP. The TTP encrypts the digital 
product using the key Kmi and then advertises it on its website i. e. the TTP's website. 
The customer visits the website and downloads the encrypted digital product from the 
TTP to be used for validating the digital product that they will receive from the 
merchant. If the customer is interested in the digital product then they can contact t he 
merchant and starts the protocol as follows. 
The actual interaction between the customer and the merchant in the Ray et al 
protocol [RaRaNa05] consists of four messages. The four messages can be 
summarised as follows. 
The customer (C) sends to the merchant (M) the first message that includes (1) 
the purchase order and (2) the payment that is encrypted with the product key of Kci x 
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Kc2. On receiving the first message, M verifies it and if it is correct then M sends the 
second message to C which includes the digital product that is encrypted with the 
product key of Kmi x Km2. On receiving the second message, C compares the 
encrypted digital product that was received from the TTP with the encrypted digital 
product that is included in the second message. If the two are compared then C can be 
sure that the un-encrypted digital products will be compared as well (in here the cross 
validation theory is applied). Therefore, if the two encrypted digital products are 
compared and C is still interested in the exchange then C sends the third message to M 
which includes the decryption key for the encrypted payment. Finally, M sends the 
fourth message to C which includes the decryption key of the encrypted digital 
product. If there is any dispute, C can contact the TTP. 
As can be seen in this protocol, the TTP will have a copy of all digital products 
that M wants to sell. Therefore, this will result in extra storage in the TTP side as well 
as extra security assurance. Another problem with this protocol is that the customer 
needs to download the digital product twice (one Erom the TTP before the exchange 
and then from the merchant). Therefore, the twice download of the digital product will 
be a communication overhead. 
Asokan Protocol 
Asokan et al [AsScWa97] proposed an optimistic fair exchange protocol i. e. 
the TTP will only be involved in the case of disputes. If the parties interested in the 
exchange want to exchange a payment and a digital product, the protocol comprises of 
four messages which can be explained as follows. 
A merchant (M) and a customer (C) promise each other to exchange their 
items (i. e. the payment and the digital product). The agreement between C and M is 
represented in messages 1 and 2. That is, C sends to M the amount of payment that 
they are willing to pay; and then M will send to C the description of the digital 
product. Then, C sends the payment to M in message 3. On receiving message 3, M 
sends the digital product to C in message 4. 
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If C found that the digital product is not the same as described in the 
agreement, then C contacts the TTP. The TTP verifies C's request, if it is valid then 
the TTP cancels the payment. If the TTP could not cancel the payment then the TTP 
can provide affidavit proof to be used in the court to resolve the disputes. 
This protocol is not the best solution for fairly exchanging digital product and 
payment because there is a possibility that the TTP could not cancel the payment in 
case of dispute which will result in not resolving disputes automatically. Imagining 
that the customer and the merchant are located in different parts of the world and the 
TTP can not resolve the dispute automatically; then, if something goes wrong i. e. the 
digital product was not the same as expected, then the customer needs to travel to the 
country of the merchant in order to go to court. Therefore, the protocol used for fair 
exchange should ensure fairness for all parties and in the case of dispute, it should 
provide online and automated dispute resolution as the parties might be located in 
different parts of the world. 
One difference between Asokan et al's protocol [AsScWa97] and Ray et al 
protocol [RaRaNa05] is that Ray et al protocol allows each party to verify the 
correctness of the item that they are going to receive before they receive it; whereas in 
Asokan et al's protocol [AsScWa97], parties are able to validate the item only after 
receiving it. Moreover, Ray et al's protocol provides automated dispute resolution, 
while there is a possibility in Asokan et al's protocol that the TTP provides proof for 
the party who has dispute which can be used in a court of law after the protocol 
finishes. 
ZhanLy Protocol 
Zhang et al [ZhShMeAs06] (will be called hereafter Zhang protocol) proposed 
an optimistic fair exchange protocol. Their protocol is for exchanging two valuable 
documents (the two documents can be a payment and a digital product) between two 
parties; party A and party B (the two parties can be a customer and a merchant). 
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The exchange of items in Zhang's protocol comprises of four messages to be 
exchanged between party A and party B. Party A starts the exchange by sending the 
first message to party B. The first message includes the encrypted document of Party 
A and the encrypted key that decrypts the decrypted document. On receiving the first 
message, party B verifies it and if satisfied then they send the second message to party 
A. The second message includes the encrypted document of party B and the encrypted 
key that decrypts it. On receiving the second message, party A verifies it and if 
satisfied then they send the decryption key to party B in the third message. When 
party B receives the decryption key, they use it to decrypt the encrypted document that 
was received in the first message. Then party B sends to party A the fourth message 
which includes the decryption key. Finally, when party A receives the decryption key, 
they use it to decrypt the encrypted document that was received in the second 
message. If there is any dispute, the TTP will be contacted to resolve it. 
3.4. Dispute resolution 
It is likely to have disputes when buying and selling products. This is because 
some customers may find that the product they have bought from a merchant is not the 
same as they wanted or the product has some problems. In the case of online purchase 
the probability of having disputes is high as a customer or a merchant might not be 
trustworthy and also because it is not possible for a customer to feel or try the product 
that they are going to pay for. 
Disputes can be resolved formally in a court. There are however some 
alternatives for resolving disputes without going to a court of law. They are called 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). Arbitration and mediation are examples of 
ADR. 
In e-commerce the need to resolve disputes online is vital because customers 
and merchants might be located in different parts of the world and come under 
different legal systems. When the dispute resolution is done online, it is called Online 
Dispute Resolution (ODR). Many techniques are available for ODR [Fl6mle02], 
[AlfuraihSnow05] and [GalKov06]: 
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Arbitrafion 
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Arbitration means having a neutral third party who collects information from 
the two parties who have a dispute. Then the third party makes a decision that is 
intended to be binding. 
Evaluation 
Evaluation is the same as arbitration but the decision made by the neutral third 
party is a recommendation rather than binding. 
Mediation 
Mediation means to have a third party who helps the two parties to reach an 
agreement. So, it is not the same as arbitration that lets the third party make the 
decision. 
Automated negotiation 
Automated negotiation is used to resolve disputes that are related to monetary 
amounts. It is based on having blind bids, in which the parties enter their suggestions 
to resolve the dispute. Each party does not know what the other party has offered. 
Finally, a computer program proposes a resolution when the offers of the parties are 
sufficiently close. 
Mock Trial 
Mock Trial is based on having a jury of peers who volunteer for making a 
decision on a case of dispute using web-based platform. The decision made by the 
jury is not binding. 
Complaint Assistance 
A Complaint Assistance is a tool that helps the person who writes a dispute. 
Some tools have interactive forms that the user needs to complete. This kind of tools 
provides advice, similar cases that have been assisted by the tool. 
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This technique allows credit card issuers to act as a third party between a 
customer and a merchant. So, the credit card issuer will study the dispute and then if 
the customer dispute is accepted, it will give the customer's money back. 
The above techniques are done online but they are not fully automated i. e. they 
require human involvement. 
There are two types of fair exchange protocols that include dispute resolution 
[RaRaNa05]. The first type is the protocols that include dispute resolution during the 
execution of the protocol, and the second type is the protocols that do not include 
dispute resolution steps during the execution of the protocol. 
For protocols that include dispute resolution during the execution of the 
protocol, the protocol includes a mechanism that ensures a resolution for any dispute. 
In these protocols a TTP is normally the one who receive the dispute requests and 
resolve them in a fair manner. Examples of this type of protocols include [RayRayOOa, 
NeZhBa04, NeZhChGo05, ZhMaMa06, RaRaNa05, ZhShMeAs06, DeChPh07, and 
RaRaNaOO], 
The protocols that do not include dispute resolution during the execution of the 
protocol are based on storing evidences to be used in the case of a dispute. The 
evidence is used after the execution of the fair exchange. The resolution might be 
done using the ODR techniques or in a court of law. The supplied evidences will help 
resolving disputes. Examples of this type are [AsScWa97, CoTySi95]. 
To use the ODR techniques in the fair exchange protocols, the protocol should 
provide a way of storing evidence that can be used in one of the ODR techniques in 
order to resolve disputes. However, this way of resolving disputes (using these 
techniques) is called after the fact solution [RaRaNa05] in which the involved parties 
might disappear. Therefore, the dispute resolution should be part of the fair exchange 
protocol and not after its execution. To do so, there should be a way in which the 
disputes can be resolved automatically before the end of protocol execution and that is 
through the use of the TTP. 
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It is clear that the protocols that include dispute resolution during the execution 
of the protocol are better than the protocols that do not. This is because normally the 
parties involved in the exchange of items are located in different parts of the world. 
So, it will be difficult to go to a court of law in the other party's country. Additionally, 
one party may disappear before the completion of the exchange. Therefore, the nature 
of e-commerce makes it difficult to resolve disputes after the execution of the fair 
exchange protocol. Hence, the first type is more suitable for e-commerce. 
There should be a way in which the possibility of having disputes should be 
reduced in order to reduce the need for dispute resolution in the first place. That is, 
before a customer and a merchant exchange their items, they should be sure that they 
are going to receive what they want from each other. By reducing the possibility of 
having disputes, the number of messages needed to resolve disputes will be reduced as 
well. As a result, the load on the communication channel between the customer and 
the TTP and between the merchant and the TTP will be reduced. 
3.5. Summary 
Fair exchange protocols have been discussed in this chapter. The protocol used 
by customer and merchant to exchange their items must ensure fairness for both 
parties. Fairness in the context of the fair exchange protocols between two parties is 
defined as at the end of the protocol execution, each party participating in the 
exchange should have the item of the other party or none do. 
Many fair exchange protocols have been discussed. They are categorised into 
two types, the ones that do not use a TTP and the ones that use a TTP. The former let 
the parties exchange their items part by part until the whole items are exchanged. The 
latter is divided into three kinds. The first kind is the one that uses the TTP for 
delivering the items to the parties i. e. inline TTP based fair exchange protocols. The 
second kind is the one that uses online TTP where the load on the TTP is reduced. The 
third kind is the one that uses offline TTP (optimistic fair exchange protocols). In the 
optimistic fair exchange protocols the TTP is only used if something goes wrong 
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during the execution of the protocol. Examples of these protocols are summarised in 
Table 1. 
Dispute resolution has been covered and some of its techniques were 
presented. The resolution of dispute has also been discussed in the context of fair 
exchange protocols. It has been shown that the dispute resolution should be part of the 
fair exchange protocol to protect a party if the other party misbehaves. Therefore, 
there is a need to have a fair exchange protocol that minimises disputes and also 
incorporates automated dispute resolution. 
As can be seen in Table 1, the load on the TTP is low in the protocols that are 
based on offline TTP. This is because the TTP will only be contacted in the case of 
disputes. Hence, the efficiency in this type of protocol is high. In the protocols based 
on inline TTP, the load on the TTP is very high because the TTP will receive the 
parties' items, validate them, and if they are correct then TTP will send them to the 
parties. Therefore, the TTP does everything even if the parties are honest. Hence, the 
efficiency in the protocols that are based inline TTP is low. The load on the TTP in the 
protocols that are based on online TTP is high as the TTP will be used during the 
exchange of items. Hence, the efficiency of this type of protocols is medium. The 
number of messages needed for the exchange of items in the presented fair exchange 
protocols is at least four messages. 
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Protocol Items to Use TTP Load Efficiency # Typeof 
be TTP Type on messages fairness 
exchanged TTP (exchange 
[NeZhBa04] e-mail and Yes Offline Low High 4 Strong 
receipt 
[NeZhChGo05] Digital Yes Offline Low High 4 Strong 
product 
and rec 
[AsShWa98] Signatures Yes Offline Low High 4 Strong 
on a 
contract 
[AsScWa97] Payment Yes Offline Low High 4 Weak 
and digital or 
product Strong 
[Jakobsson95] Payment No N/A N/A High Not Fairness 
and digital specified is not 
product ensured 
[BuPf9O] Payment Yes Inline Very Low 7 Strong 
and digital high 
product 
[ZhMaMa06] Payment Yes Online High Medium 7+ Strong 
and a physical 
product delivery 
(digital or and 
h p 1) collection 
[RaRaNa05] Payment Yes Offline Low High 4 Strong 
and digital 
product 
[ZhShMeAs06] Two Yes Offline Low High 4 Strong 
digital 
documents 
[DeChPh07] Payment Yes Online High Medium 7 Strong 
and digital 
product 
[RaRaNa001 Payment Yes Inline Very Low 6 Strong 
and digital high 
1 product I I I I I I 
Table 1: Comparison of fair exchange protocols 
The best type of fair exchange protocols is the one that is based on offline TTP 
(which is also called optimistic fair exchange protocols) because the load on the TTP 
is low and hence its efficiency is high. However, the way in which the current 
optimistic fair exchange protocols work is to let the parties exchange their encrypted 
items and if they are satisfied then they exchange the decryption keys to decrypt the 
encrypted items. So, using this way the number of messages needed will be at least 
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four messages. Therefore, a technique is needed to reduce the number of messages. 
This technique is originated in this thesis. 
Chapter 4: Concepts and Assumptions 
Chapter Four 
4. Concepts and Assumptions 
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In this chapter, some of the cryptographic concepts will be discussed and the 
assumptions of the proposed protocols will be presented. 
4.2. Cryptographic concepts 
The protocols in this thesis rely on cryptography as the underlying security 
model. This thesis is not about cryptography but this section has been included to 
show some of the background required. 
4.2.1. Symmetric-key Cryptography 
The symmetric-key cryptography has different names such as secret-key 
cryptography and conventional cryptography [Stallings99]. The idea of the 
symmetric-key cryptography is to use one key that is used by a sender and a receiver 
of a message to do the encryption and the decryptions. That is, the sender and the 
receiver will agree on a symmetric-key to be used by both of them. The sender 
encrypts a message using the agreed symmetric-key and then sends the encrypted 
message to the receiver. On receiving the encrypted message, the receiver decrypts it 
using the same key used to encrypt the message i. e. the symmetric-key. 
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4.2.2. Public-key Cryptography 
The public-key cryptography is sometimes referred to as asymmetric-key 
cryptography, The idea of the public-key cryptography [Schneier96] is based on 
having two keys that are mathematically related to each other. One of the two keys is 
called a public key and the other is called a private key. The public key can be known 
to anyone whereas the private key is only known to the party who the key belongs to. 
When using public-key cryptography, the sender first gets the public key of the 
receiver (the public keys of parties are publicly available) then second encrypts the 
message using this public key and then finally sends the encrypted message to the 
receiver. On receiving the encrypted message, the receiver uses their private key to 
decrypt the encrypted message. Many algorithms are available for public-key 
cryptography but only the RSA will be discussed as it is used in this thesis. 
4.2.2.1. RSA 
RSA [RiShAd78] refers to its inventors Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and 
Leonard Adleman. RSA is an algorithm for public-key cryptography. Each party has 
their own public and private RSA keys. The public key is known to anyone whereas 
the private key is known only to the party who owns it. The generation of RSA public 
and private keys [Stallings99] is as follows, a party: 
selects two large random prime numbers p and q 
calculates n=pq 
calculates 9(n) (p-1) * (q-1) 
selects an integer e that satisfies: 1<e< 9(n) and e is relatively prime to 9(n) 
- calculate d= e-I mod T(n) 
- the RSA public key pk = (e, n) 
the RSA private key sk = (dn) 
The encryption using RSA is performed as follows [RiShAd78]. The message 
M to be encrypted using RSA has to be less than n i. e. (M < n). If the size of M is 
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greater than n then M is divided in blocks and each block is less than n. Therefore, for 
each block the following is computed: 
me (mod n) 
With regard to the decryption using RSA, to decrypt the encrypted message C, 
the following is computed [RiShAd78]: 
M= Cd (mod n) 
4.2.3. Hash Function 
The hash function is a function that takes an input of any length and it returns a 
fixed length output [Schneier96]. The output of the hash function is called the hash 
value. The hash function is called one-way hash function if it computationally 
infeasible to get the original input from the hash value [Schneier96]. That is, when the 
hash value, say H, is computed for a message M, then it is not possible to get M from 
the hash value H. The hash function is called strong-collision-resi stance hash function 
[Schneier96] if it is computationally infeasible to have the same hash values for 
different messages. That is, when we have two different messages MI and M2 and the 
hash values for the two messages are HI and H2, respectively, then HJ#H2. 
4.2.4. Digital signature 
Digital signature is a simulation of the handwritten signature. The digital 
signature is a development of the public-key cryptography [Stallings99]. That is, for 
generating a digital signature a private key is needed whereas for verifying the 
signature the public key is needed. As stated in the public-key cryptography section, 
each party has a private key and a public key that are mathematically related to each 
other. To encrypt a message a sender uses the public key of the receiving party 
whereas, for the receiver of the encrypted message, the private key is used to decrypt 
the message. On the other hand, for digital signature, the sender uses their private key 
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to digitally sign the message and sends it to the receiver. On receiving the message, 
the receiver uses the public key of the sender to verify that the message is indeed 
signed by the sender; this is because the private key is only kept by its owner whereas 
the public key is available to anyone. Many algorithms of digital signature are 
available but only RSA signature will be presented because it is used in this thesis. 
4.2.4.1. RSA Signature 
The RSA public key, pk = (e, n), and the private key, sk = (dn), are used in 
RSA signature. To generate the RSA signature [RiShAd78], the hash value of a 
message to be signed is computed then the hash value is encrypted using the private 
key (sk) of the signer. Then the message is sent to a receiver along with the signature. 
That is, the signature generation by the sender for a message M is as follows: 
sig M= (h(M)) 
d 
(mod n) 
To verify the signature [RiShAd78]: on receiving the message and the 
signature, the receiver uses the public key, pk, of the signer to decrypt the singed hash 
value. Then the receiver computes the hash value ofthe message. The two hash values 
(the one computed by the receiver and the one decrypted using the public key of the 
signer) are compared. If they are compared then the signature is verified correctly. 
The operation of decrypting the signature is as follows, H refers to the hash value of 
the signed message: 
(Sg(M))e (mod n) 
4.3. Assumptions 
The following are the assumptions used in all the proposed protocols: 
* TTP is trusted by all parties and it will not collude with any other party 
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9 The work in this thesis is not concern about how to match the description of D 
with the one in D-Cert; rather it assumes that a function with the CA will do it 
* All parties use the same algorithms for performing encryption, decryption, 
signing, and computing the hash value 
9 Each party x (x C c, M, t, ca, cb) has an RSA key pair (public pkx and private 
skx). The pkx is certified by a recognised certificate authority and is known to 
all other parties 
9 The communication channels to be used in the pre-exchange phase of all the 
proposed protocols are secure 
9 The communication channel between TTP and C is resilient as is also the 
communication channel between TTP and M. A resilient channel means that 
all sent messages will be received by their intended recipients [RaRaNa05] 
9 The payment used in the protocols is in the form of a payment order that is 
issued and signed by a customer's bank and it specifies the amount of payment 
to be paid, the payee and the payer 
9 Double spending of the same payment is assumed to be detected and therefore 
will not occur 
9C and M have already negotiated the items to be exchanged (i. e. the digital 
product and the amount of the payment) before the protocol starts. Therefore, 
the proposed protocols are neither negotiation systems nor payment systems. 
They concern the actual exchange of a payment for a digital product between 
C and M 
*C and M will agree on the TTP to be used in both the pre-exchange phase and 
for dispute resolution before they start the protocol 
9 Parties involved in the protocols will behave rationally 
9 All messages included in the proposed protocols include Nonce and a 
transaction ID to prevent replay attacks and also to ensure the refreshment of 
all messages. But the Nonce and the transaction ID are omitted for simplicity 
* All messages include a time of a transaction to be used for disputes resolution 
where applicable. But the time is omitted for simPlicity 
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This chapter has covered the cryptographic concepts that will be used in this 
thesis. Additionally, the assumptions have been presented. 
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Chapter Five 
5. Enforcing Customer Honesty Protocol 
5.1 Introduction 
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This chapter starts by presenting the technique that is originated in this thesis. 
Then, it presents the Enforcing Customer Honesty (ECH) protocol that is based on the 
technique proposed in this thesis. In this chapter the ECH protocol will be discussed 
and analysed. 
The approach proposed in this thesis can be described as follows. There is a 
trustworthy party (called the first party) who is encouraged to be honest and the other 
party (called the second party) is enforced to be honest. Figure 7 shows a general 
diagram for the proposed approach. The approach consists of only three messages to 
be exchanged between the two parties. The trustworthy party will start the exchange 
by sending the first message (E-M I). When the second party (the one who is enforced 
to be honest) receives the first message, they test the trustworthiness of the first party 
by checking all the items included in the first message (i. e. E-Ml). The items in E-MI 
are encrypted but the second party will be able to check whether they are correct or 
not using certificates. If the second party finds that the first party is indeed trustworthy 
(i. e. all items in E-Ml are correct) then they send the second message (E-M2) to the 
first party. The items included in E-M2 are encrypted using encryption keys that are 
known to the first party. Therefore, on receiving E-M2 the first party will be able to 
decrypt E-M2 (hence the second party is enforced to be honest by sending correct E- 
M2). After correctly decrypting the second party's items, the first party will send the 
third message (E-M3) to the second party. The third message includes the decryption 
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key to be used to decrypt the encrypted items received in the first message (E-MI). If 
anything went wrong, the TTP will be involved to resolve disputes. 
Using this approach the number of messages needed to exchange the items of 
the two parties are only three messages. 
This approach is applied to have a trustworthy merchant and then enforce the 
customer to be honest which result in the ECH protocol. Then, the approach is applied 
to have a trustworthy customer and then enforce the merchant to be honest which 
result in the EMH protocol. 
jWsbygrthy PaTtv 
The Patn who is etff-proed 
to be Honest 
[E-fvtll I I 
Verify E-Ml 
Verify E-M2 
Verify E-M3 
Figure 7: The proposed approach 
5.2 ECH Protocol Description 
5.2.1 Description 
The Enforcing Customer Honesty (ECH) protocol is an optimistic fair 
exchange protocol for exchanging a digital product (D) for a payment. The basic idea 
of the ECH protocol is to have one trustworthy party (Merchant -M) and enforce the 
other party (Customer -C) to be honest. 
The trustworthiness of M is governed by two factors, the digital product 
certificate (D-Cert) issued by the Certificate Authority (CA) and the shared public 
key 
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certi icate (C. mt) issued by the TTP. Therefore, the digital product that will be sent by 
M is certified by the CA; and the public key to be used by M to encrypt the key that 
encrypts the digital product is certified by the TTP. 
The enforcement of C to be honest is governed by letting C encrypt the 
payment using a key that is sent to C by M, This is to let M be able to decrypt the 
payment without the help of C. Hence, C will send a correct encrypted payment 
because M will be able to decrypt it as soon as they receive it, 
The ECH protocol is like M saying to C, this is the encrypted digital product; 
and I am trustworthy as these certificates (D-Cert and C. mt) show BUT be honest with 
me by sending the correct payment to be able to receive the decryption key for the 
digital product. By this means M is honest by having the certificates from the CA and 
the TTP and also C is enforced to be honest. 
The ECH protocol consists of two phases. The pre-exchange phase and the 
exchange phase. In the pre-exchange phase, the merchant gets the digital product and 
the certificates (from trusted authorities) to be used in the exchange phase. In the 
exchange phase, the customer and the merchant exchange their items. The items of 
parties are sent using messages. It is not necessarily that the exchange phase comes 
immediately after the pre-exchange phase. 
5.2.2 Pre-exchange Phase 
IIE M?, Mt)dct 
M-Ml a: Requerzi shar 
[F PE-Mlb: C, mt 
PE4vj2a- C, rnt + ý-, m + Dlgýtal Product 10 
PEAM: D+ D-Cert 
Figure 8: ECH Pre-exchange Phase 
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In the pre-exchange phase (Figure 8), M needs to get the certificate C. mt of the 
shared public key (pkmt) from the TTP to be used to encrypt the key that is used to 
encrypt D. To get the shared public key certificate, M needs to request it from the TTP 
then the TTP will issue it (that is in messages PE-Mla and PE-MIb of Figure 8). M 
also needs to get the digital product (D) and its certificate D-Cert from the CA (that is 
in messages PE-M2a and PE-M2b of Figure 8), (the CA can be thought of as the 
producer of the digital product). 
In this protocol, there is a shared public key between M and the TTP. The keys 
of the parties are as follows: 
9 Each party x (x C M, C, TTP and CA) has its own RSA public (pkx) and 
private (skx) keys. 
" The CA's public key is denoted as pkca = (eca, nca) and its 
corresponding private key is denoted as skca = (dca, nca) 
" The TTP's public key is denoted as pkt = (et, nt) and its corresponding 
private key is denoted as skt = (dt, nt) 
o M's public key is denoted as pkm = (em, nm) and its corresponding 
private key is denoted as skm = (dm, nm) 
o C's public key is denoted as pkc = (ec, nc) and its corresponding 
private key is denoted as skc = (dc, nc) 
The shared RSA public key between M and TTP is denoted as pkmt = (emt, 
nmt) and its corresponding private key is denoted as skmt = (dmt, nmt) 
5.2.3 The Exchange Phase 
It is assumed that the exchange phase will take place after C finds the required 
digital product (D) with M. It is also assumed that this phase will take place after C 
and M agree on the digital product and negotiated the price. Hence this phase is about 
the actual exchange of payment and digital product D. 
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There are only three messages to be exchanged between M and C in the 
exchange phase (Figure 9). These three messages are as follows: 
Nlemhart 
[E-tvill, enckyn(D) + D-Cen + C. rrn 4 enc. pkmt(km) + enc. pkr-(kc) . 4- Sig. m(D) I 
Ve rify E-M 1 [E-M2)- encýkc(P) + Sig. c(P) 
- f> r1 
Verify E-M2 
[E-M31, encpkc(skmt) 
II 
Verif, y E-M3 
Figure 9: ECH Exchange Phase 
[E-Mll M --4 C: enc. km(D) + D-Cert + Cmt + enc. pkmt(km) + enc. pkc(kc) 
Sig. m (D) 
The first message is sent to C by M and contains the following: 
* enc. km(D): the digital product D that is encrypted with the key km (note that 
km is generated by M) 
D-Cert: the digital product certificate that is issued by the CA 
Cmt: the shared public key certificate that is issued by the TTP 
9 enc. pkmt(km): the key km (that is used to encrypt D) is encrypted using the 
shared public key pkmt (pkmt is certified in C. mt) 
0 enc. pkc(kc): a key kc that will be used by C to encrypt the payment. kc 
is 
encrypted using the public key of C (pkc). The reason for encrypting kc using 
pkc is to prevent any other party from gaining kc as it will be used to encrypt 
the payment by C (note that kc is generated by M) 
Sig. m(D): M's signature on D. This signature can serve as non-repudiation of 
origin which allows C to be sure that D is sent by A M's signature on D is the 
encryption of the hash value of D using M's private key skm 
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On receiving message E-Ml from M, C checks the correctness of enc. km(D), 
enc. pkmt(km), Sig. m(D), D-Cert and C. mt. The correctness of D-Cert can be checked 
by verifying CA's signature on D-Cert and the correctness of Cmt can be checked by 
verifying TTP's signature on Cmt. 
To check the correctness of D, C needs to check two things; the digital product 
D itself and the encrypted D with km i. e. enc. km(D). Firstly, to check the correctness 
of D, C needs to get the hash value of D (calculated as HD) by decrypting Sig. m(D) 
contained in message E-M] using M's public key pkm (the public keys of all parties 
are publicly available) and then compare it with hash value of D (hD) contained in D- 
Cert i. e. to check the following: 
hD 
If they are the same then C can be sure that M signed the correct D. 
Secondly, to check the correctness of the encrypted D i. e. enc. km(D), C 
computes the hash value of enc. km(D) (calculated as HeD) and then compare it with 
the hash value of encrypted D with km i. e. heD which is contained in D-Cert (note that 
it is assumed that C will use the same hash algorithm used by the CA to compute the 
hash value) i. e. to check the following: 
HeD ?= heD 
If they are the same then C can be sure that M encrypted D using km and not 
another key. 
C also needs to check the correctness of km which is used to encrypt D. To do 
so, C computes the hash value of enc. pkmt(km) (calculated as HeKm) and then 
compares it with heKm that is included in D-Cert, so C will check the flowing: 
HeKm ?= heKm 
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If they compare then C can be sure that the encrypted key is km and not 
another key. The point here is to make sure that M is honest by sending the key used 
to encrypt D. 
If all comparisons are correct then, at this point, C will have the following fact. 
The encrypted D is correct (i. e. it is the one certified in D-Cert) and it is indeed 
encrypted with km. In addition, the key encrypted using the shared public key pkmt is 
indeed km and not another key. The shared public key pkmt used to encrypt Ian is 
certified by the TTP. Therefore, once C has got the private key of the shared public 
key then C will be able to get D (by first decrypting enc. pkmt(km) to get km and then 
decrypting enc. km(D) using km). 
At this point C must be sure that the encrypted D matches their requirements, 
otherwise they will be at risk if they send message E-M2 to M as M already has the 
decryption key for the payment. 
Now, it is C's choice to complete the exchange or abort the protocol. If C 
wants to exchange the payment for D then they send the following: 
* enc. kc(P): C first needs to get kc by decrypting enc. pkc(kc) included in E-MI 
using their private key skc as kc encrypted using C's public key. Once C got kc 
then they encrypt the payment (P) using the key kc 
9 Sig. c(P): C's signature on P. This signature can serve as non-repudiation of 
receipt which allows M to be sure that C has received the encrypted D (it also 
can serve as non-repudiation of origin of the P) 
Note that if C decides to abort the transaction after receiving message E-Ml 
and before sending message E-M2 to M then neither C nor M lose anything. But once 
C sends a correct message in E-M2 to M then the transaction must be completed and 
the protocol will guarantee that the exchange of P and D will be fair. 
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On receiving message E-M2, M decrypts the payment using the key kc (kc is 
originated by M and sent to C in E-M] to allow C to encrypt the payment) and then 
checks whether it is correct. If C encrypted the payment using a different key then M 
ignores the transaction and aborts the protocol. If however the payment is correct then 
M sends the decryption key slant (it is encrypted using C's public key to prevent any 
other party from gaining skmt) to C to be able to decrypt km and then decrypt D. 
It is clear that if the payment is incorrect then M will not send skmt to C 
because it is C's responsibility to send the correct payment to be able to receive the 
decryption key in message E-M3. Using this method this protocol enforces C to be 
honest and hence to send the correct payment to M. If C sends incorrect payment, then 
M can ask C to re-send the correct payment to be able to receive the decryption key, 
but it depends on M if they want to do so. 
5.2.4 Dispute Resolution 
All disputes, if any, will come from C since M will not need to raise disputes 
because they receive the encrypted payment (and decrypt it using the key kc) before 
they send the decryption key to C. Therefore, the weakest link in this exchange is C as 
they have to send the correct payment in order to receive the decryption key for the 
encrypted D that they received in message E-MI. 
Thus, if C has a dispute, the following messages are sent (Figure 10): 
[DR-Mll C ---ý TTP: D-Cerl + Cmf + Sig. m(D) + enc. pkt(kc) 
enc. kc(P) 
In the case where C has a dispute, they need to send to the TTP the following: 
(D-Cert + C. mt + Sig-m(D) + enc. pkt(kc) + enc. kc(P)) 
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On receiving message DR-Ml, the TTP checks the correctness of D-Cert and 
C. mt by checking their signatures. It decrypts enc. pkt(kc) using its private key skt to 
get kc then uses kc to decrypt the payment. The hash included in Sig. m(D) is 
compared with the one in D-Cert (i. e. hD). If all of these are correct then the TTP 
checks the amount of the payment against the price field that is in D-Cert. Also, the 
TTP checks if the payee in the payment matches the merchant's name (note, the TTP 
may need to contact the customer's bank for verifying the payment if necessary). If 
the TTP finds the payment is correct then it forwards to M the payment (encrypted 
using kc) and kc that decrypts the payment (kc is sent encrypted using M's public key 
pkm to prevent any other party from gaining kc). 
Customw TTP Memhotot 
I PR-fOlj: D-, r, "+C, mt+Sýg, m(D)+enc, pkt(kc)+eno. ko(P) I 
Verify OR-Ml 
][DR. 
-Nq'. epc. kc(P) + enc, pktn(kc) 
[DRA13]: enc, pkr, (skm. t) 
Figure 10: ECH Dispute Resolution 
The reasons for forwarding the encrypted payment and kc to M (note that M is not the 
one who contacted the TTP asking for resolution) are as follows: 
C may have sent to M incorrect payment in message E-M2 (in the exchange 
phase) 
C may have not sent the payment at all; i. e. C contacted the TTP before 
sending E-M2 to M 
C may have encrypted the payment in E-M2 using different kc; therefore, the 
TTP forwards the key kc that decrypts the payment 
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Otherwise, if the TTP found that the amount of the payment does not match 
the price in D-Cert then it sends an abort message to C. If the DR-M] is incorrect then 
the TTP will not contact M at all (i. e. the TTP will not send DR-M2 to M). 
[DR-M31 TTP --io. C: enc. pkc(skmt) 
OR 
TTP ---). C: aborts; 
This is the same process for message DR-M2 above. If the TTP found that DR- 
MI is correct then it sends to C the decryption key skmt that is encrypted using C's 
public key pkc. Otherwise, if DR-MI is incorrect then the TTP sends an abort message 
to C. 
It is clear that if either C has not sent the correct payment to M in E-M2, C has 
not sent the payment at all or C encrypted the payment in E-M2 using different kc then 
C will not get an advantage over M because the TTP will check the payment and see 
whether it meets the price or not. If the amount of the payment meets the price then 
the TTP will send the decryption key skmt to C and will also forward the encrypted 
payment and its decryption key kc to M to ensure fairness in all cases. Therefore, the 
fairness is ensured for both C and M. However, if the payment is incorrect then the 
TTP will reject C's request for a dispute. 
As can be seen in the dispute resolution phase, the TTP does not need to have 
both C and M involved in order for the dispute to be resolved; rather only the 
disputant (C in this protocol) and the TTP will be involved. That is, the TTP does not 
need to contact M to verify whether or not they have received the correct payment; 
rather the TTP asks -C to provide all needed information (in DR-MI) and will be able 
to make the resolution automatically. M will only be contacted by the TTP if the 
dispute has a resolution. Therefore, this will reduce the number of messages needed to 
resolve disputes. 
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5.3 ECH Protocol Analysis 
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In this section, the ECH protocol will be analysed. The analysis includes the 
nil ability of parties to detect the dishonesty of one another, disputes analysis, and 
presenting and discussing all possible scenarios. 
5.3.1 Detection of Dishonesty 
It is crucial to test whether or not the customer and the merchant in the ECH 
protocol will be able to detect if the other party is dishonest. The customer may act 
dishonestly by sending an incorrect E-M2 to the merchant. An incorrect E-M2 means 
either 
(a) The payment is incorrect, 
(b) The payment is encrypted with a key that M does not know (i. e. the payment 
is not encrypted with kc), 
(c) The signature of C on the payment (i. e. Sigx(P)) is incorrect. 
So, on receiving E-M2 M will check if the payment is encrypted with kc, if the 
payment is correct, and if the signature is correct. Hence, detecting a dishonest 
Customer is simple. 
On the other hand, the cases in which the Merchant may act dishonestly are by 
either: 
1. sending an incorrect E-M 1; 
2. sending an incorrect E-M3; 
3. not sending E-M3 
in case 2 (i. e. sending an incorrect E-M3) there is only one possibility (by 
which M may act dishonestly) and this is where the decryption key sent by M to 
C in 
E-M3 is incorrect. In case 3 (i. e. not sending E-M3) there is also one possibility which 
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is M not sending E-M3 to C. Case I (i. e. sending an incorrect E-M I) has a number of 
possibilities. These possibilities will be studied as follows. 
Message E-Ml includes the following: enc. km(D), D-Cert, Cmt, 
enc. pkmt(km), enc. pkc(kc), and Sig. m(D). C does not need to check the correctness of 
enc. pkc(kc) because it includes the key kc that C will use to encrypt the payment if 
they are interested in the exchange. So, C will check the correctness of the other five 
items (i. e. enc. km(D), D-Cert, Cmt, enc. pkmt(k7n), and Sig. m (D)). M may act 
dishonestly by including incorrect items in E-Ml. It is important to study the all 
possibilities in which M may act dishonestly in E-Ml. 
Note that D-Cert and Cmt are not included in this discussion because they will 
be checked first by C and if they are incorrect then C will not check the correctness of 
enc. km(D), enc. pkmt(km) and Sig. m(D). However, if both D-Cert and C. mt are correct 
then C will check the correctness of enc. km(D), enc. pk7nt(km) and Sig. m(D), 
The possibilities for the items enc. km(D), enc. pkmt(km) and Sig. m(D) in E-M I are: 
A. enc. km (D): there are two things involved in forming enc. km (D), namely D and 
km. So, there are four possibilities for forming enc. km(D): 
1) D is correct and km is correct. So, M is honest 
2) D is incorrect and km is incorrect. So, M is dishonest 
3) D is correct and km is incorrect. So, M is dishonest 
4) D is incorrect and km is correct. So, M is dishonest 
B. enc. pkmt(km): there are two things involved in forming enc. pkmt(km), namely 
km and pkmt. So, there are four possibilities for forming enc. pkmt(km): 
1) km is correct and pkmt is correct. So, M is honest 
2) km is incorrect and pkmt is incorrect. So, M is dishonest 
3) km is correct and pkmt is incorrect. So, M is dishonest 
4) km is incorrect and pkmt is correct. So, M is dishonest 
C. Sig. m(D): the signature of M on D means the hash value of D encrypted with 
M's private key. Therefore, there are two things involved in forming Sig. m(D). 
They are hash value of D and M's private key. Therefore, there are four 
possibilities for forming Sig. m(D): 
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1) hash value of D is correct and M's private key is correct. So, M is 
honest 
2) hash value of D is incorrect and M'S private key is incorrect. So, M is 
dishonest 
3) hash value of D is correct and M'S private key is incorrect. So, M is 
dishonest 
4) hash value of D is incorrect and M'S private key is correct. So, M is 
dishonest 
Table 2 shows the probabilities of combining enc. km(D), enc. plant(km), and 
Sig. m(D) in E-Ml. Symbol (ý) means correct and (-) means incorrect. The cases in 
Table 2 are analysed as follows (the numbers below refers to the numbers in Table 2), 
(Note that having one incorrect in E-M I means that M is dishonest and C must not 
send the payment to A However, all cases will be studied). 
enc. km(D) enc. pkmt(km) Sig. m(D) 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Table 2: Possibilities of items in E-Ml of the ECH protocol 
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1. enc. km(D), enc. pkmt(km), Sig. m(D): 
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The encrypted D is the one certified in D-Cert and is encrypted with km 
and not another key 
The encrypted key is km and is encrypted with the key that is certified in 
C. mt 
The signed D is the same as D that is certified in D-Cert 
Result: the hash values will be the same (i. e. all verifications are correct) and hence 
M is honest. 
2. - enc. km(D), -enc. pkmt(km), -Sig. m(D): 
9 The encrypted D is different from the one certified in D-Cert. This has the 
following possibilities: 
oD is different from the one certified in D-Cert and km is also 
different from the one certified in D-Cert 
oD is the same as certified in D-Cert but km is different from the one 
certified in D-Cert 
oD is different from the one certified in D-Cert and km is the one 
certified in D-Cert 
9 The encrypted key (km) is not the one certified in D-Cert. This has the 
following possibilities: 
o km is different from the one certified in D-Cert and pkmt is 
different from the one certified in C. mt 
o km is the same as the one certified in D-Cert but pkmt is different 
from the one certified in C. mt 
o km is different from the one certified in D-Cert and pkmt is the one 
certified in C. mt 
* The signed D is not the same as D that is certified in D-Cert. This has the 
following possibilities: 
o The hash of D is incorrect and M's private key is incorrect 
o The hash of D is correct but M's private key is incorrect 
o The hash of D is incorrect and M's private key is correct 
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Result: it is clear that C will easily detect the problems in this E-Ml by different 
ways. First, C can detect that M is dishonest when C computes the hash value for 
enc. km(D) and compares it with the hash value of encrypted D (heD) in D-Cert. 
Second, C can detect that M is dishonest when C computes the hash value for 
enc. pkmt(km) and compares it with the hash value of encrypted km (heKm) in D-Cert. 
Third, when C compares the hash value of the D, that is in Sig. m(D), with the hash 
value of D (hD) in D-Cert. Therefore, C can detect that M is dishonest. 
3. - enc. km(D), enc. pkmt(km), Sig. m(D): 
0 The encrypted D is different from the one certified in D-Cert. This has 
three possibilities (these possibilities are the same ones mentioned in 
case number 2 above) 
0 The encrypted key is km and is encrypted with the key that is certified in 
C. Mt 
0 The signed D is the same as D that is certified in D-Cert 
Result: C can detect that M is dishonest when C computes the hash value for 
enc. km(D) and compares it with the hash value of encrypted D (heD) in D-Cert. 
4. enc. km(D), -ene. pkmt(km), Sig. m(D): 
9 The encrypted D is the one certified in D-Cert and is encrypted with km 
and not another key 
9 The encrypted key is not the one certified in D-Cert. This has three 
possibilities(these possibilities are the same ones mentioned in case 
number 2 above) 
9 The signed D is the same as D that is certified in D-Cert 
Result: C can detect that M is dishonest when C computes the hash value for 
enc. pkmt(km) and compares it with the hash value of encrypted km (heKm) in D-Cert. 
5. enc. km(D), enc. pkmt(km), -Sig. m(D): 
* The encrypted D is the one certified in D-Cert and is encrypted with km and 
not another key 
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e The encrypted key is km and is encrypted with the key that is certified in 
C. Mt 
* The signed D is not the same as D that is certified in D-Cert. This has three 
possibilities (these possibilities are the same ones in case number 2 above) 
Result: C can detect that the signed D is different from the one certified in D-Cert 
when C gets the hash value of D using M's public key and then comparing this hash 
value with the hash value of D (hD) in D-Cert, Note, having the signed D different 
from the one certified in D-Cert will not compromise fairness because the most 
important parts that C must be sure that they match D-Cert are enc. km(D) and 
enc. Pkmt(km) because if they are compared to the ones in D-Cert then C is sure that 
they can get the decryption key from TTP in case M becomes dishonest. However, it 
is up to C if they want to proceed or not but having all verifications are correct in E- 
MI but the signed D is not the same as D that is certified in D-Cert gives Ca sign that 
M may be dishonest. This will not affect the fairness. However, C is recommended 
not to send E-M2 because if M did not send E-M3 then C will need to contact the TTP 
(i. e. for resolution) who will find Sig. m(D) not correct and hence will not resolve the 
dispute. 
6. ene. km(D), -enc. pkmt(km), -Sig. m(D): 
* The encrypted D is the one certified in D-Cert and is encrypted with km and 
not another key 
9 The encrypted key is not the one certified in D-Cert. This has three 
possibilities (these possibilities are the same ones in case number 2 above) 
9 The signed D is not the same as D that is certified in D-Cert. This has three 
possibilities (these possibilities are the same ones in case number 2 above) 
Result: C can detect that M is dishonest when (a) C computes the hash value for 
enc. pkmt(km) and compares it with the hash value of encrypted km (heKm) in D-Cert; 
and (b) C gets the hash value of D (i. e. from Sig. m(D)) using M's public key and then 
comparing this hash value with the hash value of D (hD) in D-Cert 
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7. -enc. km(D), enc. pkmt(km), -Sig. m(D): 
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9 The encrypted D is different from the one certified in D-Cert. This has 
three possibilities (these possibilities are the same ones in case number 2 
above) 
9 The encrypted key is km and is encrypted with the key that is certified in 
C. Mt 
* The signed D is not the same as D that is certified in D-Cert. This has three 
possibilities (these possibilities are the same ones in case number 2 above) 
Result: C can detect that M is dishonest when (a) C computes the hash value for 
enc. km(D) and compares it with the hash value of encrypted D (heD) in D-Cert; and 
(b) C gets the hash value of D (i. e. from Sig. m(D)) using M's public key and then 
comparing this hash with the hash value of D (hD) in D-Cert 
8. -enc. km(D), -enc. pkmt(km), Sig. m(D): 
9 The encrypted D is different from the one certified in D-Cert. This has 
three possibilities (these possibilities are the same ones in case number 2 
above) 
e The encrypted key is not the one certified in D-Cert. This has three 
possibilities (these possibilities are the same ones in case number 2 above) 
o The signed D is the same as D that is certified in D-Cert 
Result: C can detect that M is dishonest when (a) C computes the hash value for 
enc. km(D) and compares it with the hash value of encrypted D (heD) in D-Cert; and 
(b) C computes the hash for enc. pkmt(km) and compares it with the hash'value of 
encrypted km (heKm) in D-Cert. 
To sum up the cases, it is clear firom the possibilities discussed in Table 2 that 
if M tried to cheat on C by including incorrect items in E-Ml then C will be able to 
detect it and refuse to exchange the payment with M. Therefore, the fairness in 
ensured for both C and M. However, if M behaved honestly in message E-M 
I but sent 
incorrect E-M3 or disappeared before sending the decryption key in message E-M3 
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then TTP can guarantee the fairness and will send the decryption key to C if they find 
that C is honest in DR-Ml i. e. DR-Ml is correct. 
5.3.2 Dispute Analysis 
By the end of exchanging a digital product and a payment (regardless who 
starts sending their item) between M and C, there are three possibilities for C (in here 
we are talking about the normal exchange where no protocols are used): 
1) C received the correct digital product 
2) C received incorrect digital product 
3) C did not receive the digital product at all 
There are also three possibilities for M: 
1) M received the correct payment 
2) M received incorrect payment 
3) M did not receive the payment at all 
The incorrect digital product means that the received digital product is not the 
one that C wanted; whereas incorrect payment means that the received payment is not 
the same as the requested price by M. 
Table 3 studies the combination of these possibilities for C and A In Table 3, 
(X) means either the party (C or M) has not received the item (payment or digital 
product) at all or they received incorrect item; whereas (ý) means the correct item is 
received. Note that the resolution for dispute is not specified as this discussion is 
concerned with exchange and resolution in general. 
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C M 
Receive digital Receive payment 
Result 
product 
I No dispute 
2 x M disputes 
3 x C disputes 
There are 
4 x x possibilities for disputes by both C 
and M 
Table 3: Disputes Possibilities 
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C M 
Receive decryption Receive payment 
Result 
key 
1 No dispute 
2 x Not applicable 
3 x C disputes 
4 x x 
No dispute / Not 
' applicable /C s fault 
Table 4: Disputes Possibilities for ECH 
As can be seen in the Table 3, if M and C receive each other's items then there 
is no need for a dispute (case I in Table 3). If C received the correct digital product 
and M either received incorrect payment or has not received the payment at all then M 
will dispute (case 2 in Table 3). If M received the correct payment and C either 
received incorrect digital product or has not received the digital product at all then C 
will dispute (case 3 in Table 3). Finally, the case number 4 in Table 3 has four 
possibilities which are as follows: 
a) if both C and M have not received anything from each other then no 
dispute will be made as both of them have not revealed their items 
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b) if both C and M have received incorrect items from each other (i. e. C 
received incorrect digital product and M received incorrect payment) then 
both C and M will dispute 
c) if C received incorrect digital product and M has not received the payment 
at all then both C and M will dispute 
d) if C has not received the digital product at all and M received incorrect 
payment then both C and M will dispute 
For the ECH protocol (Table 4), the actual exchange between C and M is for 
the payment (from Q and the decryption key for the encrypted digital product (from 
M). This is because M sends the encrypted digital product to C and C will verify it and 
if satisfied then the exchange of the payment and the decryption key will take place. 
The order of the exchange of the payment and the decryption key in the ECH protocol 
is as follows. M will receive a correct payment before C receives the decryption key. 
The following studies the cases presented in Table 4 which shows all possible 
cases for disputes for the ECH protocol. The meaning of (X) and (ý) in Table 4 is the 
same as the ones in Table 3. 
1) In case 1, both C and M receive the correct item (i. e. C receives the correct 
decryption key and M receives the correct payment) from each other. Hence, 
there is no dispute. 
2) In case 2, C received a correct decryption key, and M either received incorrect 
payment or has not received the payment at all. This case is not applicable in 
the ECH protocol because C has to send a correct payment to be able to 
receive the correct decryption key. 
3) In case 3, C has either received incorrect decryption key or not received the 
decryption key at all, and M received the correct payment. In this case C will 
dispute to TTP. 
4) In case 4, there are four possibilities which are: 
a) Both C and M have not received anything from each other. So, no 
dispute will be made as both of them have not revealed their items. 
This represents the case where C received E-Ml and did not send E- 
M2 to M. 
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Both C and M have received incorrect items from each other. That is, C 
received incorrect decryption key and M received incorrect payment. 
This case is not applicable in the ECH protocol because C has to send a 
correct payment to be able to receive the correct decryption key. So, if 
M found that the payment is incorrect then M will not send the 
decryption key at all i. e. neither correct decryption key nor incorrect 
decryption key. 
c) C received an incorrect decryption key and M has not received the 
payment at all. This case is not applicable in the ECH protocol because 
C has to send a correct payment to be able to receive the correct 
decryption key. So, if M has not received the payment then M will not 
send the decryption key at all. 
d) C has not received the decryption key at all and M received incorrect 
payment. This case is normal because if the payment is incorrect then 
M will not send the decryption key to C. That is, C has to send a 
correct payment to be able to receive the correct decryption key from 
M. Therefore, if this case occurs then for C to raise a dispute to the 
TTP, C needs to send to the TTP the correct payment. If C sends the 
correct payment to the TTP then the TTP will make a resolution to both 
C and M. That is, M may receive two payments (the incorrect payment 
from C, and the correct payment from TTP) and this is the penalty that 
C pays for being dishonest. Of course M may choose to disregard the 
incorrect payment. However, if the TTP found that the payment is 
incorrect then C's dispute will be rejected. 
The design of the ECH protocol reduces the possibilities for having disputes. 
Additionally, only C will raise disputes as M will not send their item unless the items 
from C are correct. Hence, the ECH protocol enforces C to be honest. As a result, the 
possibilities for disputes are reduced by preventing them occurring. 
In addition to the previous cases, the following cases are studied: 
C disputes that after decrypting the digital product they have found the digital 
product is incorrect. This is not possible because D-Cert guarantees that the 
digital product D is correct; and if C found that D is incorrect then they should 
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not have sent the payment to M. So, it is C's fault for sending the payment to 
M if they had any doubt about D. Once C sends the payment to M then this 
means that they are satisfied with the digital product D. Therefore, this dispute 
will not happen because C knows the rules of the protocol which allow C to 
check the digital product before they send the payment to M; and as a result C 
will not put themselves at risk 
9 It is clear that M will not raise a dispute because M will receive the payment 
before they send the decryption key to C. However, the following cases are 
studied: 
oM claims that they have received incorrect payment from C. This will 
not happen because C knows that if they send incorrect payment then 
they will not receive the decryption key. However, if this case does 
happen then it is C's fault for sending the incorrect payment. Again, the 
idea of this protocol is to have one trustworthy party and enforce the 
other party to be honest if they are willing to exchange their item. 
Therefore, if M received incorrect payment then they will not send the 
decryption key i. e. M's item is not revealed and hence M does not need 
to dispute. 
oM claims that they have not received the decryption key to decrypt the 
payment. This is not applicable in this protocol because the payment is 
encrypted with kc that is sent by M; and hence M is able to decrypt the 
payment as soon as they get it. However, if M found that the payment 
is not encrypted with kc then M will not send the decryption key to C 
in E-M3. 
5.3.3 Scenarios Analysis 
There are different scenarios for executing the ECH protocol by C and M. 
These scenarios include: 
a) having both C and M are behaving honestly 
b) C is behaving dishonestly and M is behaving honestly 
c) M is behaving dishonestly and C is behaving honestly 
d) having both C and M are behaving dishonestly 
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The possible scenarios for executing the ECH protocol are as follows: 
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C and M are honest which result in normal execution. That is, M sends a 
correct E-M IýC sends a correct E-M2, and M sends a correct E-M3 (Figure 
11). 
E-Ml 
E-Av 
]EE-M3 
Figure 11: ECH Protocol, Scenario I 
2. After receiving E-M I, C quits the protocol because either E-M I is incorrect or 
C is no longer interested in the exchange (Figure 12). 
E-Nh 
Figure 12: ECH Protocol, Scenario 2 
3. After receiving E-MI, C contacts the TTP before sending E-M2 to M. 
However, the TTP found that DR-Ml is incorrect. Therefore, the TTP sends 
abort message to C. In this scenario C tries to cheat but they gained nothing 
(Figure 13). 
Figure 13: ECH Protocol, Scenario 3 
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4. The same as scenario number 3 but in here, the TTP found that DR-Ml is 
correct. Therefore, the TTP will make it fair for both C and M by sending the 
resolution to M in DR-M2 and also by sending the resolution to C in DR-M3. 
In this scenario C tries to cheat but the TTP makes it fair for both C and M 
(Figure 14). 
Figure 14: ECH Protocol, Scenario 4 
5. After C received E-Ml from M, C found that E-Ml is correct and hence C 
sends E-M2 to M. C waited to receive E-M3 from M but nothing is received. 
Therefore, C contacted the TTP for resolution. However, the TTP found that 
DR-Ml is incorrect and hence the TTP sends an abort message to C. Note, 
there are two possibilities why M did not send E-M3 to C. These possibilities 
are either because M found that E-M2 is incorrect or because M is dishonest. If 
it is the former (where E-M2 is incorrect) then it is C's fault for sending an 
incorrect E-M2 to M. While, if it is the later (where E-M2 is correct but M is 
dishonest) then C needs to send correct DR-Ml to the TTP to be able to 
receive a resolution (Figure 15). 
Figure 15: ECH Protocol, Scenario 5 
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6. The same as scenario number 5 but here, the DR-Ml that C sent to the TTP is 
correct. Therefore, the TTP resolves it by sending DR-M2 to M and DR-M3 to 
C. Again, the reason for M not sending E-M3 to C is either because E-M2 is 
incorrect or because M is dishonest. If it is because E-M2 is incorrect, then for 
C to receive the DR-M3 (which is the decryption key for the encrypted digital 
product) then C has to send correct DR-M I to the TTP. When the TTP 
received the correct DR-Ml then the TTP will make it fair for both C and M. 
While if M did not send E-M3 to C because M is dishonest, then C has to send 
the correct DR-Ml to the TTP to resolve C's dispute. In this case (DR-Ml is 
correct) the TTP will send the resolution to both C and M. Therefore, M will 
receive the payment twice but there is an assumption in this protocol that 
double spending of the same payment will be detected. As a result, it will be 
fair for both C and M; and M will not get advantage over C (Figure 16). 
Figure 16: ECH Protocol, Scenario 6 
7. After C received E-MI from M, C found that E-Ml is correct and 
hence C 
sends E-M2 to M. Then, M found that E-M2 is correct. Hence, 
M sends E-M3 
to C. After receiving E-M3 C contacted the TTP for resolution. However, the 
TTP found that DR-MI is incorrect. Therefore, the TTP sends an abort 
message to C. There are two possibilities why C contacted the 
TTP in this 
scenario. The first one is because E-M3 is incorrect. The second one 
is because 
E-M3 is correct but C wants to see what they can receive from the TTP and 
thus trying to get an advantage over M. in both possibilities, C has to send 
correct DR-Ml to receive a resolution (Figure 17). 
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Figure 17: ECH Protocol, Scenario 7 
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8. The same as scenario number 7 but in here, DR-M I that C sends to the TTP is 
correct. Therefore, the TTP resolves it by sending DR-M2 to M and DR-M3 to 
C (Figure 18). 
Figure 18: ECH Protocol, Scenario 8 
Therefore, it is clear from the above scenarios that fairness is ensured for both 
C and M. 
On the other hand, the following studies the scenarios where the messages (E- 
MIý E-M2, E-M3 , DR-M Iý DR-M2, and DR-M3) of the ECH protocol are sent but 
have not been received because of the failure in the communication channels between 
the parties involved in the protocols: 
1) If E-MI is not received by C then the fairness will not be compromised 
because no one revealed their item as C will not send E-M2 if they have not 
received a correct E-M I 
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2) If E-M2 is not received by M then M will consider that C is not interested in 
the exchange and hence M will not send E-M3. As a result, C will wait for 
E-M3 from M and as M has not received E-M2 from C then M will not send 
E-M3. Therefore, C will contact the TTP for resolution. However, there is a 
possibility of having the communication channel failed. So, this possibility 
will be studied later (see case 4) 
3) If E-M3 is not received by C then C will consider it as M behaving 
dishonestly. As a result, C will contact the TTP for resolution. However, 
there is a possibility of having the communication channel failed. So, this 
possibility will be studied in the next case (see case 
4) If DR-Ml is not received by the TTP then C needs to re-contact the TTP 
asking for a resolution again 
5) If DR-M2 is not received by M then there are two possibilities: 
a) If DR-M2 is not received by M (and M has not received a correct 
E-M2) and at the same time DR-M3 is not received by C then the 
fairness is not compromised 
b) If DR-M2 is not received by M but DR-M3 is received by C then 
the fairness is compromised if and only if M has not received a 
correct E-M2 
6) If DR-M3 is not received by C then there are two possibilities: 
a) If DR-M3 is not received by C and at the same time DR-M2 is not 
received by M (and also M has not received a correct E-M2) then 
the fairness is not compromised 
b) If DR-M3 is not received by C but DR-M2 is received by M then 
the fairness is compromised if and only if C has not received a 
correct E-M3 i. e. when C received a correct E-M3 they contacted 
the TTP 
As can be seen in these cases, the communication channels between C and 
TTP, and M and TTP should be resilient for the fairness to be ensured. To ensure 
fairness even in the case of communication channels failure the fault tolerance 
techniques need to be applied to the ECH protocol. However, this is out of the scope 
of this thesis. Hence, it is left as a future work. 
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The ECH protocol is presented and analysed in this chapter. It has been shown 
that the number of messages is reduced when we apply the technique of having a 
trustworthy merchant and enforcing the customer to be honest in the fair exchange 
protocols. That is, only three messages are exchanged between the customer and the 
merchant. Additionally, only three messages are executed in order for the dispute to 
be resolved. 
It has been shown in this chapter that each party (customer and merchant) will 
be able to detect the dishonesty of the other party. If a party detects that the other party 
is dishonest then they will not send their item to them. All dispute possibilities for the 
ECH protocol have been presented. The possible scenarios of executing the ECH 
protocol have been discussed. 
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This chapter presents a fair exchange protocols that is based on having a 
trustworthy customer and then enforces the merchant to be honest. In this chapter the 
protocol will be discussed and analysed. 
6.2. EMH Protocol Description 
6.2.1. Description 
The purpose of the Enforcing Merchant Honesty (EMH) protocol is for 
exchanging a digital product D for a payment. The EMH protocol enforces the 
merchant to act honestly. Its basic idea is to have one trustworthy party (C) and 
enforce the other party (M) to be honest. 
The trustworthiness of C is governed by two factors; the payment certificate 
(P-Cert) issued by the CB; and the shared public key certificate (C. ct) issued by the 
TTP. Thus, the payment that will be sent by C is certified by the CB; and the public 
key to be used by C to encrypt the key that encrypts the payment is certified by the 
TTP- 
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The enforcement of M to be honest is governed by letting M encrypt the digital 
product using a key that is sent to M by C. This is to let C be able to decrypt the 
digital product without assistance from M. Hence, M will send a correct encrypted 
digital product because C will be able to decrypt it as soon they receive it. 
In essence this protocol is like C saying to M: this is the encrypted payment; 
and I am a trustworthy as these certificates (P-Cert and C. ct) show BUT be honest 
with me by sending the correct digital product in order to receive the decryption key 
for the payment. By this means C is trustworthy by having the correct certificates 
from the CB and the TTP, and also M is enforced to be honest. 
The EMH protocol consists of two phases. The pre-exchange phase and the 
exchange phase. In the pre-exchange phase, the customer gets the payment and the 
certificates (from trusted authorities) to be used in the exchange phase. In the 
exchange phase, the customer and the merchant exchange their items. It is not 
necessarily that the exchange phase comes immediately after the pre-exchange phase. 
6.2.2. Pre-exchange Phase 
In the pre-exchange phase (Figure 19), C needs to get the certificate C. ct of the 
shared public key from the TTP to be used to encrypt the key that is used to encrypt 
payment. Therefore, C needs to request the shared public key certificate from the TTP 
and then the TTP will send it (that is in messages PE-Mla and PE-Mlb of Figure 19). 
C also needs to get the payment and its certificate P-Cert from the CB (that is in 
messages PE-M2a and PE-M2b of Figure 19). 
M also needs to get a special version of digital product certificate (DG-Cert) 
from the CA. This DG-Cert is assumed to be publicly available, for example in M's 
website. Therefore, C can get it easily to help them in specifying what they want from 
M in the exchange phase that will be discussed later. The DG-Cert is unique for each 
digital product and it is issued once and can be used as many times as possible for the 
certified digital product. The content of this DG-Cert is shown in the Notation section. 
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PF--Mla: - Request sharing a key I 
PE-Mlti-. Cxt 
PE-M2a: C, ct + kc + affmnt + payee I 
KAM- Payment + P-Cart 
Figure 19: EMH Pre-exchange Phase 
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In this protocol C and TTP share a public key. The keys of the parties are as follows: 
Each party x (x C C, M TTP and CB) has its own public (plbc) and private (skx) 
keys. 
" The CB's public key is denoted as pkcb = (ecb, ncb) and its 
corresponding private key is denoted as skcb = (dcb, ncb). 
" The TTP's public key is denoted as pkt = (et, nt) and its corresponding 
private key is denoted as skt = (dt, nt). 
" C's public key is denoted as pkc = (ec, nc) and its corresponding 
private key is denoted as skc = (dc, nc). 
" M's public key is denoted as pkm = (em, nm) and its corresponding 
private key is denoted as skm = (dm, nm) 
The shared public key between C and TTP is denoted as pkct = (ect, nct) and its 
corresponding private key is denoted as skct = (dct, nct) 
6.2.3. The Exchange Phase 
It is assumed that the exchange phase will take place after C finds the 
requested digital product (D) with M, and that C and M agree on the digital product 
and negotiated the price. Hence this phase is about the actual exchange of payment 
and digital product D. 
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CustoEm! Merchant 
[E-Mll: desc + err-. kc(P) + P-Cert + C, ct + enc. p4, ---I(kr, ) + anc. pkm(knn) 4 Sig-c(P) 1_ 
i -I I Verify E-Ml 
[E-M2]: enc, km(D) + Sig. m(D) 
Verify E-M2 
[E-M31: enc, pkm(skrl) 
II IN 
I 
Verify E-M3 
Figure 20: EMH Exchange Phase 
There are only three messages to be exchanged between M and C in the exchange 
phase (Figure 20). These three messages are as follows: 
[E-Mll C --ý M: desc + enc. kc(P) + P-Cert + C. ct + enc. pkct(kc) + enc. pkm(km) 
Sig. c(P) 
C sends the first message E-M I to M which contains the following: 
* desc: specifies what C wants from M. desc includes two fields, they are 
0 description of D that C wants. The description can be the digital 
product ID number 
0 hDG: hash value of D. C can get it from DG-Cert that is assumed to be 
publicly available 
Note that, desc is signed by C but for simplicity C's signature is omitted 
ene. kc(P): the payment that is encrypted with the key kc (note that kc I 
generated by C) 
P-Cert: the payment certificate that is issued by the CB 
C. ct: the shared public key certificate that is issued by the TTP 
enc. pkct(kc): the key kc, used to encrypt the payment, is encrypted using the 
shared public key pkct that is certified in C. ct 
9 enc. pkm(km): a key krn that will be used by M to encrypt the digital product. 
k7n is encrypted using the public key of M (pkm). The reason for encrypting km 
using pkm is to prevent any other party from gaining k7n as it will be used to 
encrypt the digital product by M 
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0 Sigx(P): C's signature on the payment. This signature can serve as non- 
repudiation of origin which allows M to be sure that the payment is sent by C. 
C's signature on the payment is the encryption of the hash value of the 
payment using C's private key skc 
[E-M21 M --). C: enc. km(D) + Sig. m(D) 
On receiving message E-Ml from C, M checks the correctness of enc. kc(P), 
enc. pkct(kc), Sig. c(P), P-Cert and Ca. The correctness of P-Cert can be checked by 
verifying CB's signature on P-Cert and the correctness of C. ct can be checked by 
verifying TTP's signature on Ca. 
To check the correctness of the payment (P), M needs to check two things 
which are the payment itself and the encrypted payment with kc i. e. enc. kc(P). Firstly, 
to check the correctness of P, M needs to get the hash value of payment (calculated as 
HP) by decrypting Sigx(P) contained in message E-MI using C's public keypkc (the 
public keys of all parties are publicly available) and then compare it with hash value 
of P (hP) contained in P-Cert i. e. to check the following: 
LTD 
Jif 
.? = hP 
If they are the same then M can be sure that C signed the correct P. 
Secondly, to check the correctness of the encrypted payment enc. kc(P), M 
computes the hash value of enc. kc(P) (calculated as HeP) and then compare it with the 
hash value of encrypted payment with kc i. e. heP which is contained in P-Cert (note 
In. - that it is assumed that M will use the same fimction used by the CB to compute the 
hash value) i. e. to check the following: 
HeP ?= heP 
If they are the same then M can be sure that C encrypted the payment using kc 
and not another key. 
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M also needs to check the correctness of kc which is used to encryptpayment. 
To do so, M computed the hash value of enc. pkct(kc) (calculated as HeKc) and then 
compare it with heKc that is included in P-Cert, so M will check the flowing: 
HeKc ?= heKc 
If they are compared then M can be sure that the encrypted key is kc and not 
another key. The point here is to make sure that C is honest by sending the key used to 
encrypt the payment. 
Therefore, if all comparisons are correct then, at this point, M will have the 
following fact. The encrypted payment is correct (i. e. it is the one certified in P-Cert) 
and it is indeed encrypted with kc. In addition, the key encrypted using the shared 
public key pkct is indeed kc and not another key. The shared public key pkct used to 
encrypt kc is certified by TTP. Therefore, once M got the private key of the shared 
public key then M will be able to get the payment (by first decrypting enc. pkct(kc) to 
get kc and then decrypting enc. kc(P) using kc). 
At this point M must be sure that the encrypted payment matches their 
requirements, otherwise they will be at risk if they send message E-M2 to C as C 
already has the decryption key for D. Also, M must send D that matches C's 
requirement i. e. that matches desc included in E-M 1. 
Now, it is M's choice to complete the exchange or abort the protocol. If M wants 
to exchange D with the payment then M sends the following: 
9 enc. km(D): M first needs to get km by decrypting enc. pkm(km) included in E- 
MI using their private key skm as k7n was encrypted using M's public key. 
Once M got km then they encrypt D using the key km 
* Sig. m(D): M's signature on D. This signature can serve as non-repudiation of 
receipt (because if M did not receive the encrypted payment then they will not 
send E-M2) which allows C to be sure that M has received the encrypted 
payment (it also serves as non-repudiation of origin) 
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Note that if M decides to abort the transaction after receiving message E-MI 
and before sending message E-M2 to C then neither M nor C lose anything. But once 
M sends a correct message in E-M2 to C then the transaction must be completed and 
the protocol will guarantee that the exchange of D and P will be fair. 
[E-M31 C --ý M: enc. pkm(skct) 
On receiving message E-M2, C decrypts D using the key km (krn is originated 
by C and sent to M in E-Ml to allow M to encrypt D) and then checks whether it is 
correct. If M encrypted D using different key then C ignores the transaction and aborts 
the protocol. If however D is correct then C sends the decryption key Act (it is 
encrypted using M's public key to prevent any other party from gaining skct) to M to 
be able to decrypt kc and then decrypt the payment. 
It is clear that if D is incorrect then C will not send skct to M because it is M's 
responsibility to send the correct D to be able to receive the decryption key in message 
E-M3, Using this method this protocol enforces M to be honest and hence sends the 
correct D to C. If M sends incorrect D, then C can ask M to re-send the correct D to be 
able to receive the decryption key, but it depends on C if they want to do so. 
6.2.4. Dispute Resolution 
All disputes, if any, will come from M since C will not have to raise disputes 
as they receive the encrypted D and decrypt it using the key krn before they send the 
decryption key to M. Therefore, the weakest link in this exchange is M as they have to 
send the correct D in order to receive the decryption key for the encrypted payment 
that they have received in message E-M I. 
Therefore, if M has a dispute, then the following three messages are sent 
(Figure 21): 
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[DR-MIJ M --- ý TTP: desc + P-Cert + C. ct + Sig. c(P) + enc. pkt(km) + enc. km(D) 
In case M has a dispute, they need to send to TTP the following: (desc + P- 
Cert + C. ct + Sig. c(p) + enc. pkt(km) + enc. km(D)). 
PRA 
E TTP P 
[OR-Mll- dmr, + P-Cert + C, rt + Sig r. (P) + enc. pk4krn) + enckm(D) 
Vewy DR-10 1 
enc. km(D) + antpkc(km) 
[DR-M3]: anc. pkm(skct) 
Figure 21: EMH Dispute Resolution 
[DR-M21 TTP -4 C: enc. km(D) + enc. pkc(km) 
On receiving message DR-Ml above, the TTP checks the correctness of P- 
Cert and Cct by checking their signatures. In addition, the TTP verifies C's signature 
on desc. Then, the TTP decrypts enc. pkt(km) using their private key skt to get km then 
uses km to decrypt D. 
If all of these are correct then TTP computes the hash value of D then compare 
it with hDG included in desc. This comparison makes TTP be sure that C ordered this 
D and not another D. The TTP will also compare the hash value included in sig. c(P) 
with the hash value of payment included in P-Cert (i. e. hP). If the TTP found the 
comparisons are correct then the TTP forwards D (that is encrypted using km) and the 
key krn to decrypt D (km is sent to C encrypted using C's public key pkc to prevent 
any other party from gaining k7n) to C. 
There are many reasons for forwarding the encrypted D and krn to C. They are 
as follows: 
0 
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"M may have sent to C incorrect D in message E-M2 (in the exchange phase) 
"M may have not sent D at all; i. e. M contacted TTP before sending E-M2 to C 
"M may have encrypted D in E-M2 using different km; therefore, the TTP 
forwards the key km that decrypts D 
Otherwise, if the TTP found that the two hash values (i. e. the hash value of D 
with hDG and the hash value of P with hP) do not match or the other verifications are 
incorrect then the TTP sends an abort message to M. If the DR-Ml is incorrect then 
TTP will not contact C at all i. e. the TTP will not send DR-M2 to C. 
[DR-M31 TTP --+ M: enc. pkm(skct) 
OR 
TTP ---* M: aborts; 
The same process done for the message DR-M2 above. That is, if the TTP 
found that the hash value of D matches hDG included in desc and also the hash value 
of P matches hP and also the other verifications are correct then the TTP sends to M 
the decryption key skct that is encrypted using M's public key pkm. Otherwise, if the 
two hashes do not match then the TTP sends an abort message to M. 
It is clear that if either M has not sent the correct D to C in E-M2, M has not 
sent D at all or M encrypted D in E-M2 using different km then M will not get an 
advantage over C because the TTP will check D and see whether it meets what C 
wants. If the hash value of D matches hDG then the TTP is sure that C ordered D from 
M and hence will send the decryption key skct to M and will forward the encrypted D 
and its decryption key km to C to ensure fairness in all cases. Therefore, the fairness is 
guaranteed for both M and C. However, if D is incorrect (e. g. the hash value of D does 
not match hDG) then the TTP will reject M's request for a dispute. 
As can be seen in the dispute resolution phase, the TTP does not need to have 
both C and M to be involved in order for the dispute to be resolved; rather only the 
disputant (M in this protocol) and the TTP will be involved. That is, the TTP does not 
need to contact C to verify whether or not they have received the correct D; rather the 
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TTP asks M to provide all needed information (in DR-M I) and will be able to make 
the resolution. C will only be contacted by the TTP if the dispute has a resolution. 
Therefore, this will reduce the number of messages needed to resolve disputes. 
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In this section, the EMH protocol will be analysed. The analysis includes the 
ability of parties to detect the dishonesty of one another, disputes analysis, and 
presenting and discussing all possible scenarios. 
6.3.1. Detection of Dishonesty 
The same analysis that has been done for the ECH protocol will be done for 
the EMH protocol, to test the ways in which the customer and the merchant may act 
dishonestly. 
There is only one way in which the merchant may act dishonestly. It is by 
sending incorrect E-M2. Incorrect E-M2 can be constructed by: 
(a) Including incorrect digital product (either not the same as the one C wanted 
or a broken digital product), 
(b) Encrypting the digital product with a key that C does not know of (a key that 
is not km), 
(c) Including incorrect signature (i. e. Sig. m(D)). 
On receiving message E-M2, if E-M2 is incorrect then C will easily detect that 
M is dishonest and then will not send E-M3 to A 
On the other hand, the cases in which the customer may act dishonestly are by : 
1. sending an incorrect E-M 1; 
2. sending an incorrect E-M3; 
3. not sending E-M3 
In case 2 (i. e. sending an incorrect E-M3) there is only one possibility (by 
which C may act dishonestly) and this is where the decryption key sent by C to M in 
E-M3 is incorrect. In case 3 (i. e. not sending E-M3) there is also one possibility which 
is C not sending E-M3 to M. Case I (i. e. sending an incorrect E-M I) has a number of 
possibilities. These possibilities will be studied as follows. 
Chapter 6: EMH Protocol 105 
Message E-Ml includes the following: enc. kc(P), P-Cert, Cct, enc. pkct(kc), 
enc. pkm(km), and Sig. c(P). M does not need to check the correctness of enc-pkm(km) 
because it includes the key km that M will use to encrypt the digital product D if they 
are interested in the exchange. So, M will check the correctness of the other five items 
(which are enc. kc(P), P-Cert, Ca, enc. pkct(kc), and Sig. c(P)). C may act dishonestly 
by including incorrect items in E-Ml. It is important to study the all possibilities in 
which C may act dishonestly in E-M L 
Note that P-Cert and C. ct are not included in this discussion because they will 
be checked first by M and if they are incorrect then M will not check the correctness 
of enc. kc(P), enc. pkct(kc) and Sig. c(P). However, if both P-Cert and C. ct are correct 
then M will check the correctness of enc. kc(P), enc. pkct(kc) and Sig. c(P). 
The possibilities for the items enc. kc(P), enc. pkct(kc) and Sig. c(P) in E-Ml are: 
A. enc. kc(P): there are two things involved in forming enc. kc(P). They are P and 
kc. So, four possibilities are available for forming enc. kc(P): 
1) P is correct and kc is correct. So, C is honest 
2) P is incorrect and kc is incorrect. So, C is dishonest 
3) P is correct and kc is incorrect. So, C is dishonest 
4) P is incorrect and kc is correct. So, C is dishonest 
B. enc. pkct(kc): there are two things involved in forming enc. pka(kc). They are 
kc and pkct. So, four possibilities are available for forming enc. pkct(kc): 
1) kc is correct and pkct is correct. So, C is honest 
2) kc is incorrect and pkct is incorrect, So, C is dishonest 
3) kc is correct and pkct is incorrect. So, C is dishonest 
4) kc is incorrect and pkct is correct. So, C is dishonest 
C. Sig. c(P): this signature means the hash value of payment (P) encrypted with 
C's private key. Therefore, there are two things involved in forming Sig. c(P). 
They are hash value of P and CS private key. Therefore, there are four 
possibilities for forming Sig. c(P): 
1) hash value of P is correct and C'S private key is correct. So, C is honest 
2) hash value of P is incorrect and Cs private key is incorrect. So, C is 
dishonest 
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3) hash value of P is correct and Cs private key is incorrect. So, C is 
dishonest 
4) hash value of P is incorrect and Cs private key is correct. So, C is 
dishonest 
enc. kc(P) enc. pkct(kc) Sig. c(P) 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Table 5: Possibilities of items in E-MI of the EMH protocol 
Table 5 shows the possibilities of combining enc. kc(P), enc. pkct(kc), and 
Sig. c(P) in E-Ml. Symbol (ý) means correct and (-) means incorrect. The cases in 
Table 5 are analysed as follows (the numbers below refers to the numbers in Table 5), 
(Note that having one incorrect in E-Ml means that C is dishonest and M must not 
send the digital product to C. However, all cases will be studied). 
1. enc. kc(P), enc. pkct(kc), Sig. c(P): 
0 The encrypted payment is the one certified in P-Cert and is encrypted with 
kc and not another key 
The encrypted key is kc and is encrypted with the key that is certified in 
C. Ct 
9 The signed payment is the same as payment that is certified in P-Cert 
Result: the hash values will be the same (i. e. all the verifications are correct) and 
hence C is honest. 
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9 The encrypted payment is different from the one certified in P-Cert. This has 
the following possibilities: 
o Payment is different from the one certified in P-Cert and kc is also 
different from the one certified in P-Cert 
o payment is the same as certified in P-Cert but kc is different from the 
one certified in P-Cert 
o payment is different from the one certified in P-Cert and kc is the one 
certified in P-Cert 
9 The encrypted key is not the one certified in P-Cert. This has the following 
possibilities: 
o kc is different from the one certified in P-Cert and pkct is different 
Erom the one certified in C. ct 
o kc is the same as the one certified in P-Cert but pkct is different from 
the one certified in C. ct 
o kc is different from the one certified in P-Cert and pkct is the one 
certified in C. ct 
9 The signed payment is not the same as payment that is certified in P-Cert. 
This has the following possibilities: 
o The hash value of the payment is incorrect and C's private key is 
incorrect 
o The hash value of the payment is correct but C's private key is 
incorrect 
o The hash value of the payment is incorrect and C's private key is 
correct 
Result: it is clear that M will easily detect the problems in this E-MI by different 
ways, First, M can detect that C is dishonest when M computes the hash value for 
enc. kc(P) and compares it with the hash value of encrypted payment (heP) included in 
P-Cert. Second, M can detect that C is dishonest when M computes the hash value for 
enc. pkct(kc) and compares it with the hash value of encrypted kc (heKc) included in 
P-Cert. Third, when M compares the hash value of the payment, that is in Sig. c(P), 
with the hash value of payment (hP) included in P-Cert. Therefore, M can detect that 
C is dishonest. 
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9 The encrypted payment is different from the one certified in P-Cert. This 
has three possibilities (the possibilities are the same as the ones in case 
number 2 above) 
The encrypted key is ke and is encrypted with the key that is certified in 
C. Ct 
9 The signed payment is the same as payment that is certified in P-Cert 
Result: M can detect that C is dishonest when M computes the hash value for 
enc. kc(P) and compares it with the hash value of encrypted payment (heP) included in 
P-Cert. 
4. ene. kc(P), -enc. pkct(kc), Sig. c(P): 
9 The encrypted payment is the one certified in P-Cert and is encrypted with 
kc and not another key 
9 The encrypted key is not the one certified in P-Cert. This has three 
possibilities (the possibilities are the same as the ones in case number 2 
,, I, above) 
9 The signed payment is the same as payment that is certified in P-Cert 
Result: M can detect that C is dishonest when M computes the hash value for 
enc. pkct(kc) and compares it with the hash value of encrypted kc (heKc) included in 
P-Cert. 
5. enc. kc(P), enc. pkct(kc), -Sig. c(P): 
9 The encrypted payment is the one certified in P-Cert and is encrypted with 
kc and not another key 
9 The encrypted key is kc and is encrypted with the key that is certified in C. ct 
9 The signed payment is not the same as payment that is certified in P-Cert. 
This has three possibilities (the possibilities are the same as the ones in case 
number 2 above) 
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Result: M can detect that the signed payment is different from the one certified in P- 
Cert when M gets the hash value of payment using C's public key and then comparing 
this hash with the hash value of payment (hP) included in P-Cert. Note, having the 
signed payment different from the one certified in P-Cert will not compromise fairness 
because the most important parts that M must be sure that they match P-Cert are 
enc. kc(P) and enc. pkct(kc) because if they are compared to the ones in P-Cert then M 
is sure that they can get the decryption key from TTP in case C becomes dishonest. 
However, it is up to M if they want to proceed or not but having all verifications are 
correct in E-M I but the signed payment is not the same as payment that is certified in 
P-Cert gives Ma sign that C may be dishonest. This will not affect the fairness. 
However, if Sigx(P) is incorrect then in case of dispute then M needs to send Sigx(P) 
to the TTP but when the TTP finds it incorrect then the TTP will not resolve the 
dispute. Therefore, it is better not to send E-M2 to C if Sig. c(P) is incorrect. 
6. enc. kc(P), -enc. pkct(kc), -Sig. c(P): 
9 The encrypted payment is the one certified in P-Cert and is encrypted with 
kc and not another key 
* The encrypted key is not the one certified in P-Cert. This has three 
possibilities (the possibilities are the same as the ones in case number 2 
n1l above) 
* The signed payment is not the same as payment that is certified in P-Cert, 
This has three possibilities (the possibilities are the same as the ones in case 
number 2 above) 
Result: M 'can detect that C is dishonest when (a) M computes the hash value for 
enc. pkct(kc) and compares it with the hash value of encrypted kc (heKc) included in 
P-Cert; and (b) M gets the hash value of payment (i. e. from Sig. c(P)) using C's public 
key and then comparing this hash with the hash value of payment (hP) included in P- 
Cert 
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9 The encrypted payment is different from the one certified in P-Cert. This has 
three possibilities (the possibilities are the same as the ones in case number 2 
above) 
9 The encrypted key is kc and is encrypted with the key that is certified in C. ct 
9 The signed payment is not the same as payment that is certified in P-Cert. 
This has three possibilities (the possibilities are the same as the ones in case 
number 2 above) 
Result: M can detect that C is dishonest when (a) M computes the hash value for 
enc. kc(P) and compares it with the hash value of encrypted payment (heP) included in 
P-Cert; and (b) M gets the hash value of payment (i. e. from Sig. c(P)) using C's public 
key and then comparing this hash with the hash value of payment (hP) included in P- 
Cert 
8. -enc. kc(P), -ene. pkct(kc), Sig. c(P): 
9 The encrypted payment is different from the one certified in P-Cert. This has 
three possibilities (the possibilities are the same as the ones in case number 2 
-l-ove) au 
9 The encrypted key is not the one certified in P-Cert. This has three 
possibilities (the possibilities are the same as the ones in case number 2 
above) 
9 The signed payment is the same as payment that is certified in P-Cert 
Result: M can detect that C is dishonest when (a) M computes the hash value for 
enc. kc(P) and compares it with the hash value of encrypted payment (heP) included in 
P-Cert; and (b) M computes the hash value for enc. pkct(kc) and compares it with the 
hash value of encrypted kc (heKc) included in P-Cert. 
To sum up the cases appear in Table 5, it is clear from the possibilities 
discussed in Table 5 that if C tried to cheat on M by including incorrect items in E-M I 
then M will be able to detect it and refuse to exchange the digital product with C. 
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Therefore, the fairness is ensured for both C and M. However, if C behaved honestly 
in E-MI but disappeared before sending the decryption key in E-M3 or sent incorrect 
E-M3 then the TTP can guarantee the fairness and will send the decryption key to M if 
they find that M is honest. 
6.3.2. Dispute Analysis 
For the EMH protocol, the exchange between C and M is for the digital 
product (from M) and the decryption key for the encrypted payment (from Q. This is 
because C sends the encrypted payment to M in message E-M I and M will verify it 
and if satisfied then the exchange of the digital product (by M) and the decryption key 
(by Q will take place. The order of the exchange of the digital product and the 
decryption key in the EMH protocol is as follows. C will receive a correct digital 
product before M receives the decryption key. 
C m 
Receive Receive Result 
digital product decryption key 
I No dispute 
2 x Not 
applicable 
3 x M disputes 
No dispute 
4 x x 
Not applicable in 
EMH protocol / M's 
fault 
Table 6: Disputes possibilities for EMH 
Table 6 shows all possible cases for disputes for the EMH protocol. Each case 
is discussed below. In Table 6, (X) means either the party (C or M) has not received 
the item (digital product or decryption key) at all or they received incorrect item; 
whereas (ý) means the correct item is received. 
Chapter 6: EMH Protocol 112 
In case 1, both C and M receive the correct items (i. e. C receives the correct digital 
product and M receives the correct decryption key) from each other. Hence, there 
is no dispute. 
2) In case 2, C has either received incorrect digital product or not received the digital 
product at all, and M received the correct decryption key. This case is not 
applicable in the EMH protocol because M has to send a correct digital product to 
be able to receive the correct decryption key 
3) In case 3, C received a correct digital product, and M either received incorrect 
decryption key or has not received the decryption key at all. In this case M will 
dispute to TTP 
4) In case 4, there are four possibilities which are: 
a) Both C and M have not received anything from each other. So, no dispute 
will be made as both of them have not revealed their items. This represents 
the case where M received E-M 1 and did not send E-M2 to C 
b) Both C and M have received incorrect items from each other. That is, C 
received incorrect digital product and M received incorrect decryption key. 
This case is not applicable in the EMH protocol because M has to send a 
correct digital product to be able to receive the correct decryption key. So, if 
C found that the digital product is incorrect then C will not send the 
decryption key at all i. e. neither correct decryption key nor incorrect 
decryption key 
c) C received an incorrect digital product and M has not received the 
decryption key at all. This case is normal because if the digital product is 
incorrect then C will not send the decryption key to M. That is, M has to 
send a correct digital product to be able to receive the correct decryption key 
from C. Therefore, if this case occurs then for M to raise a dispute to the 
TTP, M needs to send to the TTP the correct digital product. If M sends the 
correct digital product to the TTP then the TTP will make a resolution to 
both C and M. That is, C will received two digital products (the incorrect 
digital product from M, and the correct digital product from TTP) and this is 
the penalty that M pays for being dishonest. However, if the TTP found that 
the digital product is incorrect then M's dispute will be rejected. Note that 
the incorrect digital product that C may have received from M means either a 
digital product that is not valid (not working software for example) or a 
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digital product that is not the one C wants (C wants a piece of music for 
artist X and received a piece of music for artist Y) 
d) C has not received the digital product at all and M received incorrect 
decryption key. This case is not applicable in the EMH protocol because M 
has to send a correct digital product to be able to receive the correct 
decryption key. So, if C has not received the correct digital product then C 
will not send the decryption key at all 
The design of the EMH protocol reduces the possibilities for having disputes. 
Additionally, only M will raise disputes as C will not send the decryption key unless 
the correct digital product is received from M. Hence, the EMIJ protocol enforces M 
to be honest. As a result, the possibilities for disputes are reduced by preventing them 
occurring. 
In addition to the previous cases, the following cases are studied: 
9M disputes that they have received incorrect payment. This is not possible 
because P-Cert guarantees that the payment is correct; and if M found that 
payment is incorrect or not the same as they requested then they should have 
not sent the digital product to C. So, it is M's fault if they send the digital 
product to C if they have any doubt about the correctness of the payment. 
Once M sends the digital product to C then this means that they are satisfied 
with the payment. Therefore, this dispute will not happen because M knows 
the rules of the protocol which allow M to check the payment before they send 
the digital product to C; and as a result M will not put themselves at risk 
9 It is clear that C will not raise a dispute because C will receive the digital 
product before they send the decryption key to M. However, the following 
cases are studied: 
oC claims that they have received incorrect digital product from M. This 
will not happen because M knows that if they send incorrect digital 
product then they will not receive the decryption key. Again, the idea 
of this protocol is to have one trustworthy party and enforce the other 
party to be honest if they are willing to exchange their item. Therefore, 
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if C received incorrect digital product then they will not send the 
decryption key to M i. e. C's item is not revealed and hence C does not 
need to dispute. 
oC claims that they have not received the decryption key to decrypt 
digital product. This is not applicable in this protocol because the 
digital product is encrypted with k7n that is sent by C; and hence C is 
able to decrypt the digital product as soon as they get it. However, if C 
found that D is not encrypted with km then C will not send the 
decryption key to M in E-M3. 
6.3.3. Scenarios Analysis 
There are different scenarios for executing the EMH protocol by C and M. 
These scenarios include: 
a) having both C and M are behaving honestly 
b) C is behaving dishonestly and M is behaving honestly 
c) M is behaving dishonestly and C is behaving honestly 
d) having both C and M are behaving dishonestly 
The possible scenarios for executing the EMH protocol are as follows: 
1. C and M are honest which result in normal execution. That is, C sends a 
correct E-MI, M sends a correct E-M2, and C sends a correct E-M3 (Figure 
22). 
E-Ml - 
c E-W -m 
c 
EE-M3- 
Figure 22: EMH Protocol, Scenario I 
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2. After receiving E-M 1, M quits the protocol because either E-M I is incorrect or 
M is no longer interested in the exchange (Figure 23). 
c -E-Ml 
c 
Figure 23: EMH Protocol, Scenario 2 
3. After receiving E-MI, M contacts the TTP before sending E-M2 to C. 
However, the TTP found that DR-Ml is incorrect. Therefore, the TTP sends 
: J, awort message to M. In this scenario M tries to cheat but they gained nothing 
(Figure 24) 
Figure 24: EMH Protocol, Scenario 3 
4. The same as scenario number 3 but in here, the TTP found that DR-Ml is 
correct. Therefore, the TTP will make it fair for both C and M by sending the 
resolution to C in DR-M2 and also by sending the resolution to M in DR-M3. 
In this scenario M tries to cheat but TTP makes it fair for both C and M 
(Figure 25) 
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Figure 25: EMH Protocol, Scenario 4 
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5. After M received E-Ml from C, M found that E-Ml is correct and hence M 
sends E-M2 to C. M waited to receive E-M3 from C but nothing is received. 
Therefore, M contacted the TTP for resolution. However, the TTP found that 
DR-MI is incorrect and hence the TTP sends an abort message to M. Note, 
there are two possibilities why C did not send E-M3 to A These possibilities 
are either because C found that E-M2 is incorrect or because C is dishonest. If 
it is the former (where E-M2 is incorrect) then it is M's fault for sending an 
incorrect message to C. While, if it is the later (where E-M2 is correct but C is 
dishonest) then M needs to send correct DR-MI to the TTP to be able to 
receive a resolution (Figure 26) 
Figure 26: EMH Protocol, Scenario 5 
6. The same as scenario number 5 but here, DR-Ml that M sent to the TTP is 
correct. Therefore, the TTP resolves it by sending DR-M2 to C and DR-M3 to 
M. Again, the reason for C not sending E-M3 to M is either because E-M2 is 
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incorrect or because C is dishonest. If it is because E-M2 is incorrect, then for 
M to receive the DR-M3 (which is the decryption key for the encrypted 
payment) then M has to send correct DR-Ml to the TTP. When the TTP 
received the correct DR-Ml then the TTP will make it fair for both C and M. 
While if C did not send E-M3 to M because C is dishonest, then M has to send 
the correct DR-M I to the TTP for the dispute to be resolved (Figure 27). 
Figure 27: EMH Protocol, Scenario 6 
7. After M received E-Ml from C, M found that E-Ml is correct and hence M 
sends E-M2 to C. Then, C found that E-M2 is correct. Hence, C sends E-M3 to 
M. After receiving E-M3, M contacted the TTP for resolution. However, the 
TTP found that DR-Ml is incorrect. Therefore, the TTP sends an abort 
message to M. There are two possibilities why M contacted the TTP in this 
scenario. The first one is because E-M3 is incorrect. The second one is because 
E-M3 is correct but M wants to see what they can receive from the TTP and 
thus trying to get an advantage over C. In both possibilities, M has to send 
correct DR-M 1 to receive a resolution (Figure 28) 
Chapter 6: EMH Protocol 
Figure 28: EMH Protocol, Scenario 7 
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8. The same as scenario number 7 but in here, DR-M I that M sends to the TTP is 
correct. Therefore, the TTP resolve it by sending DR-M2 to C and DR-M3 to 
M (Figure 29) 
Figure 29: EMH Protocol, Scenario 8 
Therefore, it is clear from the above scenarios that fairness is ensured for both 
C and A 
On the other hand, the following studies the scenarios where the messages (E- 
MI) E-M2, E-M3, DR-Ml, DR-M2, and DR-M3) of the EMH protocol are sent but 
have not been received because of the failure in the communication channels between 
the parties involved in the protocols: 
If E-M I is not received by M then the fairness will not be compromised 
because no one revealed their item as M will not send E-M2 
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2) If E-M2 is not received by C then C will consider that M is not interested in 
the exchange and hence C will not send E-M3. As a result, M will wait for E- 
M3 from C and as if C has not received E-M2 from M then C will not send E- 
M3. Therefore, M will contact the TTP for resolution. However, there is a 
possibility of having failure in the communication channel. So, this possibility 
will be studied later (see case 4) 
3) If E-M3 is not received by M then M will consider it as C behaving 
dishonestly, As a result, M will contact the TTP for resolution. However, there 
is a possibility of having the communication channel failed. So, this possibility 
will be studied in the next case (see case 4) 
4) If DR-MI is not received by the TTP then M needs to re-contact the TTP 
asking for a resolution again 
5) If DR-M2 is not received by C then there are two possibilities: 
a) , If DR-M2 is not received by C (and also C has not received a correct E- 
M2) and at the same time DR-M3 is not received by M then the fairness 
is not compromised 
b) If DR-M2 is not received by C but DR-M3 is received by M then the 
fairness is compromised if and only if C has not received a correct E-M2 
6) If DR-M3 is not received bý M then there are two possibilities: 
a) If DR-M3 is not received by M and at the same time DR-M2 is not 
received by C (and also C has not received a correct E-M2) then the 
fairness is not compromised 
b) If DR-M3 is not received by M but DR-M2 is received by C then the 
fairness is compromised if and only if M has not received a correct E-M3 
i. e. when M received a correct E-M3 they contacted the TTP 
As can be seen in these cases, the communication channels between C and 
TTP, and, M and TTP should be resilient for the fairness to be ensured. To ensure 
fairness even in the case of communication channels failure the fault tolerance 
techniques need to be applied to the EMH protocol. However, this is out of the scope 
of this thesis. Hence, it is left as a future work. 
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6.4. Summary 
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The EMH protocol is presented and analysed in this chapter. It has been shown 
that the number of messages is reduced when we apply the technique of having a 
trustworthy customer and enforcing the merchant to be honest in the fair exchange 
protocols. That is, only three messages are exchanged between the customer and the 
merchant. 
It has been shown in this chapter that each party (customer and merchant) will 
be able to detect the dishonesty of the other party. If a party detects that the other party 
is dishonest then they will not send their item to them. All dispute possibilities for the 
EMH protocol have been presented. The possible scenarios of executing the EMH 
protocol have been discussed. 
This chapter presented the EMH protocol where the merchant is enforced to be 
honest; whereas the previous chapter presented the ECH protocol where the customer 
is enforced to be honest. The same ideas that are applied in the ECH protocol and the 
EMH protocol were used in order to propose a fair exchange protocol that enforces 
both parties (customer and merchant) to be honest. However, it has been found that 
enforcing the honesty of the both parties is not possible in the optimistic fair 
exchange, This is because the party that is enforced to be honest is the party who 
reveals their unencrypted item first (or the item is encrypted with a key that the other 
party knows of). That is, in the ECH protocol the customer is the first party who 
reveals the payment that is encrypted with a key that the merchant knows of. 
Therefore, the customer is enforced to be honest in the ECH protocol. In the EMH 
protocol, however, the merchant is the first party who reveals the digital product that 
is encrypted with a key that the customer knows of. Therefore, the merchant is 
enforced to be honest in the EMH protocol. As a result, enforcing both parties to be 
honest (in the optimistic approach) is not possible as only one party has to reveal their 
item first. 
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Chapter Seven 
7. Encouraging Customer and 
Honesty Protocol 
7.1 Introduction 
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Merchant 
This chapter presents a fair exchange protocols that is based on having two 
trustworthy parties i. e. customer and merchant. The ideas used in the ECH and EMH 
protocols have been combined to produce a protocol that encourages (rather that 
enforces as explained in the previous chapter) the customer and merchant to be honest. 
In this chapter, this protocol will be discussed and analysed. 
7.2 ECMH Protocol Description 
7.2.1 Description 
The Encouraging Customer and Merchant Honesty (ECMH) protocol is an 
optimistic fair exchange for exchanging a digital product D with a payment. The basic 
idea of the ECMH protocol is to provide the parties (C and M) with certificates that let 
the parties test the trustworthiness of one another. Therefore, there is no point for a 
party to be dishonest. Hence, the ECMH encourages the parties to be honest. 
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The trustworthiness of C is governed by two things which are the payment 
certificate (P-Cert) issued by the CB and the public key certificate (C. ct) issued by the 
TTP. Therefore, the payment that will be sent by C is certified by the CB; and the 
public key to be used by C to encrypt the key used to encrypt this payment is certified 
by the TTP. The trustworthiness of M is also governed by two things which are the 
digital product certificate (D-Cert) issued by the CA and the public key certificate 
(C. mt) issued by the TTP. Therefore, the digital product that will be sent by M is 
certified by the CA; and the public key to be used by M to encrypt the key used to 
encrypt this digital product is certified by the TTP. Therefore, this protocol 
encourages both C and M to be honest by sending correct items as each party will be 
nil able to detect if the received item is incorrect. 
The ECMH protocol is like C and M exchanging their encrypted items 
(payment and digital product) and their certificates. These encrypted items and their 
certificates will test the trustworthy of each party. If the parties found that the other 
party is trustworthy then they will complete the exchange otherwise they abort it. 
Hence, there is no point of being dishonest. 
The ECMH protocol consists of two phases. The pre-exchange phase and the 
exchange phase. In the pre-exchange phase, the merchant gets the digital product and 
the certificates (from trusted authorities) to be used in the exchange phase. 
Additionally, the customer gets the payment and the certificates (from trusted 
authorities) to be used in the exchange phase. In the exchange phase, the customer and 
the merchant exchange their items. It is not necessarily that the exchange phase comes 
immediately after the pre-exchange phase. 
7.2.2 Pre-exchange phase 
In the pre-exchange phase (Figure 3 1), C needs to get the certificate C. ct of the 
shared public key from the TTP to be used to encrypt the key used to encrypt the 
payment (that is in messages PE-M Ia and PE-M Ib of Figure 3 1). C also needs to get 
the payment and its certificate P-Cert Erom the CB (that is in messages PE-M2a and 
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PE-M2b of Figure 3 1). Also in the pre-exchange phase (Figure 30) M needs to get the 
certificate C. mt of the shared public key from the TTP to be used to encrypt the key 
used to encrypt D (that is in messages PE-Mla and PE-Mlb of Figure 30). M also 
needs to get the digital product (D) and its certificate D-Cert from the CA (that is in 
messages PE-M2a and PE-M2b of Figure 30), (the CA can be thought of as the 
producer of the digital product). 
T, 
I PE-Mla., Request shaH,,, ng a key I 
-j-d- ___j I I- PE-Mlb: C. rnL i, 
t1 
PE-M2a- Cmt + ým + Digul Produoi ID 1 
PE-M2b: D+ D-Cort 
Figure 30: ECMH Pre-exchange Phase (1) 
UP 
t I PIEWI a: Rw4ussl shwiN a key 
I- IF PE4,11b: C ul, I 
rllm 
PE-M2a: C, ct + kc -+ ammnl, + payee I 
PF--I, A2b: Payment + P-Cerl 
Figure 31: ECMH Pre-exchange Phase (2) 
In this protocol, there are two public keys to be shared. The first one is shared 
between the TTP and C. The other one is shared between the TTP and M. The way in 
which these keys are shared is as follows. 
9 Each party x (x C C, M, CB, CA and TTP) has its own public (pkx) and 
private (skx) keys. 
o The CB's public key is denoted as pkcb = (ecb, ncb) and its 
corresponding private key is denoted as skcb = (dcb, ncb). 
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o The CA's public key is denoted as pkca = (eca, nca) and its 
corresponding private key is denoted as skca = (dca, nca). 
" The TTP's public key is denoted as pkt = (et, nt) and its corresponding 
private key is denoted as skt = (dt, nt). 
" C's public key is denoted as pkc = (ec, nc) and its corresponding 
private key is denoted as skc = (dc, nc) 
" M's public key is denoted as pkm = (em, nm) and its corresponding 
private key is denoted as skm = (dm, nm). 
The shared public key between C and the TTP is denoted as pkct = (ect, nct) 
and its corresponding private key is denoted as skct = (dct, nct). 
The shared public key between M and the TTP is denoted as pkmt = (emt, 
nmt) and its corresponding private key is denoted as skmt = (dint, nmt). 
7.2.3 The Exchange Phase 
It is assumed that the exchange phase will take place after C finds the wanted 
digital product (D) with M. It is also assumed that this phase will take place after C 
and M agree on the digital product and negotiated the price. Hence this phase is about 
the actual exchange of payment and digital product D. 
ustomef 
Verify E-M2 
[E-Mll: desc + one. kc(p) + P-Cerl + C-ct+ onc-pket(kc) + Sig. c(P) 
[E. 412]: eric, ým(D) + D-Geit + C-mt i, enc, pkmgkm) , Sig. m(D) 
[EýWjý enc. pkm(skcl) 
(E-M4): anc. pkc(skmt) 
VeHfy E-M4 
Figure 32: ECMH Exchange Phase 
Merchart 
Verify E-M 1 
Verify E-M3 
There are four messages to be exchanged between M and C in the exchange 
phase (Figure 32). These four messages are as follows: 
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[E-Mll C --- ý M: desc + enc. kc(P) + P-Cert + C. ct+ enc. pkct(kc) + Sig-c(P) 
C sends to M the first message E-M I which contains the following: 
dese: specifies what C wants from M i. e. description of D that C wants (the 
description can be the digital product ID) 
ene. kc(P): the payment that is encrypted with the key kc. kc is generated by C 
P-Cert: the payment certificate that is issued by the CB 
C. ct: the shared public key certificate that is issued by the TTP 
enc. pUt(kc): the key kc (that is used to encrypt the payment) is encrypted 
using the shared public key pkct that is certified in C ct 
9 Sigx(P): C's signature on the payment. This signature can serve as non- 
repudiation of origin which allows M to be sure that the payment is sent by C. 
C's signature on payment is the encryption of the hash value of payment using 
C's private key (skc) 
[E-M2] M --4 C: enc. km(D) + D-Cert + C. mt + ene. pkmt(km) + Sig. m(D) 
On receiving message E-Ml from C, M checks the correctness of enc. kc(P), 
enc. pkct(kc), Sig. c(P), P-Cert and Ca. The correctness of P-Cert can be checked by 
verifying the CB's signature on P-Cert and the correctness of Cct can be checked by 
verifying the TTP's signature on Ca. 
To check that the encrypted payment is correct, M needs to check three things 
(1) the amount field in P-Cert against the price field in D-Cert that M has. This is to 
make sure that the payment meets the asked price; (2) the payment itself, and (3) the 
encrypted payment with kc i. e. enc. kc(P). 
To check the correctness of the payment, M needs to get the hash value of 
payment (calculated as HP) by decrypting Sig. c(P) using C's public key pkc (the 
public keys of all parties are publicly available) and then compare it with hash value 
of the payment (hP) that is included in P-Cert. That is, to check the following: 
HP ?= hP 
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If they are the same then M can be sure that C signed the correct payment. 
To check the correctness of the encrypted payment enc. kc(P), M computes the 
hash value of enc. kc(P) (calculated as HeP) and then compare it with the hash value of 
encrypted payment with kc i. e. heP which is included in P-Cert (note that it is 
assumed that M will use the same function used by the CB to compute the hash 
value). That is, to check the following: 
HeP ?= heP 
If they are the same then M can be sure that C encrypted the payment using kc 
and not another key. 
M also needs to check the correctness of kc which is used to encrypt the 
payment. To do so, M computes the hash value of enc. pkct(kc) (calculated as HeKc) 
and then compare it with heKc that is included in P-Cert, so M will check the flowing: 
HeKc ?= heKc 
If they are the same then M can be sure that the encrypted key is kc and not 
another key. The point here is to make sure that C is honest by sending the key used to 
encrypt the payment. 
Therefore, if all comparisons are correct then, at this point, M will have the 
following fact. The encrypted payment is correct (i. e. it is the one certified in P-Cert) 
and it is indeed encrypted with kc. In addition, the encrypted key in enc. pkct(kq) is 
indeed kc and not another key. The shared public key pkct used to encrypt kc is 
certified by TTP, Therefore, once M got the private key (skct) of the shared public key 
then M will be able to get the payment (by first decrypting enc. pkct(kq) to get kc and 
then decrypting enc. kc(P) using kc). 
Now, it is M's choice to complete the exchange or abort the protocol. If M 
wants to exchange D for the payment then M sends (in E-M2) the following to C: 
* enc. km(D): the digital product D that is encrypted with the key km (km Is 
generated by M). This D must be the one described by C in E-M I in desc 
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D-Cert: the digital product certificate that is issued by the CA 
C-mt: the shared public key certificate that is issued by the TTP 
e enc. pkmt(km): the key km, that is used to encrypt D, encrypted using the 
shared public key pkmt that is certified in C. mt 
* Sig. m(D): M's signature on D. This signature can serve as non-repudiation of 
origin which allows C to be sure that D is sent by M. M's signature on D is the 
encryption of the hash value of D using M's private key skm 
Note that if M decides to abort the transaction after receiving message E-Ml 
and before sending message E-M2 to C then neither M nor C lose anything. 
[E-M31 C --ý M: enc. pkm(skct) 
On receiving message E-M2 from M, C checks the correctness of enc. km(D), 
enc. pkmt(km), Sig. m(D), D-Cert and Cmt. The correctness of D-Cert can be checked 
by verifying the CA's signature on D-Cert and the correctness of C. mt can be checked 
by verifying the TTP's signature on Cmt. 
To check the correctness of D, C needs to check two things which are the 
digital product D itself and the encrypted D with km i. e. enc-km(D). Firstly, to check 
the correctness of D, C needs to get the hash value of D (calculated as HD) by 
decrypting Sig. m(D) contained in message E-M2 using M's public key pkm (the 
public keys of all parties are publicly available) and then compare it with hash value 
of D (hD) contained in D-Cert. That is, to check the following: 
hD 
If they are the same then C can be sure that M signed the correct D. 
Secondly, to check the correctness of the encrypted D enc. krn(D), C computes 
the hash value of enc. pkmt(D) (calculated as HeD) and then compares it with the hash 
value of encrypted D with km i. e. heD which is contained in D-Cert (note that it is 
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assumed that C will use the same function used by the CA to compute the hash value) 
i. e. to check the following: 
HeD ?= heD 
If they are the same then C can be sure that M encrypted D using km and not 
another key. 
C also needs to check the correctness of km which is used to encrypt D. To do 
so, C computes the hash value of enc. pkmt(km) (calculated as HeKm) and then 
compares it with heKm that is included in D-Cert, so C will check the flowing: 
HeKm ?= heKm 
If they are compared then C can be sure that the encrypted key is krn and not 
another key. The point here is to make sure that M is honest by sending the key used 
to encrypt 
Therefore, if all comparisons are correct then, at this point, C will have the 
following fact. The encrypted D is correct (i. e. it is the one certified in D-Cert) and it 
is indeed encrypted with km. In addition, the encrypted key in enc. pkmt(km) is indeed 
km arid not another key. The shared public key pkmt used to encrypt km is certified by 
TTP. Therefore, once C got the private key (skmt) of the shared public key then C will 
be able to get D (by first decrypting enc. pkmt(km) to get km and then decrypting 
enc. km(D) using km). 
Note that C must be sure that the encrypted D matches their requirements as 
explained earlier, otherwise C will be at risk if they send a correct E-M3 to M because 
when C sends to M the decryption key then this means that they are satisfied with E- 
M2 and hence M will be able to decrypt the payment. 
Now, it is C's choice to complete the exchange or abort the protocol. If C 
wants to exchange the payment for D then C sends to M the decryption key skct 
encrypted using M's public key pkm to allow M be able to decrypt the encrypted 
payment. 
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Note that if C decides to abort the transaction after receiving message E-M2 
and before sending message E-M3 to M then neither C nor M lose anything. But once 
C sends a correct E-M3 to M then the transaction must be completed and the protocol 
will guarantee that the exchange of payment and D will be fair if the sent items are as 
they described i. e. the payment matches the price in D-Cert and also the digital 
product matches desc that appears in message E-Ml. 
[E-M4] M ----* C: enc. pkc(skmt) 
On receiving message E-M3, M decrypts enc. pkm(skct) using M's private key 
skm to get the private key skct. Once M got ska then they decrypt enc. pkct(kc) to get 
kc that can be used to decrypt the encrypted payment received in E-M I. 
If M managed to get the payment correctly then M sends to C in E-M4 the 
decryption key skmt that is encrypted using C's public key. 
On receiving message E-M4, C decrypts enc. pkc(skmt) using C's private key 
skc to get the private key sk7nt. Once C got skmt then they decrypt enc. pkmt(km) to get 
km that can be used to decrypt the encrypted D received in E-M2. 
If C managed to get D correctly then the protocol finishes and the fair 
exchange of payment and digital product is ensured. If, however, C has any dispute 
then they can contact the TTP for resolution (the dispute resolution will be discussed 
in the following section). 
7.2.4 Dispute resolution 
All disputes requests, if any, will come from C since M will not need to raise 
disputes as they get the decryption key of the encrypted payment and decrypt it before 
they send the decryption key of the digital product to C. Thus, if C has a dispute, the 
following messages are sent (see Figure 33): 
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ITP 
[DR-Mil: D-Cwt + C-ct enc, pkl(skrA)+ Sig m(E)) I 
[DR-M31: enc, pkciskmi) 
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Mercýt 
Vefify DR-M 1 
[DR-M21- enc pkm(skct) 
Figure 33: ECMH Dispute Resolution 
[DR-Mll C --. > TTP: D-Cert + C. mt + C. ct + enc. pkt(skct) + Sig. m(D) 
In case C has a dispute, they need to send to the TTP the following: D-Cert, 
C. mt, Cct, enc. Pkt(skct) and M's signature on D that has been received in message E- 
M2 of the exchange phase. 
[DR-M21 TTP --+ M: enc. pkm(skct) 
On receiving message DR-M] above, the TTP will check the correctness of D- 
Cert, Cmt, Cct by checking their signatures. If they are correct then the TTP will 
decrypt the signature of M on D. That is, TTP decrypts Sig. m(D) to get the hash value 
of D included in the signature and then compares it with the hash value of D (hD) 
which is included in D-Cert. If the TTP managed to decrypt Sig. m(D) correctly and 
the two hashes are the same then the TTP is sure that M was satisfied with the 
payment that C sent to them in message E-Ml of the exchange phase. This is because 
no other party can sign D as it needs M's private key which is only held by M. If M 
was not satisfied then they would not send Sig. m(D) to C in message E-M2. In other 
words, M will send message E-M2 (which includes Sig. m(D)) only if they are sure 
that the payment sent by C is correct. If TTP found that the certificates and the 
signature of M is correct then TTP sends to M the decryption key skct (encrypted with 
M's public key) to be used to get kc that decrypts the encrypted payment. The reason 
for sending the decryption key skct to M (as M is not the one who raises the dispute) is 
because C may have not sent the decryption key to M in message E-M3 or has sent 
incorrect decryption key. 
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Otherwise, if the TTP found that either the certificates are incorrect or the 
signature of M is incorrect then the TTP sends an abort message to C and nothing will 
be sent to M. 
[DR-M31 TTP --+ C: enc. pkc(skmt) 
OR 
TTP --* C: aborts; 
This is the same process for message DR-M2 above, if the TTP found that 
Sig. m(D) is correct then the TTP sends to C the decryption key skmt (encrypted with 
C's public key) to be used to get km that decrypts the encrypted D. Otherwise if 
Sig m(D) is incorrect then the TTP sends an abort message to C. CD , 
It is clear that if either C has sent incorrect decryption key skct to M or C has 
not sent the decryption key at all in message E-M3 then C will not get an advantage 
over M because the TTP will check DR-M] that C send to the TTP in order to check 
the signature of M. If the signature is correct then the TTP will send the decryption 
keys to both parties (C and M) to ensure fairness. Therefore, the fairness is ensured for 
both C and A However, if the signature of M is incorrect then the TTP will reject C's 
request for a dispute. 
As can be seen in the dispute resolution phase, the TTP does not need to have 
both C and M to be involved in order for the dispute to be resolved; rather only the 
disputant (C in this protocol) and the TTP will be involved. That is, the TTP does not 
need to contact M to verify whether or not they have received the correct decryption 
key; rather the TTP asks C to provide all evidences and finally will make the 
resolution. M will only be contacted by the TTP if the dispute has a resolution. 
Therefore, this will reduce the number of messages needed to resolve disputes. 
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7.3 ECMH Protocol Analysis 
In this section, the ECMH protocol will be analysed. The analysis includes the 
ability of parties to detect the dishonesty of one another, disputes analysis, and 
presenting an discussing all possible scenarios. 
7.3.1 Detection of Dishonesty 
The same analysis that has been done for the ECH protocol and the EMH 
protocol will be done for the ECMH protocol. 
The ways in which the customer may act dishonestly are by: 
1. sending an incorrect E-Ml; and 
2. sending an incorrect E-M3 
Incorrect E-M3 can be constructed by sending incorrect decryption key (ska). 
However, there are different ways in which incorrect E-MI can be constructed. These 
are exactly the same possibilities mentioned for message E-M I for the EMH protocol; 
see Table 5 in the EMH Protocol Chapter. Therefore, to avoid repetition these 
possibilities will not be discussed again. 
On the other hand, the ways in which the merchant may act dishonestly are by: 
1. sending an incorrect E-M2; 
2. sending an incorrect E-M4; and 
3. not sending E-M4 
In case 2, there is only one possibility by which E-M4 can be incorrect. This 
possibility is by sending an incorrect decryption key (skmt). In case 3 there is also one 
possibility which is not sending E-M4 to C. However, there are different ways in 
which incorrect E-M2 can be constructed. These are exactly the same possibilities 
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mentioned for message E-M I for the ECH protocol; see Table 2 in the ECH Protocol 
Chapter. Therefore, to avoid repetition these possibilities will not be discussed again. 
Therefore, if C tried to act dishonestly then M will be able to detect it. Also, if 
M tried to act dishonestly then C will be able to detect it. As a result, the fairness is 
ensured for both C and M in the ECMH protocol. 
7.3.2 Dispute Analysis 
For the ECMH, the actual exchange between C and M is for the decryption 
key in E-M3 (from Q and the decryption key in E-M4 (from M). This is because C 
and M exchanged their encrypted items in messages E-M I and E-M2. Therefore, after 
receiving the first message (E-M I) M will verify it and if satisfied they will send the 
second message (E-M2) to C. If C is satisfied with the second message then the 
exchange of the decryption keys between C and M will take place. The order of the 
exchange of the decryption keys in the ECMH protocol is as follows. M will receive a 
correct decryption key from C before C receives the correct decryption key from M. 
C m 
Receive decryption 
key (E-M4) 
Receive decryption 
key (E-M3) 
Result 
I No dispute 
2 x Not applicable 
3 x C disputes 
4 x x 
No dispute / Not 
applicable in ECMH 
protocol / C's fault 
Table 7: Disputes possibilities for ECMH 
Table 7 shows all possible cases for disputes for the ECMH protocol. Each 
case is discussed below. In Table 7, (X) means either the party (C or M) has not 
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received the item (decryption key) at all or they received incorrect item; whereas 
means the correct item is received. 
In case 1, both C and M receive the correct item (i. e. C receives the correct 
decryption key and M receives the correct decryption key) from each other. 
Hence, there is no dispute. 
2) In case 2, C received a correct decryption key, and M either received incorrect 
decryption key or has not received the decryption key at all. This case is not 
applicable in the ECMH protocol because C has to send a correct decryption key 
to M to be able to receive the correct decryption key from M. 
3) In case 3, C has either received incorrect decryption key or not received the 
decryption key at all, and M received the correct decryption key. In this case C 
will dispute to the TTP. 
4) In case 4, there are four possibilities which are: 
a) Both C and M have not received anything from each other. So, no 
dispute will be made as both of them have not revealed their items (the 
decryption keys). This represents the case where C received E-M2 and 
did not send E-M3 to M or the case where C sends E-M I to M but M 
does not send E-M2 to C. 
b) Both C and M have received incorrect items from each other. That is, C 
received incorrect decryption key and M received incorrect decryption 
key. This case is not applicable in the ECMH protocol because C has to 
send a correct decryption key to be able to receive the correct 
decryption key from M. So, if M found that the decryption key is 
incorrect then M will not send to C the decryption key at all. 
c) C received an incorrect decryption key and M has not received the 
decryption key at all. This case is not applicable in the ECMH protocol 
because C has to send a correct decryption key to M to be able to 
receive the correct decryption key from M. So, if M has not received 
the decryption key then M will not send the decryption key at all. 
d) C has not received the decryption key at all and M received incorrect 
decryption key. This case is normal to occur because if C sent incorrect 
decryption key then M will not send their decryption key to C. 
Therefore, if this case occurs then for C to raise a dispute to the TTP, C 
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needs to send to the TTP the correct DR-Ml (see message DR-Ml of 
the dispute resolution phase of the ECMH protocol). If C sends the 
correct DR-M 1 to the TTP then the TTP will make a resolution to both 
C and M. However, if the TTP found that DR-M I is incorrect then C's 
dispute will be rejected 
The design of the ECMH protocol reduces the possibilities for having disputes. 
Additionally, only C will raise disputes as M will not send their item unless the items 
from C are correct. As a result, the possibilities for disputes are reduced by preventing 
them occurring. 
In addition to the previous cases, the following cases are studied: 
9C disputes that they have received incorrect digital product. This is not 
possible scenario because D-Cert guarantees that the digital product is 
correct; and if C found that the digital product is incorrect or not the same as 
they wanted then they should have not sent to M the decryption key in E-M3. 
So, it is C's fault to send to M the decryption key if they have any doubt 
about the digital product, Once C sends to M the decryption key then this 
means that they are satisfied with the digital product. Therefore, this scenario 
will not happen because C knows the rules of the protocol which allow C to 
check the digital product before they send the decryption key to M; and as a 
result C will not put themselves at risk 
0 It is clear that M will not raise a dispute because M will receive from C the 
decryption key skct and get the payment before they send the decryption key 
skmt to C. However, the following scenarios are studied: 
oM claims that they have received incorrect payment from C. This will 
not occur because if M received incorrect payment then they will not 
send the encrypted digital product in message E-M2 i. e. if M found 
that the payment is incorrect then they would not send the encrypted 
digital product to C and hence no one will get advantage over the 
other party. However, once M sends message E-M2 to C then this 
means that they are satisfied with the encrypted payment 
Chapter 7: ECMH Protocol 136 
oM claims that they have not received the decryption key skct. This is 
not applicable in this protocol because if the decryption key is not 
received then no party is hurt and the fairness is not compromised. 
The reason for not receiving the decryption key skct may be because 
C is not satisfied with the encrypted digital product or C is no longer 
interested in the exchange 
oM claims that they have received incorrect decryption key skct from 
C. This is not applicable in this protocol because if the decryption 
key is incorrect then no party is hurt and the fairness is not 
compromised as if the Act is incorrect then M will not send their 
decryption key (skmt) to C 
7.3.3 Scenarios Analysis 
There are different scenarios for executing the ECMH protocol by C and M. 
These scenarios include: 
a) having both C and M are behaving honestly 
b) C is behaving dishonestly and M is behaving honestly 
c) M is behaving dishonestly and C is behaving honestly 
d) having both C and M are behaving dishonestly 
The possible scenarios for executing the ECMH protocol are as follows: 
1. C and M are honest which result in normal execution. That is, C sends a 
correct E-Ml, M sends a correct E-M2, C sends a correct E-M3, and M sends a 
correct E-M4 (Figure 34) 
E-Nll 
c 
E-M2 
m 
E-M3 
cc 
E-M4 
Figure 34: ECMH Protocol, Scenario 1 
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2. After receiving E-M 1, M quits the protocol because either E-M I is incorrect or 
M is no longer interested in the exchange (Figure 35) 
E-Ml 
Figure 35: ECMH Protocol, Scenario 2 
3. After receiving E-M 1, M found that E-M I is correct and hence they sent E-M2 
to C. However, C quits the protocol after receiving E-M2 because either E-M2 
is incorrect or C is no longer interested in the exchange (Figure 36) 
c 
-E-Ml -- 
E, 42-ý 
Figure 36: ECMH Protocol, Scenario 3 
4. After receiving E-M2, C contacts the TTP before sending E-M3 to M. 
However, the TTP found that DR-Ml is incorrect. Therefore, the TTP sends 
abort message to C. In this scenario C tries to cheat but they gained nothing 
(Figure 37) 
Figure 37: ECMH Protocol, Scenario 4 
5. The same as scenario number 4 but in here, the TTP found that DR-M I is 
correct. Therefore, the TTP will make it fair for both C and M by sending the 
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resolution to M in DR-M2 and also by sending the resolution to C in DR-M3. 
In this scenario C tries to cheat but the TTP makes it fair for both C and M 
(Figure 38) 
Figure 38: ECMH Protocol, Scenario 5 
6. After M received E-Ml from C, M found that E-Ml is correct and hence M 
sends E-M2 to C. Then, C validated E-M2 and found it correct as well. C is 
interested in the exchange and hence C sent E-M3 to M. C waited to receive E- 
M4 from M but nothing is received. Therefore, C contacted the TTP for 
resolution. However, the TTP found that DR-Ml is incorrect and hence the 
TTP sends an abort message to C. Note, there are two possibilities why M did 
not send E-M4 to C. These possibilities are either because M found that E-M3 
is incorrect or because M is dishonest. If it is the former (where E-M3 is 
incorrect) then it is C's fault to send incorrect message to A While, if it is the 
later (where E-M3 is correct but M is dishonest) then C needs to send correct 
DR-M I to the TTP to be able to receive a resolution (Figure 3 9) 
Figure 39: ECMH Protocol, Scenario 6 
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7. The same as scenario number 6 but in here, DR-Ml that C sent to the TTP is 
correct. Therefore, the TTP resolves it by sending DR-M2 to M and DR-M3 to 
C. Again, the reason for M not sending E-M4 to C is either because E-M3 is 
incorrect or because M is dishonest. When the TTP received the correct DR- 
MI then the TTP will make it fair for both C and M. If it is the case where M 
is dishonest (by not sending E-M4) then M will receive the same decryption 
key twice (one in E-M3 and the other in DR-M2), If, however, M did not send 
E-M4 because E-M3 is incorrect then the TTP will ensure fairness for both C 
and M (Figure 40) 
Figure 40: ECMH Protocol, Scenario 7 
8. After M received E-MI from C, M found that E-Ml is correct and hence M 
sent E-M2 to C. Then, C found that E-M2 is correct. Hence, C sent E-M3 to 
M. When M found that E-M3 is correct, they sent E-M4 to C. After receiving 
E-M4 C contacted the TTP. However, the TTP found that DR-Ml is incorrect. 
Therefore, the TTP sends an abort message to C. There are two possibilities 
why C contacted the TTP in this scenario, The first one is because E-M4 
is 
incorrect. The second one is because E-M4 is correct but C wants to see what 
they can receive from the TTP and thus trying to get an advantage over M. In 
both possibilities, C has to send correct DR-Ml to receive a resolution (Figure 
41) 
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Figure 41: ECMH Protocol, Scenario 8 
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9. The same as scenario number 8 but in here, DR-M I that C sends to the TTP is 
correct. Therefore, the TTP resolves it by sending DR-M2 to M and DR-M3 to 
C. Hence, the fairness is ensured for both C and M (Figure 42) 
Figure 42: ECMH Protocol, Scenario 9 
Note that there are other scenarios which include M sending dispute requests 
to the TTP but the TTP will find that DR-MI is incorrect as M has not got the key 
ska. Therefore, if this kind of scenario occurs then the TTP will reject the dispute 
request. 
Therefore, it is clear from the above scenarios that fairness is ensured for both 
C and M. 
On the other hand, the following studies the scenarios where the messages (E- 
Mlý E-M2, E-M3, E-M4, DR-Ml, DR-M2, and DR-M3) of the ECMH protocol are 
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sent but have not been received because of the failure in the communication channels 
between the parties involved in the protocol: 
1) If E-MI is not received by M then the fairness will not be compromised because 
no one revealed their item 
2) If E-M2 is not received by C then the fairness will not be compromised because no 
one revealed their item 
3) If E-M3 is not received by M then M will consider that C is not interested in the 
exchange and hence M will not send E-M4. As a result, C will wait for E-M4 from 
M and as M has not received E-M3 from C then M will not send E-M4. Therefore, 
C will contact the TTP for resolution. However, there is a possibility of having 
failure in the communication channel. So, this possibility will be studied later (see 
case 5) 
4) If E-M4 is not received by C then C will consider it as M behaving dishonestly. As 
a result, C will contact TTP for resolution. However, there is a possibility of 
having the communication channel failed. So, this possibility will be studied in the 
next step (see case 5) 
5) If DR-M I is not received by the TTP then C needs to re-contact the TTP asking 
for a resolution again 
6) If DR-M2 is not received by M then there are two possibilities: 
a) If DR-M2 is not received by M (and also E-M3 is not received by M) and 
at the same time DR-M3 is not received by C then the fairness is not 
compromised 
b) If DR-M2 is not received by M but DR-M3 is received by C then the 
fairness is compromised if and only if M has not received a correct E-M3 
7) If DR-M3 is not received by C then there are two possibilities: 
a) If DR-M3 is not received by C and at the same time E-M3 and DR-M2 are 
not received by M then the fairness is not compromised 
b) If DR-M3 is not received by C but either E-M3 or DR-M2 are received by 
M then the fairness is compromised if and only if C has not received a 
correct E-M4 i. e. when C received a correct E-M4 they contacted the TTP 
As can be seen in these cases, the communication channels between C and 
TTP, and M and TTP should be resilient for the fairness to be ensured. To ensure 
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fairness even in the case of communication channels failure the fault tolerance 
techniques need to be applied to the ECMH protocol. However, this is out of the scope 
of this thesis. Hence, it is left as a future work. 
7.4 Summary 
The ECMH protocol is presented and analysed in this chapter. The number of 
messages needed for the exchange of items in this protocol is four messages. 
It has been shown in this chapter that each party (customer and merchant) will 
be able to detect the dishonesty of the other party. If a party detects that the other party 
is dishonest then they will not send their item to them. All dispute possibilities for the 
ECMH protocol have been presented. The possible scenarios of executing the ECMH 
protocol have been discussed. 
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In this chapter the ECH, EMH, and ECMH protocols will first be compared 
against each other and then compared with other relevant protocols in the literature. 
8.2. Comparisons of the Three Protocols 
In this section, the ECH, EMH, and ECMH protocols will be compared against 
each other. 
8.2.1. ECH Protocol vs. EMH Protocol 
The number of messages in the exchange phase of the ECH protocol and the 
EMH protocol are three messages. Therefore, the two protocols have the same number 
of messages in the exchange phase. 
The way in which products (digital or physical) and payments are exchanged 
online is that a customer sends the payment to a merchant and then the merchant 
checks the correctness of the payment. If the payment is correct then the merchant 
sends the product to the customer. This way is applied in the EMH protocol. 
However, 
the way it is applied in the ECH protocol is that a merchant sends an encrypted 
digital 
product to the customer and then the customer checks the correctness of the encrypted 
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digital product. If the customer is satisfied with the digital product then they send the 
payment to the merchant. 
Each way has advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of the way it is 
applied in the EMH protocol is that it follows the conventional exchange order where 
the customer sends money first and then the merchant sends the product. Therefore, 
customers and merchants in the EMH protocol will not feel that there are changes in 
the way they conduct business. Whereas they will notice a difference in the ECH 
protocol as the merchant will start the exchange by sending the digital product. 
Additionally, in the EMH protocol, the merchant receives the first message (E-MI) 
which contains the encrypted payment and then the merchant may decide not to 
complete the exchange i. e. not to send the second message (E-M2) to the customer. 
However, in the ECH protocol the customer receives the first message (E-MI) which 
contains the encrypted digital product and then the customer may decide not to 
complete the exchange i. e. not to send the second message (E-M2) to the merchant. 
Therefore, if the ECH protocol and the EMH protocol are compared in this respect 
(i. e. the party who receives E-Ml decides not to complete the exchange because either 
they are not interested in the exchange or E-MI is incorrect), then the EMH protocol 
would be better in that the size of payment is smaller than the size of digital product. 
The EMH protocol puts more responsibility on merchant to find a digital 
product that matches customer's requirements. This is the way in which merchant is 
enforced to be honest and hence sends the correct digital product to customer in order 
to receive the decryption key to decrypt the encrypted payment. The ECH protocol, on 
the other hand, puts more responsibility on customer to send a correct payment in 
order to receive the decryption key to decrypt the encrypted digital product. This is the 
way in which customer is enforced to be honest in the ECH protocol. 
In the case of disputes, in the EMH protocol the party to raise disputes, if any, 
is the merchant whereas in the ECH protocol the party to raise disputes, if any, is the 
customer. The number of messages to be executed in case of dispute is three messages 
which are the same for both the ECH protocol and the EMH protocol. 
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The total size of messages (i. e. DR-M1, DR-M2, and DR-M3) in the dispute 
resolution phase for the EMH protocol is bigger than the size of messages (i. e. DR- 
M15 DR-M2, and DR-M3) in the dispute resolution phase for the ECH protocol. The 
reason for this is that in the EMH protocol the encrypted digital product is included in 
both DR-Ml and DR-M2; while, in the ECH protocol the encrypted payment is the 
one included in both DR-Ml and DR-M2. Therefore, it is clear that the size of digital 
product is bigger than the size of payment (especially if the size of digital product is 
very big). 
The ECH protocol enforces the customer to be honest whereas the EMH 
protocol enforces the merchant to be honest. Therefore, the idea of enforcing a party 
to be honest has been applied in both protocols. Both protocols ensure strong fairness. 
Regarding the number of modular exponentiations (which are the most 
expensive operations [NeZhChGo05]), both the ECH and the EMH protocols have the 
same number of modular exponentiations in the exchange phase with 11 modular 
exponentiations; and also in the dispute resolution phase with 7 modular 
exponentiations. 
8.2.2. ECH and EMH Protocols vs. ECMH Protocol 
The number of messages to be exchanged between merchant and customer in 
both the ECH protocol and the EMH protocol is only three messages whereas there 
are four messages in the ECMH protocol. 
In the case of disputes, three messages are sent to resolve disputes in all the 
three protocols. However, the items (payment and digital product) are not included in 
DR-M II DR-M2, and DR-M3 of the ECMH protocol; whereas these items are 
included in the ECH protocol (the payment is included) and the EMH protocol (the 
digital product is included). Therefore, the total size of messages in the dispute 
resolution phase in the ECMH protocol is smaller than the ones in the ECH and the 
EMH protocols. 
The number of modular exponentiations in the exchange phase of the ECMH 
protocol is 14 whereas the number of modular exponentiations in the dispute 
resolution phase of the ECMH protocol is 9. Therefore, both the ECH and the EMH 
protocols have lower numbers of modular exponentiations in both the exchange and 
dispute resolution phases. 
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The ECH protocol and the EMH protocol are more efficient than the ECMH 
protocol because of many reasons. Firstly, the ECH protocol and the EMH protocol 
have fewer messages in the exchange phase. Secondly, the ECMH protocol has more 
encryptions and certificates. That is, four certificates are included in the ECMH 
protocol in the exchange phase. These certificates are P-Cert, C. ct, D-Cert and C. mt 
whereas only two certificates are included in the ECH protocol and three certificates 
are included in the EMH protocol. Finally, the number of modular exponentiations in 
the exchange phase is greater in the ECMH protocol than the one in the ECH and the 
EMH protocols. Also, the number of modular exponentiations in the dispute 
resolution phase is greater in the ECMH protocol than the one in the ECH and the 
I 
EMH protocols. 
The Table 8 summarizes the comparisons between the three protocols 
presented in this thesis. 
ECH Protocol EMH Protocol ECMH Protocol 
# messages in 
3 3 4 
exchange phase 
# messages in 
3 3 3 
dispute phase 
Starts the 
M C C 
exchange 
Enforced to be 
C M N/A 
Honest 
Party who raises C M C 
disputes 
# of modular 
exponentiations 11 11 14 
(exchange phase) 
# of modular 
exponentiations 7 7 9 
(dispute resolution 
phase) 
Table 8: Comparisons between ECH, EMH, and ECMH protocols 
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8.2.3. Comparing the Timing of the Three Protocols 
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In this section, the timing of executing the ECH, EMH, and ECMH protocols 
will be compared. The timing numbers are in milliseconds and the numbers are the 
mean of running the protocols 10 times. 
The specification of the computer used to perform and measure these timings 
are as follows. The processor is Intel Pentium 4,2.4 Gliz, and 496 MB of RAM. 
For each protocol, three scenarios have been carried out. The first one is to 
have a digital product (D) that of size 28 KB, the second one is to have a digital 
product (D) that of size 2.2 MB, and the third one is to have a digital product (D) that 
of size 10 MB. 
Tables 9,10, and 11 represent the time comparisons tables for the ECH, the 
EMH, and the ECMH protocols, respectively. SD in Tables 9,10, and 11 refers to 
Standard Deviation. Note, some of the standard deviations in Tables 9,10 and II are 
larger than the mean because the distribution of the values is skewed and the values 
given are in milliseconds. Timings on a PC are not precise hence the distribution of 
values will probably be skewed. 
Scenario 1: digital Scenario 2: digital Scenario 3: digital 
product size= 28 product size= 2.2 product size= 10 
KB MB MB 
E-Ml 
40 (SD=9.4) 312.3 (SD=17.8) 1310.9 (SD=261.7) 
Construction 
E-Ml Verification 10 (S D=4.7) 50.3 (SD=0.4) 199.3 (SD=10.1) 
E-M2 
28.1 (SD=4.2) 29 (SD=3.1) 32 (SD=6.3) 
Construction 
E-M3 
17 (SD=8.2) 26 (SD=33.7) 54.1 (SD=62.7) 
Construction 
Payment 
2 (SD=4.2) 3 (SD=4.8) 4 (SD=6.9) 
decryption 
Digital product 164.1 (SD=17.7) 557.8(SD=18.2) 1394 (SD=59.4) 
decryption 
Total 261.2 978.4 2994.3 
Table 9: Timing of the ECH Protocol 
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Scenario 1. Scenario 2: Scenario 3: 
digital product digital product digital product 
size= 28 KB size= 2.2 MB size= 10 MB 
E-Ml 
32 (SD=4.4) 42 (SD=4.4) 38 (SD=4.5) 
Construction 
E-Ml 
18 (SD=8.3) 18 (SD=4.4) 18.2 (SD=4.6) 
Verification 
E-M2 1359.8 
38.2 (SD=4.6) 364.8 (SD=20.9) 
Construction (SD=136.4) 
E-M3 
II (SD=2.2) 12 (SD=4.4) 24 (SD=20.7) 
Construction 
Payment 
140.2 (SD=0.4) 138 (SD=4.4) 136 (SD=5.4) 
decryption 
Digital product 8 (SD=4.4) 248.6 (SD=3 8.1) 1009.6 (SD= 16.3) 
decryption 
Total 247.4 823.4 2585.6 
Table 10: Timing of the EMH Protocol 
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In the tables (9,10 and 11) the time gets bigger if a message includes the 
digital product. That is, the time needed to construct the message E-Ml of the ECH 
protocol (see table 9) when the digital product size equals 2.2 MB is greater than the 
time needed when the digital product size equals 28 KB. 
The time is roughly the same when a message does not include the digital 
product. Examples from the tables (9,10, and 11) are as follows. First, the timings of 
E-M2 construction, E-M3 construction, and payment decryption in table 9. Second, 
the timings of E-MI construction, E-Ml verification, E-M3 construction, payment 
decryption in table 10. Finally, the timings of E-MI construction, E-MI verification, 
E-M3 construction, E-M4 construction, and payment decryption in table 11. 
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Scenario 1: Scenario 2: Scenario 3: 
digital product digital product digital product 
size= 28 KB size= 2.2 MB size= 10 MB 
E-Ml 
Construction 
24 (SD=5.1) 21 (SD=3.1) 22 (SD=4.2) 
E-MI 
Verification 
12 (SD=4.2) 14 (SD=5.1) 13 (SD=4.8) 
E-M2 1369.9 
28 (SD=6.3) 346.6 (SD=20.7) 
Construction (SD=269.1) 
E-M2 
13.1 (SD=4.9) 5 1.1 (SD=3.1) 202.3 (SD=8.2) 
Verification 
E-M3 
3 1.1 (SD=26.9) 20 (SD=22.1) 36 (SD=41.9) 
Construction 
E-M4 
13 (SD=4.8) 15 (SD=9.7) 21.3 (SD=12.2) 
Construction 
Payment 
178.2 (SD=25.6) 185.3 (SD=56.2) 157.1 (SD=4.9) 
decryption 
Digital product 1570.4 
157.3 (SD=9.4) 591 (SD=51.2) 
decryption (SD=172.6) 
Total 456.7 1244 3392 
Table 11: Timing of the ECMH Protocol 
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It is worth mentioning that the time needed to decrypt the same item is 
different in each protocol. That is, the time needed to decrypt the payment in the ECH 
protocol (see table 9) is less than the time needed to decrypt the payment in the EMH 
protocol (see table 10). The reason for this is that the merchant in the ECH protocol 
has the decryption key that decrypts the payment (i. e. the merchant has kc). Therefore, 
on receiving the encrypted payment in message E-M2, the merchant decrypt it using 
the key kc. On the other hand, in the EMH protocol the merchant receives the 
encrypted kc (that is encrypted with pkct) along with the encrypted payment (that is 
encrypted with kc) in the message E-Ml. Therefore, in order to decrypt the payment 
the merchant needs to first decrypt kc with skct (that is received in E-M3) then they 
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use kc to decrypt the payment. So, two decryptions are needed to get the payment in 
the EMH protocol whereas only one is needed in the ECH protocol; and this is the 
reason that the time needed for decrypting the payment in the ECH protocol is less 
than the one needed in the EMH protocol. 
The same reason applies for the time needed to decrypt the digital product in 
the ECH protocol and the EMH protocol. That is, two decryptions are needed to get 
the digital product in the ECH protocol whereas only one is needed to get it in the 
EMH protocol. Hence, the time needed to decrypt the digital product in the EMH 
protocol is less than the time needed in the ECH protocol. 
For the ECMH protocol, there is a need for two decryptions to get the digital 
product and also two decryptions to get the payment. The reason for this is that the 
merchant and the customer encrypt their items with km and kc, respectively. Then they 
encrypt km and kc with the shared keys pkrnt and pkct, respectively. Therefore, the 
receiver first needs to decrypt the key (krn or kc) then they decrypt the item. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that in both the ECH protocol and the 
EMH protocol there is one item that requires one decryption (payment in the ECH and 
digital product in the EMH) and the other item requires two decryptions (digital 
product in the ECH protocol and payment in the EMH protocol). However, both items 
(payment and digital product) require two decryptions in the ECMH protocol. Hence, 
the total time required for the ECMH protocol is greater than the time required in the 
ECH and the EMH protocols. This reflects how the idea of enforcing a party to be 
honest helped in proposing more efficient protocols. 
8.2.4. Cost functions for the three protocols 
In this section a cost function will be devised for each of the ECH, EMH, and 
ECMH protocols. The cost functions to be devised concern with the time needed to 
form/construct the messages of the exchange phases of the protocols. 
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For the ECH Drotocol: 
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There are three messages in the exchange phase of the protocol. Therefore, a 
cost function will be devised for each message then a general cost function will be 
devised for the all messages of the protocol. 
E-MI: 
The message E-MI includes six items, namely, enc. km(D), D-Cert, Cmt, 
enc. pkmt(km), enc. pkc(kc), Sig. m(D). The items D-Cert and Cmt are received from 
CA and TTP, respectively, in the pre-exchange phase. Therefore, M will not need to 
construct them. As a result, M will need to construct the other four items (namely, 
enc. km(D), enc. pkmt(km), enc. pkc(kc), Sig. m(D)). So, the cost function for the E-MI 
is the sum of the time needed to construct these four items: 
J(E-Ml)-:,,,: enc. km(D) + enc. pkmt(km) + enc. pkc(kc) + Sig. m(D) 
The time needed for constructing enc. km(D) will change according to the size of the 
digital product (D) whereas the time needed to construct the other three items will 
remain roughly the same because the size of the keys (i. e. km, pkmt, pkc, kc and skm 
that is used to sign the digital product in Sig. m(D)) will remain the same in any 
message even if the keys change. Therefore, the cost function for E-M I is: 
AE-Ml)= enc. km(D) + cl + c2 +0 
where c 1, c2 and c3 are constants that represent the time needed to construct 
enc. pkmt(km), enc. pkc(kc), and Sig. m(D), respectively. 
E-M2: 
The message E-M2 includes two items, namely, enc. kc(P) and Sig. c(P). 
Therefore, the cost function for the E-M2 is the sum of the time needed to construct 
these two items: 
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AE-M2)= enc. kc(P) + Sig-c(P) 
The payment normally includes specific information (such as the names of the 
payer and payee, and the amount) which has roughly the same size even if the 
information included in the payment is different i. e. if there is a payment of L 100 from 
Mike to Sally and another payment of E20 from Louise to John then the size of the 
two payments is roughly the same. Therefore, the time needed to construct the two 
items included in E-M2 will remain roughly the same in any message. Therefore, the 
cost function for E-M2 is: 
c4 + c5 
where c4 and c5 are constants that represent the time needed to construct enc. kc(P) 
and Sig. c(P), respectively. 
E-M3: 
The message E-M3 includes one item which is enc. pkc(skrnt). Therefore, the 
cost function for E-M3 is: 
J(E-M3)= enc. pkc(skmt) 
The time needed to construct E-M3 will remain roughly the same even if the 
keys (i. e. pkc and skmt) change because the size of these keys will 
be the same. 
Therefore, the cost function for E-M3 is: 
J(E-M3)":::: c6 
where c6 is a constant that represents the time needed to construct enc. pkc(skmt). 
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The cost function for the exchange phase of the ECH protocol: 
The cost function for the exchange phase of the ECH protocol is the sum of the 
cost functions for E-M 15 E-M2 and E-M3. That is: 
AECH):: 
-': J(E-MI) +J(E-M2) +f(E-M3) 
AECH)= (enc. km(D) + cl + c2 + c3) + (c4 + c5) + (c6) 
AECH)= enc. km(D) + cl + c2 +0+ c4 + c5 + c6 
J(ECH)= enc. km(D) +C (where C is the sum of all constants) 
The time needed to construct the messages in the exchange phase of the ECH 
will increase significantly if the size of the digital product gets bigger. Otherwise, the 
time will remain roughly the same if the size of the digital Product remaIns the same. 
The time needed to construct the messages of the exchange phase of the ECH protocol 
in three scenarios was given in Table 9. 
For the EMH protocol: 
The cost function for each message will be devised then the cost function for 
the EMH protocol will be the sum of these cost functions. 
E-MI: 
desc + enc. kc(P) + enc. pkct(kc) + enc. pkm(km) + Sig-c(P) 
Note that P-Cert and C-ct are not included because they were constructed in the pre- 
exchange phase by CB and TTP, respectively. The time needed to construct the 
items 
included inAE-MI)will remain roughly the same as the size of these items will not 
change. Therefore, this cost function will be as follows: 
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J(E-M I)--": C I+ c2 + c3 + c4 + c5 
where cl, c2, c3, c4 and c5 are constants that represent the time needed to construct 
desc, enc. kc(P), enc. pkct(kc), enc. pkm(km), Sig. c(P), respectively. 
E-M2: 
f(E-M2)= enc. km(D) + Sig. m(D) 
The time needed to construct enc. km(D) will change according to the size of the 
digital product whereas the time needed to construct Sig. m(D) will remain roughly the 
same. Therefore, this cost function can be rewritten as follows: 
J(E-M2)= enc. km(D) + c6 
where c6 is a constant that represents the time needed to construct Sig. m(D). 
E-M3: 
f(E-M3)=enc. pkm(skct) 
The time needed to construct E-M3 will remain roughly the same even if the 
keys (i. e. pkm and skct) change because the size of these keys will be the same. 
Therefore, the cost function for E-M3 is: 
AE-M3): --c7 
where c7 is a constant that represents the time needed to construct enc. pkm(skct). 
The cost function for the exchange phase of the EMH protocol: 
The cost function for the exchange phase of the EMH protocol is the sum of 
the cost functions for E-M 1, E-M2 and E-M3. That is: 
AEMH) "AE-MO +AE-M2) +J(E-M3) 
J(EMH) (C + c2 + c3 + c4 + c5) + (enc. km(D) + c6) + (0) 
J(EMH) CI+ c2 + c3 + c4 + c5 + enc. km(D) + c6 + c7 
J(EMH) enc. km(D) +C (where C is the sum of all constants) 
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Therefore, the cost function for constructing the messages in the exchange phase of 
the EMH protocol is very similar of the one for the ECH protocol. In both of them the 
time gets bigger when the digital product gets bigger. The time needed to construct the 
messages of the exchange phase of the EMH protocol in three scenarios was given in 
Table 10. 
For the ECMH protocol: 
The cost function for each message will be devised then the cost function for 
the ECMH protocol will be the sum of these cost functions. 
E-MI: 
J(E-M, )= dese + ene. kc(P) + ene. pkct(kc) + Sig. c(P) 
This cost ftmcti-on will be rewritten as follows: 
J(E-M I): -- C1+ c2 +0+ c4 
where c I, c2, c3, and c4 are constants that represent the time needed to construct desc, 
enc. kc(P), enc. pkct(kc), Sig. c(P), respectively. The reasons for having these constants 
are the same as in E-M I of the EMH protocol. 
E-M2: 
J(E-M2)--,,: enc. km(D) + enc. pkmt(km) + Sig. m(D) 
This cost function will be rewritten as follows: 
J(E-M2)= enc. km(D) + c5 + c6 
where c5 and c6 are constants that represent the time needed to construct 
enc. pkmt(km) and Sig. m(D) respectively. 
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E-M3: 
enc. pkm(skct) 
This cost function will be rewritten as follows: 
fiE-M3)= c7 
where c7 is a constant that represents the time needed to construct enc. pkm(skct). 
E-M4: 
J(E-M4)= enc. pkc(skmt) 
This cost function will be rewritten as follows: 
J(E-W)ý-- C8 
where c8 is a constant that represents the time needed to construct enc. pkc(skmt). 
Cost function for the exchange phase of the ECMH protocol: 
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The cost function for the exchange phase of the ECMH protocol is the sum of 
the cost functions for E-M Iý E-M2 , E-M3 and E-M4. That 
is: 
AECMH) 
--": 
AE-MI) +J(E-M2) +J(E-M3) +AE-M4) 
AECMH) (C 1+ c2 + c3 + c4) + (enc. km(D) + c5 + c6) + (C) + (d) 
AECMH) C I+ c2 + c3 + c4 + enc. km(D) + c5 + c6 + c7 + c8 
J(ECMH)= enc. km(D) +C (where C is the sum of all constants) 
The time needed to construct the messages of the exchange phase of the ECMH 
protocol in three scenarios was given in Table 11. 
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8.3. Comparisons with other Protocols 
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In this section, the ECH, EMH, and E. CMH protocols will be compared with 
other protocols in the literature. 
To have a fair comparison, the three protocols will only be compared to those 
protocols have the same characteristics. In other words, the ECH, EMH, and ECMH 
protocols will be compared to fair exchange protocols that are based on RSA 
[RiShAd78] and for exchanging digital products and payments (or for exchanging two 
digital products). Therefore, the ECH, EMH, and ECMH protocols will be compared 
against Ray et al protocol [RaRaNa05] (denoted as Ray protocol), Zhang et al protocol 
[ZhShMeAs06] (denoted as Zha protocol), Devane et al protocol [DeChPh07] 
(denoted as Devane protocol), and Ray et al protocol [RaRaNaOO] (denoted as R-R-N 
protocol). ' 
The comparisons will be made on different criteria. (1) number of messages in 
both the exchange and dispute resolution phases, (2) whether or not the TTP needs to 
hold a copy of an item to be exchanged, (3) whether or not all parties (M and Q will 
be involved to allow the TTP to resolve any disputes, and (4) number of modular 
exponentiations in both the exchange and dispute resolution phases. 
The Ray protocol paper [RaRaNa05] did not give detail for the dispute 
resolution phase so the number of messages in the phase and the number of modular 
exponentiations had to be calculated manually. In addition, the numbers of modular 
exponentiations for Zha's protocol [ZhShMeAs06], R-R-N protocol [RaRaNaOO], and 
Devane protocol [DeChPh07] have also been calculated manually. 
As can be seen in Table 12, the ECH protocol and the EMH protocol have the 
lowest number of messages (among other protocols) needed to be exchanged between 
customer and merchant in the exchange phase. The ECMH protocol, Zha protocol, 
and Ray protocol has four messages; whereas R-R-N protocol and Devane protocol 
require six message and seven messages, respectively. 
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With regard to dispute resolution, all protocols apart from Ray protocol have 
the same numbers of messages needed in the dispute resolution phase. 
Ray's protocol and R-R-N protocol let the TTP hold merchant's item before 
the exchange between customer and merchant takes place. Therefore, this requires 
more storage and security assurance in the TTP side. 
Ray's protocol requires both parties (customer and merchant) to be contacted 
by the TTP in case one party raises a dispute; whereas in the other protocols only the 
disputant and the TTP will be involved. Involving both parties in dispute resolution 
would require more messages to be sent and hence more load on the communication 
channels. 
With regard to the number of modular exponentiations, the ECH, EMH, and 
ECMH protocols have the lowest number of modular exponentiations needed to 
generate and verify messages in the exchange phase. On the other hand, the number of 
modular exponentiations for the ECH, the EMH protocols and other protocols in the 
dispute resolution phase is roughly the same. The ECMH protocol has the highest 
number of modular exponentiations in the dispute resolution phase. 
It is clear from the comparison presented in Table 12 how the idea of enforcing 
honesty in fair exchange protocol reduces both the number of messages and the 
number of modular exponentiations. As a result, it helped in having more efficient fair 
exchange protocols. 
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8.4. Summary 
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This chapter presented the comparisons between the ECH, EMH, and ECMH 
protocols. The three protocols were also compared with other relevant protocols from 
the literature. 
Chapter 9: Model Checking 
Chapter Nine 
9. Model Checking 
Introduction 
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This chapter introduces the notion of formal verification of systems and in 
particular model checking. Model checking will be used to model the ECH, EMH, and 
ECMH protocols to formally verify the fairness property. 
9.2. Formal analysis (verification) 
Formal analysis of systems is very important for detecting unexpected flaws in 
the system design. Many techniques can be used to do the formal verifications, 
including manual proofs, theorem proving, and model checking [AnHaLoSu06b, 
WaHiBaWhOO]. The problem with manual proofs is that it is time consuming, slow 
and error prone [AnHaLoSu06a, WaHiBaWhOO]. Theorem proving sometimes 
requires human involvement, when a failure is detected by the theorem prover then it 
will not necessarily provide a detailed description of the source of that failure 
[AnHaLoSu06a, WaHiBaWhOO]. Model checking provides fully automated method 
for validating systems. 
Chapter 9: Model Checking 
9.3. Model checking 
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Model checking is a formal verification technique which is fully automated. It 
is used to verify whether or not a property of a finite state system holds 
[HeTyWiWo96]. 
Model checking has many advantages over the other formal verification 
techniques such as manual proofs and theorem proving [AnHaLoSu05a, 
WaHiBaWhOO, and RayRayOOb]. Firstly, it is fully automated and hence is fast, not 
time consuming, and not error-prone. Secondly, in the case where a property does not 
hold then a model checker can provide a counterexample that specifies the reasons. 
The tasks of a model checker can be surnmarised as follows [ClGrPe99]. First, 
the model (system) needs to be specified. Second, property to be verified needs to be 
specified (the properties represent the system requirements). Then, the model checker 
will automatically verify whether or not the property holds by checking all possible 
behaviours of the system. If the property does not hold then the model checker will 
provide a counterexample that specifies the reasons why the property does not hold. In 
addition to verifying properties of systems, some model checkers provide a facility for 
randomly simulating a system run. 
Many model checkers are available. Some of which are FDR (Failures 
Divergences Refinement) [FDR99], SMV (Symbolic Model Verifier) [SMV08], 
Mocha [AlHeMaQaRaTa98], VeriSoft [VeriSoft08], and SPIN [Spin08]. 
Many e-commerce protocols have been verified using these model checkers. 
Ray and Ray [RayRayOOb] used the FDR model checker to verify the fairness 
property. Wang et al [WaHiBaWhOO] used two model checkers for their formal 
verifications, the VeriSoft [VeriSoftO8] and the SPIN [SpinO8]. Anderson et al 
[AnHaLoSu06a, AnHaLoSu05a, AnHaLoSu06b, and AnHaLoSu05b] verified the 
protocol described in [RaRaNaOO] using the FDR model checker. 
Heintze et al 
[HeTyWiWo96] used the FDR model checker to verify the protocol presented in 
[CoTySi95]. Fanjul et al [FaTuCo98] used the SPIN model checker to verify the 
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protocol presented in [CoTySi95]. Nenadic [Nenadic05] used the SPIN to verify the 
protocols presented in [NeZhBa04a, NeZhBa04]. 
Spin Model Checker 
The SPIN model checker was developed by Holzmann at Bell Labs in the 
1980s [Spin08]. It has been awarded in 2001 the ACM's prestigious System Software 
Award [Spin08]. The SPIN is a free and open source model checker. 
The fairness property has been verified in all the protocols presented in this 
thesis using the SPIN model checker. The reasons for choosing the SPIN is that, in 
addition to that it is model checker, it is a simulation tool as well. So, it helped 
simulating the scenarios of the proposed protocols. The second reason is that it has 
been successfully used to verify fair exchange protocols [Nenadic05 and FaTuCo98]. 
The third reason is that the language accepted by SPIN to specify the models 
(protocols) is Promela which is very similar to the language C. Hence, it is simple and 
easy to learn. Fourthly, the SPIN is free and open source tool. 
To verify a system's property (fairness for example) using SPIN, the model 
(system) needs to be specified using the verification language Promela (Process Meta 
Language) [Holzmann04] and the properties to be verified needs to be specified using 
LTL (Linear Temporal Logic) [Holzmann04]. After specifying the model and the 
properties to be verified, these are fed into the SPIN's GUI (Graphi cal User Interface) 
which is called XSpin. The XSpin will identify if there are any syntax errors. If there 
are no errors then SPIN will verify whether or not the specified property is verified 
against the specified model. If it is verified then the verification result that confirms 
the correctness of the verification will be shown on the GUI. If, however, the specified 
property is not verified then a counterexample will be provided to identify the source 
of the error in the model. 
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Promela 
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The Promela (Process Meta Language) is the verification language accepted by 
the SPIN. There are three basic types that any Promela model is constructed from, 
processes, data objects, and message channels [Holzmann04]. 
Each party (entity) of a system is considered and modelled as a process. A 
process specifies all activities of the party. A process is defined using the keyword 
proctype and then followed by the process's name and then a set of parameters. This 
can be illustrated in the following example: 
proctype Customer( parameters ) 
statements 
After specifying the process, it can be instantiated using the keyword run. 
For the data objects, there are two types of variables: local variables, which are 
defined within the scope of a process, and global variables, which are defined outside 
the scope of processes. Promela defines basic types such as bit, byte, bool, int. 
For the message channels, the exchange of data between processes is modelled 
using the message channels. They are declared using the keyword chan. For example, 
chan ch = [01 of fbitý; 
defines a synchronous message channel and each message consists of one field which 
is of bit type. 
The following statements send a message with the value of c which is 0 to the 
channelch: 
bitc 1--- 0; 
ch! c; 
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The following statement receives a message from channel ch and stores the value in 
variable m: 
ch? m; 
A statement in Promela is either executable or blocked. If the statement is 
executable then it will be executed whereas if it is blocked then it will not be 
executed. Print statements and assignment statements are always executable. An 
expression statement is executable if it equals to true (not equals to zero). 
9.3.1.2. LTL 
The LTL (Linear Temporal Logic) [Holzmann04] is accepted by SPIN for 
specifying the system's properties to be verified. The operators of the LTL describe 
the order of events on a single computation path [ClGrPe99]. That is, the operators 
describe events on a sequence of states of a system. 
In addition to the used logic operators such as "and" (A), "or" (V), "not" 
and "implies" (=: ý); LTL provides "always" (11), "eventually" (0), and "next time" 
(0). 
9.4. Modelling the Protocols 
The fairness properties for the ECH, EMH, and ECMH protocols have been 
verified using the SPIN model checker. The modelling of the three protocols 
is similar 
to each other and the modelling of the fairness property of the three protocols 
is 
exactly the same. Therefore, to avoid repetition only the modelling of 
the ECH and the 
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fairness property will be presented here. The full specifications of all the three 
protocols are given in Appendix A. 
Modelling the ECH Protocol 
In order to verify the fairness property in the ECH protocol using the SPIN 
model checker, the ECH protocol needs to be modelled (specified) using the Promela 
language and the fairness property needs to be specified using LTL. 
Each party involved in the ECH protocol will be represented by a process in 
the Promela. All the behaviours of the party will be specified in the process. The 
parties involved in the ECH protocol are Customer, Merchant, and TTP. 
Modelling Customer process 
The Customer process in the Promela model represents the Customer entity in 
the ECH fair exchange protocol. The process will start by waiting for the message E- 
MI from the Merchant process. Once the message is received then the process will list 
all possible behaviours of the Customer after receiving message E-Ml (these possible 
behaviours are discussed in section 5.3.3 of chapter 5). That is, E-Ml is correct and 
the Customer wants to complete the exchange, E-M I is correct but the Customer does 
not want to complete the exchange, E-Ml is incorrect, or E-Ml is correct but the 
Customer contacts the TTP for resolution before they send E-M2 to the Merchant. So, 
all possible behaviours of the Customer are specified in the Customer process and 
then the model checker will verify all possible behaviours of the Customer with all 
possible behaviours of the Merchant. In the same way all possible behaviours of the 
Customer after sending E-M2, receiving E-M3, sending DR-Ml, and receiving DR- 
M3 are specified. 
The following presents a fragment that shows all possible behaviours of the 
Customer after receiving message E-MI (the full specification of the Customer 
process is given in Appendix A). 
Chapter 9: Model Checking 
proctype Customer(chan chCM, chCTTP) 
f 
do 
(sendEM2 == FALSE) && (sendDRM1== FALSE) 
chCM? EMl; 
quitCustomer = FALSE; 
/* All possibilities after receiving EM1 */ 
if 
: TRUE -> 
/* EM1 is correct, C wants to exchange 
chCM! EM2; 
sendEM2 = TRUE; 
:: TRUE -> 
/* EM1 is correct, C contacts TTP 
chCTTP! DRMl; 
sendDRM1= TRUE; 
: TRUE -> 
/* EM1 is correct, C quits early*/ 
quitCustomer = TRUE; 
break; 
: TRUE -> 
/* EM1 is incorrect, C quits 
quitCustomer = TRUE; 
break; 
fi 
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od; 
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9.4.1.2. Modelling Merchant process 
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The Merchant process in Promela represents the Merchant entity in the ECH 
fair exchange protocol. The process will start by sending the message E-Ml to the 
Customer process. Once the message is sent, then the process will wait for the 
message E-M2 to be received from the Customer process. On receiving E-M2, the 
Merchant process will specify all possible scenarios and behaviours of the Merchant. 
The following shows a fragment of the Merchant process which shows sending 
message E-M I to the Customer process (the full specification of the Merchant process 
is given in Appendix A). 
proctype Merchant(chan chCM, chMTTP) 
do 
:: (sendEM1 == FALSE) -> 
chCM! EM1; 
sendEM1 = TRUE; 
quitMerchant = FALSE; 
od; 
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9.4.1.3. Modeffing TTP process 
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The TTP process in Promela represents the TTP entity in the ECH fair 
exchange protocol. The TTP will only be contacted by the Customer; therefore, in the 
model of the TTP it is listening for incoming messages from the Customer process. 
On receiving the message DR-Ml firom the Customer process, the TTP process will 
send the resolution messages to both the Merchant process and the Customer process 
(the full specification of the TTP process can be found in the Appendix A). 
9.4.1.4. Modelling Fairness property 
Fairness is defined as either both the Customer and the Merchant receive each 
other's items or no one gets anything. That is, by the end of executing the ECH 
protocol, the Customer will get a correct digital product and the Merchant will get a 
correct payment or neither the Customer nor the Merchant will get anything. This 
fairness property is specified in LTL formula as follows: 
1: 1( (quit-Merchant A quit_Customer) ==> 
(re ce ive_Co rrec t Payment A re ce ive_Correct Product) 
(-, -ire ce ive_Co rrect Payment A -rece ive_Corre ct Product) 
)) 
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This LTL formula specifies that it is always the case that when the Merchant 
The Verification results 
XSpin has been used to write the protocol's specifications in Promela. Figure 
and the Customer terminates the protocol execution then either the correct payment 
will be received by the Merchant and the correct digital product will be received by 
correct digital product will not be received by the Customer. 
43 shows the XSpin and the ECH protocol specification in Promela. 
File., I Edit.. I View., I Run,. I Help SPIN DESIGN VERIFICATION Line#: 2 1- Findj 
proctype Merchant(chan chCM, chMTTP) 
bool sendEM1, sendEM3, waitForTTP, 
sendEM1 =FALSE, 
sendEM3 = FALSE, 
waitForTTP = FALSE; 
quitMerchant = TRUE: 
do 
(sendEM1 == FALSE) 
chCM! EM1 , 
sendEM1 =TRUE; 
quitMerchant= FALSE; 
printf('Merchant, message EM1 sentln"), 
. (sendEMI ==TRUE) 
&&(sendEM3== FALSE)&& (quitMerchant== FALSE)-> 
if 
+ 
chCM? EM2 -> f** Merchant receives the payment from Customer 
printf(Werchant, message EM2 received W), 
quitMerchant= FALSEý 
Figure 43: XSpin 
the Customer, or the correct payment will not be received by the Merchant and the 
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XSpin provides a facility for simulating the protocol specified in Promela. 
Hence, a number of simulations for the ECH protocol are performed to check the 
behaviour of the parties. Figure 44 shows one random simulation of the ECH protocol. 
Search for: 
quitCustomer =1 
quitMerchant =1 
receiveCorrectPayment 
receiveCorrectProduct 
Figure 44: ECH Protocol Simulation (1) using XSpin 
As Figure 44 shows, the simulation represents the case where the Merchant 
sent E-M I to the Customer. On receiving E-M 1, the Customer contacts the TTP trying 
to get an advantage over the Merchant but the ECH protocol is designed in a way that 
the resolution is sent to both parties. Therefore, the fairness is ensured for both parties. 
Figure 45 shows another simulation that represents the case where both the 
Customer and the Merchant act honestly and hence the fairness in ensured. As can be 
seen from Figure 45, the TTP is not involved in the protocol execution. 
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Search for: Find 
quitCustomer 1 
2 quitMerchant 1 
receiveCorrectPayment 
receiveCorrectProduct 
ITTP: 31 
1 ! 53 1 
Figure 45: ECH Protocol Simulation (2) using XSpin 
1 
XSpin also provides a separate window for specifying the properties to be 
verified against the specified model. Using this window, the specifications of the 
fairness property is written i. e. the LTL formula. The window provides a facility for 
verifying whether or not the specified property is valid against the model specified in 
Promela. After writing the specification of the fairness property (this is through the 
top of Figure 46) and verifying it against the ECH protocol specification, SPIN shows 
that the fairness property is valid for the specified protocol. The verification result is 
shown in the bottom of Figure 46. Therefore, SPIN checked all possible behaviours of 
all parties and found that the fairness property holds. 
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Linear Time Temporal Logic Formulae 
Formula: 1[]((q uit _Merchant 
&& quit_Customer) -> e'. > ((receive_CorrecLPa, y, rF, ent receive_C Lo 
Operators: []j,.,, Uj->jtnýorj 10 
I iProperty holds for: 6' All Executions (desired behavior) I'- No Executions (error behavior) 
i 51 t l fH X ECH P l I l sp n lpro oco s/ Notes [ e C: j IECH rotoco , t ]: 
Use Load to open a file or a template, 
'Symbol Definitions: 
A. #define quit Merchant (quitMerchant TRUE) 
#define quit-Customer (quitCustomer ==TRUE) 
#define receive CorrectPayment (receiveCorrectPayment ==TRUE) 
v, #define receive CorrectProduct (receiveCorrectProduct ==TRUE) 
Never Claim: Generate 
A 
Formula As Typed: []((quit 
-Merchant 
&& quit-Customer) -><> 
((receive 
- 
CorrectPayment && receive_CorrectProduct) (! receive -CorrectPayment 
&& 
receive_CorrectProduct))) 
" The Never Claim Below Corresponds 
" To The Negated Formula ! ([]((quit_Merchant && quit-Customer) -><> 
((receive 
-CorrectPayment 
&& receive_CorrectProduct) I receive_CorrectPayment && 
v! rec eive_Correct Product)))) 
Verification Result: valid Run Verification 
Full statespace search for: 
never claim + 
assertion violations + (if within scope of claim) 
acceptance cycles + (fairness disabled) 
invalid end states - (disabled by never claim) 
v, State-vector 56 byte, depth reached 101, errors: 0 
e'ýIl p 
ý 
Close I Save As., 
Figure 46: LTL Property Manager 
9.5. Summary 
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This chapter presented the formal verification techniques used to verify 
systems. It has presented the modelling of the ECH, EMH, and ECMH protocols. 
The 
specification of the fairness property has also been presented. 
The SPfN model 
checker showed that the specified fairness property 
is valid against the specified 
models. 
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It is worth mentioning that the model (i. e. specification) of a protocol may be 
different from the protocol itself This is due to either errors in modelling or the 
specification of the protocol cannot fully express the protocol. Reasons for the later 
can be as follows. Firstly, the model of the protocol, normally, specifies the protocol 
in an abstract way. Therefore, the model will not specify all items of the protocol 
rather it specifies all possible behaviours that will be checked by the model checker to 
verify if a property holds, Secondly, the formal methods may have some limitations 
which result in their lack to fully express the protocol [Nenadic05]. As a result, SPIN 
model checker helped in formally verifying the fairness property against the specified 
models. Additionally, it helped in simulating all scenarios of the protocols. However, 
implementing the protocols (which will be presented in the next chapter) is very 
important and different from the modelling of the protocols. This is because the 
implementation of the protocols will help dealing with real data (digital products and 
payment) and parties (C, M, TTP, CA, CB) in order to test whether or not all parties 
able to construct and send the protocols' messages, verify the correctness of the 
received messages, and requesting resolutions for disputes where applicable. 
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Chapter Ten 
10. Protocols Implementation 
10.1. Introduction 
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A prototype proof of concept implementation has been developed using the 
Java programming language. Java RMI (Remote Method Invocation) has been used 
for the remote interaction between the parties involved in the fair exchange protocols 
(e. g. Customer, Merchant, TTP, CA and CB). 
This chapter presents the design and implementation of the prototype that 
implements the ECH, EMH and ECMH protocols. 
10.2. High Level Design 
The ECH, EMH and ECMH protocols are independently implemented. The 
design is different for each protocol because the parties are different in the protocols. 
The design for each protocol will be presented in the following sections. 
10.2.1. High Level Design for ECH protocol 
The system architecture for the ECH protocol consists of the following parties 
(see Figure 47): 
o TTP Server 
CA Server 
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o Merchant Server 
* Customer 
Figure 47: ECH-High level design 
The Merchant Server communicates with the TTP Server and the CA Server in 
the pre-exchange phase. In the pre-exchange phase, the Merchant shares a key with 
the TTP Server and it also certifies the digital product to be exchanged using the CA 
Server. 
The parties involved in the exchange phase are the Merchant Server and the 
Customer. In the exchange phase the ECH protocol messages are exchanged between 
the Merchant Server and the Customer. 
The TTP Server will be contacted by the Customer if anything went wrong in 
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the exchange phase. The TTP Server will validate the request and if valid will make 
the automatic resolution to both the Merchant Server and the Customer. 
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10.2.1.1. Activity diagrams for ECH protocol 
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All activities involved in the exchange phase between Customer and the 
Merchant server are shown in Figures 48 and 49 and if applicable the dispute 
resolution phase activities are shown in Figures 50,51, and 52, These activity 
diagrams are based on the specifications of the ECH protocol in sections 5.2.3 and 
5.2.4 of chapter 5. 
Figure 48: ECH Protocol-Activity Diagram-Exchange-Customer 
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Figure 49: ECH Protocol-Activity Diagra m-Exch ange-Merch ant Server 
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Figure 50: ECH-Activity Diagram-Dispute-Customer 
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Figure 51: ECH-Activity Diagram-Dispute-Merchant Server 
Wait for requests from C 
Nothing received 
DR-Ml is received 
Validate DR-M I 
DR-Ml is not coffect A DR-M I is correct 
Send abort to C 
Send DR-M2 to MIf Send EIR-M3 lo C 
Figure 52: ECH-Activity Diagram-Dispute-TTP Server 
10.2.1.2. TTP Server 
The TTP Server provides three services to be called by the Merchant Server 
and Customer. Some of these services will be called in the pre-exchange phase and the 
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other will be called in the dispute resolution phase if there is a dispute. 
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The Merchant Server calls services in the pre-exchange phase. The pre- 
exchange services are "Register" and "ShareKey" services. A Merchant Server 
registers with TTP Server using a username and password. Then, using the usemame 
and the password the Merchant Server calls the "ShareKey" service. The TTP Server 
will verify the correctness of the username and password. If they are correct then the 
TTP Server will share a key with the Merchant Server and issue the share public key 
certificate (C. mt) to the Merchant Server to be used in the exchange phase. 
The Customer calls the TTP services in the dispute resolution phase if there is 
a dispute. The Customer needs to send to the TTP Server a correct DR-MI. On 
receiving the Customer's request the TTP Server will validate the request and if it is 
correct then an automatic resolution will be sent to both the Merchant Server and 
Customer. 
10.2.1.3. CA Server 
The CA Server provides one service to be called by the Merchant Server in the 
pre-exchange phase. This service is called "Certify". The Merchant Server calls this 
service by supplying the CA Server with the digital product identifier, symmetric key 
(km) to be used by the CA Server for computing the hash value of the encrypted 
digital product with krn, the C. mt that the Merchant Server received from the TTP 
Server, and the price (the value of the digital product) that the Merchant wants. On 
receipt the CA Server will validate them and if they are correct will issue the digital 
product's certificate (D-Cert) to the Merchant Server. 
10.2.1.4. Merchant Server 
The Merchant Server provides three services to be used by Customer and the 
TTP Server in the exchange phase and the dispute resolution phase, respectively. 
Two services to be used by the Customer to execute the exchange phase of the 
ECH protocol. The first service is "getEM I" that allows Customer to receive the 
first 
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message (E-M I) of the exchange phase. The second service is "sendEM2" that is used 
by Customer to send the second message (E-M2) to the Merchant Server and then 
used by the Merchant Server to send the third message (E-M3) to the Customer if and 
only if the Merchant Server found that the E-M2 is correct. 
One service to be called by the TTP Server in case the Customer contacted the 
TTP for dispute resolution and the TTP decided that there is a resolution. That is, if 
there is no resolution then the TTP Server will not call this service. This service is 
called "sendDRM2". 
10.2.1.5. Customer 
The Customer is responsible for communicating with the Merchant Server to 
execute the exchange phase of the ECH protocol and the TTP Server to request a 
resolution for any disputes. 
The Customer first calls the service "getEMI" which is located in the 
Merchant Server. On receiving E-Ml the Customer validates it and if correct then 
"sendEM2" service is called which is also located in the Merchant Server. Using this 
service the Customer sends E-M2 to the Merchant Server and waits for message E-M3 
to be sent by the Merchant Server. On receiving E-M3 and decrypting the encrypted 
digital product the exchange phase of ECH protocol is complete. 
If however the E-M3 is not received or it is incorrect then the Customer will 
automatically initiate a request to the TTP Server by sending DR-Ml via a "resolve" 
service. The Customer then waits for the response. The response might be a rejection 
message or a resolution for the dispute depending on the correctness of the message 
DR-M 1- If the response is a resolution then the customer program will decrypt the 
encrypted digital product and notify the Customer of the completion of the 
dispute 
resolution phase. 
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10-2.2. High Level Design for EMH protocol 
Figure 53: EMH-High level design 
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The system architecture for EMH protocol consists of the following parties 
(see Figure 53): 
9 TTP Server 
9 CA Server 
o CB Server 
9 Merchant Server 
9 Customer 
In the pre-exchange phase, the Merchant Server communicates with the CA 
Server to certify the digital product to be exchanged with Customer. In addition, the 
Customer communicates with the TTP Server to share a key and then communicates 
with the CB Server to certify the payment to be exchanged. The pre-exchange phase 
also includes the Customer registration with the Merchant Server and receiving the 
digital product certificate (DG-Cert) from the Merchant Server. 
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In the exchange phase Customer and Merchant Server exchange the EMH 
protocol messages. 
The TTP Server will be contacted by the Merchant Server if anything went 
wrong in the exchange phase. The TTP Server will validate the request and if valid 
then automatic resolution will be sent to both Customer and Merchant Server. 
10.2.2.1. Activity diagrams for EMH protocol 
The activity diagrams for the EMH protocol are similar to but not exactly the 
same as ECH protocol activity diagrams. All activities involved in the exchange phase 
between Customer and Merchant server are shown in Figures 54 and 55 and if 
applicable the dispute resolution phase activities diagrams are shown in Figures 56, 
57, and 58. These activity diagrams are based on the specifications of the EMH 
protocol in sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 of chapter 6. 
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Figure 54: EMH Protocol-Activity Diagram-Exchange-Customer 
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Figure 55: EMH Protocol-Activity Diagram-Exchange-Merchant Server 
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Figure 56: EMH-Activity Diagram-Dispute-Customer 
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Figure 57: EMH-Activity Diagram-Dispute-Merchant Server 
Wall fo( requests fian M 
Nothing received 
DR-M 1 is received 
valiftte DR-M 1 
DR4A 1 is not correct D R-M I is corred 
Send abort to M 
Send OR-M2 to 01 (Send OR-M3 to M 
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Figure 58: EMH-Activity Diagram-Dispute-TTP Server 
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10.2.2.2. TTP Server 
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The TTP Server in the EMH protocol provides the same services provided by 
the TTP Server in the ECH protocol with the only changes being in the party who 
calls these services. The Customer is the one who calls the "Register" and "ShareKey" 
services whereas the Merchant Server is the one who calls the "resolve" service. The 
certificate to be issued by the TTP Server by calling the "ShareKey" service is C. ct. 
10.2.2.3. CA Server 
The services provided by the CA Server is the same as the one discussed in the 
ECH protocol, the only change is in the digital certificate issued by the CA Server. In 
here the certificate to be issued is DG-Cert. Additionally, in order for the Merchant 
I 
Server to get DG-Cert they need to supply the CA Server with the digital product 
identifier and the price of the digital product. 
10.2.2.4. CB Server 
The CB Server provides one service, "certify", to be called by the Customer in 
the pre-exchange phase of the protocol. The Customer needs to supply the CB Server 
with a symmetric key (kc) to be used by the CA Server for computing the hash value 
of the encrypted payment with kc, C. ct received from the TTP Server, payer, payee, 
and the amount of payment to be certified. On receiving these items the CB Server 
will validate them and if they are correct then it will issue the payment's certificate (P- 
Cert) to the Customer. 
10.2.2.5. Merchant Server 
The Merchant Server in the EMH protocol is different from the one in the 
ECH protocol and provides three services which are all called by the Customer. Two 
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of the services are called in the pre-exchange phase and one is called in the exchange 
phase. 
The services to be called in the pre-exchange phase are "register" service 
which allows the Customer to register with the Merchant Server and the "getDGCert" 
which allows the Customer to receive the digital product certificate (DG-Cert) that 
will be used in constructing message E-M I of the exchange phase. 
The service to be called by the Customer in the exchange phase is "sendEM I". 
This service allows the Customer to send the message E-MI to the Merchant Server. 
On receiving E-M I from the Customer, the Merchant Server will validate it and if it is 
correct then it will call the service "sendEM2" that is defined in the Customer side to 
send E-M2. Then, the Merchant Server will wait for the message E-M3 from the 
Customer and on receiving it and decrypting the encrypted payment the exchange 
phase of EMH protocol is complete. 
If however the E-M3 is not received or is incorrect then the Merchant Server 
will automatically initiate a request to the TTP Server by sending DR-Ml via the 
6crpsolve" service. The response might be a rejection message or a resolution for the 
dispute depending on the correctness of the message DR-Ml. If the response is a 
resolution then the Merchant Server will decrypt the encrypted payment and then the 
dispute resolution phase is complete. 
10.2.2.6. Customer 
The Customer is different from the one in the ECH protocol in that it provides 
services for the Merchant Server and the TTP Server. The service for the 
Merchant 
Server is to be called in the exchange phase of the EMH protocol whereas the service 
for the TTP Server is to be called in the dispute resolution phase if there is a dispute. 
The service to be called by the Merchant Server is "sendEM2" while the service to 
be 
called by the TTP Server is "sendDRM2". 
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The Customer program starts the exchange phase by sending message E-M I 
via the service "sendEMl" which is located in the Merchant Server. If the Merchant 
Server found E-MI is correct then the Customer's service "sendEM2" will be called 
by the Merchant Server to send E-M2. On receiving E-M2, the Customer will verify it 
and if it is correct then the digital product will be decrypted and the message E-M3 
will be sent to the Merchant Server. 
The service "sendDRM2" will be called by the TTP Server if and only if the 
Merchant Server contacted the TTP Server for resolution and the TTP Server decided 
that there is a resolution. That is, if there is no resolution then the TTP Server will not 
call this service. 
10.2.3. High Level Design for ECMH protocol 
Pre-exchanW TTP 
r- Server 
Customer K, Protocol execution 
a 
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CB 
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Pre-exchange 
Merchant 
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cb 
' 
Co 
LD IL 
CA 
Server 
Figure 59: ECMH-High level design 
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The parties involved in the system architecture for ECMH protocol are the 
same as the ones appear in the EMH protocol. There are three differences between the 
two designs. The first one is that in the ECMH the Merchant Server needs to 
communicate with TTP Server in the pre-exchange phase to share a key. The second 
one is that in the ECMH Customer is the party who contacts TTP Server in case of 
disputes. Therefore, the TTP Server will validate Customer's request and if valid then 
the automatic resolution will be sent to both the Merchant Server and Customer. The 
third difference is that in the ECMH the Customer does not need to contact the 
Merchant Server in the pre-exchange phase. The high level design for the ECMH 
protocol appears in Figure 59. 
10.2.3.1. Activity diagrams for ECMH protocol 
The activity diagrams for ECMH protocol are similar to but not exactly the 
same as the activity diagrams for the ECH and EMH protocols. Al 
,I 
activities involved 
in the exchange phase between Customer and Merchant Server are shown in Figures 
60 and 61 and if applicable the dispute resolution phase activity diagrams are shown 
in Figures 62,63, and 64. These activity diagrams are based on the specifications of 
the ECMH protocol in sections 7.2.3 and 7.2.4 of chapter 7. 
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Figure 60: ECMH Protocol-Activity Diagram-Exchange-Customer 
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Figure 61: ECMH Protocol-Activity Diagram-E xchange-Merch ant Server 
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Figure 62: ECMH-Activity Diagram-Dispute-Customer 
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Figure 63: ECMH-Activity Diagram-Dispute-Merchant Server 
Chapter 10: Protocols Implementation 
Wall for requesis from C 
Notbing received 
DR-Ml is feceived 
validate DR-mi 
DR-M I is not coffect /X\ DR-Ml is coffect 
Send abort to 0 
Send DR-PA2 to MIf Send DRAt3 to C 
Figure 64: ECMH-Activity Diagram-Dispute-TTP Server 
10.2.3.2. TTP Server 
The services provided by the TTP Server in the ECMH protocol are the same 
as the ones provided in the EMH protocol. These services are "Register" service, 
"ShareKey" service, and "resolve" service. The "Register" service and the 
"ShareKey" service will be called by both the Merchant Server and the Customer in 
the pre-exchange phase. The "resolve" service however will only be called by the 
Customer in the dispute resolution phase if something went wrong in the exchange 
phase. 
10.2.3.3. CA Server 
The service provided by the CA Server is exactly the same as the one provided 
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by the CA Server in the ECH protocol. 
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10-2.3-4. CB Server 
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The service provided by the CB Server is exactly the same as the one provided 
by the CB Server in the EMH protocol. 
10.2.3.5. Merchant Server 
The Merchant Server provides three services which are "sendEMI", 
'csendEM3", and "sendDRM2". The services "sendEMI" and "sendEMY will be 
called by the Customer in the exchange phase whereas the service "sendDRM2" will 
be called by the TTP Server in the dispute resolution phase in case the Customer 
contacts the TTP Server for dispute resolution and there is a resolution. That is, if the 
Customer contacts the TTP Server for a dispute resolution but the TTP Server decided 
that there is no resolution then the TTP Server will not call the service "sendDRM2". 
10.2.3.6. Customer 
The Customer is the one who initiates the exchange phase of the ECMH 
protocol. It does so by first sending the message E-M I via the service "sendEM I" that 
is located in the Merchant Server. Then, the Customer will wait for the message E-M2 
to be sent by the Merchant Server. On receiving the message E-M2 the Customer will 
validate it and if correct then the Customer will send the message E-M3 via the 
service "sendEMY that is located in the Merchant Server. Then, the Customer will 
wait for the message E-M4 to be sent by the Merchant Server. On receiving E-M4 and 
decrypting the encrypted digital product the exchange phase of the ECMH protocol is 
complete. 
If however the E-M4 is not received or is incorrect then the Customer will 
automatically initiate a request to the TTP Server by sending DR-Ml via the "resolve" 
service. The response from the TTP Server might be a rejection message or a 
resolution for the dispute depending on the correctness of the message 
DR-M 1. If the 
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response is a resolution then the Customer will decrypt the encrypted digital product 
and then the dispute resolution phase is complete. 
10.3. The Tools 
This section will discuss the tools that have been implemented to perform the 
scenarios of the ECH, EMH, and ECMH protocols. The tools for the ECH protocol 
and the EMH protocol are very similar to each other, and thus only the tools for the 
ECH protocol and the ECMH protocol will be presented. 
10.3.1. The ECH Protocol Tool 
This tool allows its user to perform the execution of the ECH protocol under 
some conditions. These conditions include having one or both parties honest, having 
one or both parties dishonest, and the number of times the ECH protocol to be 
executed. If the user chooses a party to be dishonest then they will be allowed to 
choose the type of dishonesty for that party. There are three types of dishonesty for M 
and two types of dishonesty for C that affect the fairness (these types were discussed 
in section 5.3.1 of chapter 5). The types of dishonesty for M are: 
1. after receiving a correct E-M2 from C, M will not send E-M3, 
2. after receiving a correct E-M2 from C, M will send incorrect E-M3, and 
3. M will send to C incorrect E-M I 
The types of dishonesty for C are: 
1. after receiving a correct E-Ml from M, C will send to M incorrect payment in 
E-M2, and 
2. after receiving a correct E-Ml from M, C will encrypt the payment with 
incorrect key in E-M2. 
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After executing the ECH protocol under the entered conditions, the user will 
be shown the messages that have been exchanged between C and M. In addition, if the 
TTP is contacted by C for resolution then the messages will also be presented. 
The user will also be presented with a summary of the transactions that have 
been executed. The summary includes the number of times the TTP was contacted, the 
number of times the TTP rejected the dispute, the number of times the TTP resolved 
the disputes, the average time for E-Ml construction by M, the average time for E-M I 
verification by C, the average time for E-M2 construction by C, the average time for 
E-M3 construction by M, the average time for decrypting the digital product, the 
average time for decrypting the payment, the average time for DR-Ml verification by 
TTP (if applicable as the TTP will not always be contacted). 
Finally the tool presents a table that shows the scenarios that have been 
executed. Figure 65 shows the tool for the ECH protocol. 
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10.3.2. The ECMH Protocol Tool 
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This tool is similar to the one presented in the previous section, the difference 
however is in the type of dishonesty for C and M. There are three types of dishonesty 
for M and two types of dishonesty for C (these types were discussed in section 7.3.1 
of chapter 7). 
The types of dishonesty for M are: 
1. after receiving a correct E-M3 from C, M will not send E-M4, 
2. after receiving a correct E-M3 from C, M will send incorrect E-M4, and 
3. after receiving a correct E-Ml from C, M will send to C incorrect E-M2. 
The types of dishonesty for C are: 
1. C will send to M incorrect E-M 1, and 
2. after receiving a correct E-M2 from M, C will send to M incorrect E-M3 
Output from the tool showing a summary of the transactions those have been 
executed. The summary includes the number of times the TTP was contacted, the 
number of times the TTP rejected the dispute, the number of times the TTP resolved 
the disputes, the average time for E-M I construction and verification, the average time 
for E-M2 construction and verification, the average time for E-M3 construction, the 
average time for decrypting the digital product, the average time for E-M4 
construction, the average time for decrypting the payment, the average time for DR- 
MI verification by TTP, Figure 66 shows the tool for the ECMH protocol. 
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Figure 66: The Simulation Tool for ECMH Protocol 
10.4. Summary 
This chapter presented the design and implementation of the prototype proof 
of concept of the ECH, EMH and ECMH protocols. It also presented the tools that 
have been implemented to easily execute all the scenarios of the protocols. 
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11.1. Introduction 
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As the Internet grows its use in selling and buying products grow as well. 
More and more merchants offer their products and services on the Internet every day. 
These products and services on the Internet have attracted customers. 
Buying products and services from the Internet requires vigilance on the part 
of customers when buying from unknown (and possibly dishonest) merchants. This is 
because after the customer pays the money to the merchant, the merchant might not 
send the product to the customer or might send incorrect product. Therefore, there is a 
need for fair exchange protocols to ensure that the customer receives the correct 
product and also the merchant receives the correct payment. 
Two types of fair exchange protocols exist. The first type is one that does not 
involve a Trusted Third Party (TTP). In this type of protocol, the two parties exchange 
their items part by part. That is, the parties divide their items into parts and then 
exchange these parts until the whole items are exchanged. Therefore, many rounds are 
required to complete the exchange of the items between the two parties. Additionally, 
fairness is not ensured because one party needed to send their last part first to the other 
party. As a result, the party who receives the last part of the other party's item may 
disappear before sending their last part. 
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The second type is the one that involves a TTP. This type is divided into three 
kinds according to how the TTP is involved. The first kind is the one that involves an 
inline TTP where the parties send their items to the TTP who verifies them and if they 
are correct then forwards the relevant item to the other party, In the inline TTP based 
fair exchange protocols, the TTP is actively involved. This results in extra costs and 
the TTP may become a source of communication bottleneck. Furthermore, the TTP 
can be the main target of attacks. The second kind is the one that involves an online 
TTP where the parties exchange their items directly but the TTP is used during the 
exchange for validation purposes and for generating and/or storing evidence of a 
transaction. This kind of protocol reduces the use of the TTP but it still requires that 
the TTP to be available during the exchange of items. This requirement is seen as a 
disadvantage as it will result in extra messages to be exchanged as well as the TTP is 
the main target of attacks. The third kind of protocol is the one that involves an offline 
TTP (an optimistic fair exchange protocol) where the parties exchange their items 
directly. The TTP will only be involved if something goes wrong between the parties. 
Therefore, the disadvantages of the inline and online TTP based protocols are 
minimised because the use of the TTP is kept to minimum. 
This thesis has focused on optimistic fair exchange protocols that are for the 
exchange of payments and digital products between customers and merchants. 
The research has developed new concept in fair exchange protocols, that of 
enforcing one of the parties to be honest. Two different but similar optimistic fair 
exchange protocols have been specified, one enforces the customer to be honest (ECH 
protocol) and the other enforces the merchant to be honest (EMH protocol). Both 
protocols have been shown to be efficient as compared with existing protocols in that 
they require less messages and reduce the number of modular exponentiations. These 
protocols also simplify the process of automatic dispute resolution by reducing the 
number of possible incidents of disputes. 
Enforcing both parties to be honest within one optimistic fair exchange 
protocol whilst being a logical consequence of the ECH and EMH protocols was 
shown not to be possible. However, a weaker condition of encouraging both parties to 
be honest was shown to be possible and incorporated into a third new protocol 
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(ECMH). This protocol while not being as efficient as the ECH and EMH protocols is 
as efficient in the number of messages required when compared with existing 
protocols in the literature. It also turns out that the ECMH protocol also makes 
automatic dispute resolution simpler by reducing the number of possible incidents 
where a dispute can be raised. 
11.2. Criteria for Success 
The result reported in this thesis was started with a set of aims labelled as 
criteria for success. These were enumerated in chapter 1. This section addresses each 
of the criteria to ascertain to what degree the research has succeeded. 
1) Development of efficient optimisticfair exchange protocols 
Three optimistic fair exchange protocols for exchanging payments and digital 
products between customers and merchants have been proposed. These protocols are 
the ECH protocol, the EMH protocol, and the ECMH protocol and are specified in 
chapters 5,6, and 7, respectively. The ECH protocol and the EMH protocol applied 
the idea of encouraging a party to be honest and then enforcing the other party to be 
honest. This is an original contribution to fair exchange protocols. The ECH protocol 
encourages the merchant to be honest and then enforces the customer to be honest 
whereas the EMH protocol encourages the customer to be honest and then enforces 
the merchant to be honest. The same ideas were applied to try to enforce the two 
parties to be honest. However, due to the fact that only one party has to send their item 
first then this party is the one to be enforced to be honest. Therefore, enforcing two 
parties is not possible in the optimistic approach. As a result, instead of enforcing the 
two parties to be honest the ECMH protocol has been proposed which encourages the 
customer and the merchant to be honest. 
The idea of enforcing a party to be honest which is applied in the ECH and the 
EMH protocols has resulted in reducing the number of messages needed in the 
exchange phase of the protocols. The number of messages needed to be exchanged 
between a customer and a merchant in the exchange phase of both the ECH and the 
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EMH protocols is only three messages. This number is the lowest number of messages 
when compared against the other relevant fair exchange protocols in the literature. On 
the other hand, the number of messages needed for the exchange phase of the ECMH 
protocol is four messages. This number of messages is the same as some protocols 
that appear in the literature. This shows how the idea of enforcing a party to be honest 
reduces the number of messages by one i, e. three messages only are required in the 
ECH and the EMH protocols. 
With regard to number of messages in the dispute resolution phase, the lowest 
possible number of messages to be executed in the dispute resolution phase is three 
messages (this is in the case where there are two parties involved in the exchange and 
one TTP). This is because in the dispute resolution phase, a disputant needs to contact 
a TTP requesting a resolution which results in one message. In case the dispute has a 
resolution then the TTP will send the resolution to both parties which result in two 
messages. Therefore, the total number of messages is three. This is the number of 
messages needed in the dispute resolution phase of the ECH, EMH, and ECMH 
protocols. 
Therefore, the number of messages exchanged during the proposed protocols 
(in both the exchange and dispute phases) is kept to minimum. 
The ECH, EMH, and ECMH protocols were compared against each other. 
Then, the three protocols were compared with the relevant protocols from the 
literature. The comparisons were based on different criteria such as the number of 
messages in both the exchange and the dispute phases, number of modular 
exponentiations in both the exchange and the dispute phases. The results of the 
comparisons show that the ECH and EMH protocols have the lowest number of 
messages and also the lowest number of modular exponentiations in the exchange 
phase. The ECMH protocol has the lowest number of modular exponentiations 
compared with the related protocols from the literature. Details of these comparisons 
can be found in chapter 8. 
This criterion has been met. A new result for the research was the notion of 
enforcing honesty on one of the parties in a transaction. 
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2) Specification of the efficient optimisticfair exchange protocols 
The specifications of the new efficient optimistic fair exchange protocols 
(ECH, EMH, and ECMH) have been presented. These protocols have been specified 
using diagrams, informal descriptions and formal notations. The full specifications of 
the ECH protocol are discussed in section 5.2 of chapter 5, and section 10.2.1.1 of 
chapter 10. The full specifications of the EMH protocol are discussed in section 6.2 of 
chapter 6, and section 10.2.2.1 of chapter 10. The full specifications of the ECMH 
protocol are discussed in section 7.2 of chapter 7, and section 10.2.3.1 of chapter 10. 
The formal notation of all the three protocols is presented in section 4.3 of chapter 4. 
3) Built in automatic dispute resolution 
The ECH, EMH, and ECMH protocols are able to resolve any disputes 
automatically online with the help of the TTP. The dispute resolution phase of the 
ECH protocol that appears in section 5.2.4 (of chapter 5) shows the ability of the ECH 
protocol to resolve the disputes automatically online. Also, the dispute resolution 
phase of the EMH protocol that appears in section 6.2.4 (of chapter 6) shows the 
ability of the EMH protocol to resolve the disputes automatically online. Finally, the 
dispute resolution phase of the ECMH protocol that appears in section 7.2.4 (of 
chapter 7) shows the ability of the ECMH protocol to resolve the disputes 
automatically online. In all the three protocols the number of messages needed in the 
dispute resolution phase is only three messages. 
By enforcing honesty the number of opportunities where a dispute can arise is 
reduced thus simplifying the dispute resolution phase. 
4) The protocols should ensure strongfairness for all parties 
It has been shown that the ECH, EMH, and ECMH protocols ensure strong 
fairness. That is, in all the three protocols either the customer receives the digital 
product and the merchant receives the payment or no one gets anything. 
Chapter 11: Conclusions and Future Work 205 
In the ECH protocol, if the customer sends the correct payment to the 
merchant (in message E-M2) but the merchant either sends (in message E-M3) 
incorrect decryption key or does not send the decryption key at all (i. e. it is not fair for 
the customer) then the customer can contact the TTP (in message DR-Ml) to re- 
ensure the fairness. Hence, the strong faimess in the ECH protocol is ensured, The full 
details of the dispute resolution phase of the ECH protocol is described in section 
5.2.4 of chapter 5. 
In the EMH protocol, if the merchant sends the correct digital product to the 
customer (in message E-M2) but the customer either sends (in message E-M3) 
incorrect decryption key or does not send the decryption key at all (i. e. it is not fair for 
the merchant) then the merchant can contact the TTP (in message DR-Ml) to re- 
ensure the fairness. Hence, the strong fairness in the EMH protocol is ensured. The 
full details of the dispute resolution phase of the EMH protocol is described in section 
6.2.4 of chapter 6. 
In the ECMH protocol, if the customer sends the correct decryption key to the 
merchant (in message E-M3) but the merchant either sends (in message E-M4) 
incorrect decryption key or does not send the decryption key at all (i. e. it is not fair for 
the customer) then the customer can contact the TTP (in message DR-Ml) to re- 
ensure the fairness. Hence, the strong fairness in the ECMH protocol is ensured. The 
full details of the dispute resolution phase of the ECMH protocol is described in 
section 7.2.4 of chapter 7. 
Analysis of the newprotocolsfor completeness 
All possible scenarios of executing the proposed protocols were studied. That 
is, all the possible scenarios of executing the ECH, the EMH, and the ECMH 
protocols were studied; see sections 5.3.3,6.3.3 and 7.3.3. It has been shown that the 
strong fairness is ensured in all protocols in all scenarios under the assumptions made. 
Detailed analyses were conducted on the proposed protocols to check whether 
or not each party is able to detect the dishonesty of the other party. The results of the 
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analyses show that each party is able to detect the dishonesty of the other party. The 
analysis for the ECH protocol can be found in section 5.3.1, and for the EMH protocol 
in section 6.3.1, and for the ECMH protocol in section 7.3.1. 
All dispute possibilities and claims were studied and identified for the 
proposed protocols. The analyses show that the proposed protocols reduce the number 
of disputes by preventing them. It has been shown that there are resolutions in all 
cases were the claims are correct i. e. DR-Ml is correct. The complete analyses of all 
dispute claims of the ECH, EMH and ECMH protocols can be found in section 5.3.2, 
6.3.2, and 7.3.2 respectively. 
The SPIN model checker was used to formally verify the faimess and model 
the proposed protocols. It has been fonnally proven that the fairness is ensured for the 
three protocols (i. e. ECH, EMH, and ECMH protocols). Full details of the formal 
verification of the protocols can be found in chapter 9 and in the Appendix A. 
A proof of concept implementation 
All the three protocols were implemented in Java using Java-RMI. The 
implementation shows that in all the protocols each party was able to send messages 
and verify the correctness of the incoming messages. In addition, the implementation 
shows that the TTP was able to verify dispute requests and if they were valid then 
resolves them automatically online. All scenarios were tested and all of them worked 
as expected. The implementation details can be found in chapter 10. 
11.3. Future Work 
The research in this thesis was based on a number of assumptions enumerated 
in chapter 4. Different directions of future work have been identified, some to reduce 
or eliminate some of these assumptions, Some areas of future work are summarised as 
follows: 
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o Existing Fault-tolerant techniques from the literature should be combined with 
the proposed protocols in order to have fault-tolerant fair exchange protocols. 
These will ensure the fairness for all parties even in the event of a system crash 
and/or a communication failure 
9 Investigating the application of the idea of enforcing a party to be honest 
which is proposed in this thesis to the existing fair exchange protocols. This 
may reduce the number of messages in these protocols. Hence, more efficient 
fair exchange protocols may emerge 
9 The protocols presented in this thesis are for the exchange of a payment and a 
digital product. Extending this by applying these protocols to be used for 
certified e-mail, certified digital product delivery, contract signing 
9 Some customers prefer to be anonymous to merchants. The protocols 
presented in this thesis do not offer the anonymity for customer. This is 
because the merchant can identify the customer from the payment. A future 
work can study how to provide anonymity of customers in the proposed 
protocols 
9 I)evelopment of an adaptive system that includes all the three protocols (ECH, 
EMH, and ECMH) and switches between them to decide which one is more 
suitable to be used at any particular instance of a transaction. For example, if 
the two parties (the customer and the merchant) do not know each other then 
the adaptive system will chose the ECMH protocol. If one party tried to be 
dishonest then the adaptive system will make a note of this. Then, when the 
same parties want to exchange new items then the adaptive system will adapt 
itself to use the protocol that enforces the dishonest party to be honest 
9 Investigating the use of more than one TTP in the protocols 
* The parties involved in the exchange phase of the proposed protocols are C 
and A That is, they are two parties. Extending the ideas of the proposed 
protocols by having multi-party fair exchange protocols 
9 investigating the use of different public-key cryptography algorithm. That is, 
using algorithm other than RSA 
9 Applying the ECH, EMH, and ECMH to be used for the exchange of a 
payment and a physical product 
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" Reducing the certificates included in the proposed protocols. That is, using the 
same D-Cert for selling the same product multiple times 
" Including the time issues in the protocols and also in the dispute resolution 
Summary 
Three optimistic fair exchange protocols have been proposed in this thesis. The 
protocols are for the exchange of payment and digital product between a customer and 
a merchant. Two of the three protocols (namely, ECH and EMH protocols) use the 
idea of enforcing a party to be honest an idea that is originated in this thesis. The ECH 
protocol enforces the customer to be honest whereas the EMH enforces the merchant 
to be honest. The ECMH protocol, however, encourages the customer and the 
merchant to be honest. It has been shown that enforcing a party to be honest increases 
the efficiency of the fair exchange protocol leading to the fact that only three 
messages are required to exchange items between two parties. Additionally, the 
number of modular exponentiations that have to be calculated is reduced. Therefore, 
this answers the research question of this thesis which is: "Is there a way of reducing 
the number of messages in the optimistic fair exchange protocols in order to have 
more efficient protocols? " 
The new protocols have been analysed and evaluated against each other and 
against the related protocols from the literature. It has been shown that all the three 
protocols ensure strong fairness under the assumptions made. 
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This appendix includes the Promela code used in SPIN to fonnally verify the 
protocols. The codes for the ECH, EMH, and ECMH protocols are presented 
separately in the following sections. 
Modelling the ECH protocol 
#define TRUE I 
#define FALSE 0 
1* 
ECH Protocol messages 
mtype =f EM 1, EM2, EM3, DRM 1, DRM2, DRM3 1; 
bool quitMerchant, quitCustomer; 
bool receiveCorrectPayment, receiveCorrectProduct; 
/* Merchant Sends messages: EMI, EM3 
Receives messages: EM2, DRM2 
*1 
proctype Merchant(chan chCM, chMTTP) 
bool sendEM I, sendEM3, waitForTTP; 
sendEM I= FALSE; 
sendEM3 = FALSE; 
waitForTTP = FALSE; 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
Appendix A 
do 
:: (sendEM Iý FALSE) -> 
chCM! EMI; 
sendEM I= TRUE; 
quitMerchant = FALSE; 
printf("Merchant: message EM I sent \n"); 
:: (sendEM I== TRUE) && (sendEM3 == FALSE) && (quitMerchant == 
FALSE) -> 
if 
:: chCM? EM2 -> /* Merchant receives the payment from Customer */ 
printf("Merchant: message EM2 received \n"); 
quitMerchant = FALSE; 
/* Now all possibilities after receiving EM2 by M will be studied */ 
if 
:: TRUE -> /* payment is correct and M is honest */ 
receiveCorrectPayment = TRUE; 
chCM! EM3; 
sendEM3 = TRUE; 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
waitForTTP = TRUE; 
printf("Merchant: message EM3 sent \n"); 
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:: TRUE -> /* payment is correct, M quits the protocol, M is dishonest */ 
receiveCorrectPayment = TRUE; 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
waitForTTP = TRUE; 
printf("Merchant: The payment is A but M quits the protocol before 
sending message EM3 to C; M is dishonest \n"); 
Appendix A 
:: TRUE -> /* payment is incorrect; M quits the protocol */ 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
printf("Merchant: The payment is incorrect and hence M will not 
send EM3 to C BUT M will wait for TTP in case C contacted TTP \n"); 
waitForTTP = TRUE; 
f, 
/* Nothing is received after sending EM I; it seems that C does not 
want to exchange, BUT M will wait for any messages from TTP 
in case C contacted them */ 
:: timeout 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
waitForTTP = TRUE; 
f, 
:: (waitForTTP == TRUE) -> 
if 
:: chMTTP? DRM2 -> /* M receives the payment from TTP because C 
contacts TTP before C sends EM2 or because EM3 either incorrect or has not been 
sent to C by M */ 
receiveCorrectPayment = TRUE; 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
printf("Merchant: M received payment from TTP; The protocol is fair 
by the help of TTP \n"); 
break; 
:: timeout 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
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break; 
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f, 
od; 
/* Customer Sends messages: EM2, DRM I 
Receives messages: EM I, EM3, DRM3 
*1 
proctype Customer(chan chCM, chCTTP) 
f 
bool sendEM2, sendDRM I; 
sendEM2 = FALSE; 
sendDRM I= FALSE; 
quitCustomer = TRUE; 
do 
:: (sendEM2 == FALSE) && (sendDRM I== FALSE) -> 
chCM? EMI; 
printf("Customer: message EM I received \n"); 
quitCustomer = FALSE; 
/* Now all possibilities after receiving EM I by C will be studied */ 
if 
:: TRUE -> /* EM I is correct; and C want to complete the exchange */ 
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chCM! EM2; 
sendEM2 = TRUE; 
A, 
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printf(" Customer: message EM2 sent \n"); 
TRUE -> /* EM I is correct, but C contacts TTP to get the decryption 
key before C sends the payment to M */ 
chCTTP! DRMI; 
sendDRM 1= TRUE; 
printf(" Customer: message DRM1 sent \n"); 
TRUE -> /* EM 1 is correct, but C quits the protocol i. e. C does not 
want to complete the exchange */ 
quitCustomer = TRUE; 
printf(" Customer: Verification of EM I is A but Customer quits the 
protocol before sending message EM I \n"); 
break; 
TRUE -> /* EM I is incorrect; C quits the protocol 
quitCustomer = TRUE; 
printf("Customer: EM I is incorrect and hence Customer quits the 
protocol before sending message EM I \n"); 
break; 
f, 
:: (sendEM2 == TRUE) && (sendDRM I= = FALSE) && (quitCustomer == 
FALSE) -> 
if 
:: chCM? EM3 -> /* EM3 is received */ 
printf(" Customer: message EM3 received \n"); 
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/* Now all possibilities after receiving EM3 by C will be studied */ 
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if 
:: TRUE -> /* The decryption key is correct and C finishes 
the protocol as it was fair */ 
receiveCorrectProduct = TRUE; 
quitCustomer = TRUE; 
printf("Customer: C decrypts the digital product correctly; Fair 
protocol \n"); 
break; 
:: TRUE -> /* The decryption key is correct, but C contacts 
TTP to get the decryption key again */ 
receiveCorrectProduct = TRUE; 
chCTTP! DRMl; 
sendDRM 1= TRUE; 
printf(" Customer: C received correct decryption key from M 
but C sends to TTP to get the decryption key again \n"); 
:: TRUE -> /* The decryption key is incorrect; C contatc TTP 
to get the decryption key */ 
chCTTP! DRMl; 
sendDRM I= TRUE; 
printf(" Customer: decryption key is incorrect and hence 
Customer sends DRM I to TTP \n"); 
f, 
:: timeout -> /* C has not received EM3; So, C will contact TTP as C 
sent EM2 to M but has not received EM3 */ 
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chCTTP! DRMI; 
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sendDRM I= TRUE; 
printf(" Customer: C has not received EM3; So, C will contact 
TTP as C sent EM2 to M but has not received EM3\n"); 
fi 
:: (sendDRM I= = TRUE) && (quitCustomer == FALSE) 
chCTTP? DRM3; 
receiveCorrectProduct = TRUE; 
quitCustomer = TRUE; 
printf(" Customer: C received correct decryption key from TTP; The 
protocol is fair by the help of TTP \n"); 
break; 
od; 
/* TTP Sends messages: DRM2, DRM3 
Receives messages: DRM1 
*1 
proctype TTP(chan chMTTP, chCTTP) 
I 
do 
:: chCTTP? DRM I -> /* when TTP receives DRM I from C then resolve the 
disputes fairly */ 
chMTTP! DRM2; 
chCTTP! DRM3; 
break; 
od; 
init 
f 
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chan chCM = [01 of ýMtype); 
chan chCTTP = [0] of ýmtypel; 
chan chMTTP = [01 of ýmtypeý; 
run Merchant(chCM, chMTTP); 
run Customer(chCM, chCTTP); 
run TTP(chMTTP, chCTTP); 
Modelling the EMH protocol: 
#define TRUE I 
#define FALSE 0 
/* 
EMH Protocol messages 
*1 
mtype =f EM 1, EM2, EM3, DRM 1, DRM2, DRM3); 
bool quitMerchant, quitCustomer; 
bool receiveCorrectPayment, receiveCorrectProduct; 
/* Customer Sends messages: EMI, EM3 
Receives messages: EM2, DRM2 
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proctype Customer(chan chCM, chCTTP) 
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bool sendEM 1, sendEM3, waitForTTP; 
sendEMI = FALSE; 
sendEM3 = FALSE; 
waitForTTP = FALSE; 
quitCustomer = TRUE; 
do 
:: (sendEM I== FALSE) 
chCM! EMI; 
sendEM I= TRUE; 
quitCustomer = FALSE; 
printf(" Customer: message EM 1 sent \n"); 
:: (sendEM I== TRUE) && (sendEM3 == FALSE) && (quitCustomer == 
FALSE) -> 
if 
:: chCM? EM2 -> /* Customer receives the payment from Merchant */ 
printf(" Customer: message EM2 received \n"); 
quitCustomer = FALSE; 
/* Now all possibilities after receiving EM2 by C will be studied */ 
if 
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: TRUE -> /* The digital product is correct; and C want to complete the 
exchange fairly; C is honest */ 
receiveCorrectProduct = TRUE; 
chCM! EM3; 
sendEM3 = TRUE; 
quitCustomer = TRUE; 
waitForTTP =TRUE; 
printf(" Customer: message EM3 sent \n"); 
Appendix A 
:: TRUE -> /* The digital product is correct, but C quits the 
protocol before sending the decryption key i. e. C is 
dishonest */ 
receiveCorrectProduct = TRUE; 
quitCustomer = TRUE; 
waitForTTP =TRUE; 
printf("Customer: The digital product is ok but C quits the protocol 
before sending message EM3 to M; C is dishonest \n"); 
:: TRUE -> /* The digital product is incorrect; C quits the 
protocol BUT will wait for TTP in case M asked 
for resolution */ 
quitCustomer = TRUE; 
printf(" Customer, The digital product is incorrect and hence C will 
not send EM3 to M, also C will wait for TTP in case M asked for resolution \n"); 
waitForTTP =TRUE; 
fi 
/* Nothing is received after sending EMI; it seems that M does not want to 
exchange, BUT C will wait for TTP in case M has contacted them 
timeout -> 
quitCustomer = TRUE; 
waitForTTP = TRUE; 
f, 
:: (waitForTTP == TRUE) 
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if 
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chCTTP? DRM2 -> /*C receives the digital product from TTP 
because M contacts TTP before M sends EM2 
or because EM3 either incorrect or has not been 
sent to M by C */ 
receiveCorrectProduct = TRUE; 
quitCustomer = TRUE; 
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printf(" Customer: C received digital product from TTP; The protocol is 
fair by the help of TTP \n"); 
break; 
: timeout 
quitCustomer = TRUE; 
break; 
f, 
od; 
/* Merchant Sends messages: EM2, DRM1 
Receives messages: EM I, EM3, DRM3 
*1 
proctype Merchant(chan chCM, chMTTP) 
bool sendEM2, ýendDRM1; 
sendEM2 = FALSE; 
sendDRM I= FALSE; 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
do 
(sendEM2 FALSE) && (sendDRMl= = FALSE) 
chCM? EMl; 
printf("Merchant: message EM I received 
\n"); 
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quitMerchant = FALSE; 
/* Now all possibilities after receiving EM I by M will be studied 
if 
TRUE -> /* EM I is correct; M want to complete the exchange 
chCM! EM2; 
sendEM2 = TRUE; 
printf("Merchant: message EM2 sent \n"); 
:: TRUE -> /* EM I is correct, but M contacts TTP to get 
the decryption key before M sends digital product to C */ 
chMTTP! DRMI; 
sendDRM I= TRUE; 
printf("Merchant: message DRM I sent \n "); 
:: TRUE -> /* EMI is correct, but M quits the protocol i. e. M 
does not want to complete the exchange */ 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
printf("Merchant: Verification of EM I is ok but Merchant quits 
the protocol before sending message EMl \n"); 
break; 
:: TRUE -> /* EMI is incorrect; M quits the protocol 
*/ 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
printf("Merchant: EM I is incorrect and hence Merchant quits 
the protocol before sending message EMI. \n"); 
break; 
232 
f, 
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: (sendEM2 == TRUE) && (sendDRM I= = FALSE) && (quitMerchant 
== FALSE)-> 
if 
: chCM? EM3 -> /* EM3 is received */ 
printf("Merchant: message EM3 received \n"); 
/* Now all possibilities after receiving EM3 by M will be studied 
if 
:: TRUE -> /* The decryption key is correct and M finishes the 
protocol as it was fair */ 
receiveCorrectPayment = TRUE; 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
printf("Merchant: M decrypts the payment correctly; 
Fair protocol \n"); 
break; 
:: TRUE -> /* The decryption key is correct, but M 
contacts TTP to get the decryption key again */ 
receiveCorrectPayment = TRUE; 
chMTTP! DRMl; 
sendDRM I= TRUE; 
printf("Merchant: M received correct decryption key 
from C but M sends to TTP to get the decryption key again \n"); 
:: TRUE -> /* The decryption key is incorrect; M contacts 
TTP to get the decryption key */ 
chMTTP! DRMI; 
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sendDRM 1= TRUE; 
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printf("Merchant: decryption key is incorrect and hence 
Merchant sends DRM I to TTP \n"); 
f, 
:: timeout -> /* M has not received EM3; So, M will contact TTP as M 
sent EM2 to C but has not received EM3 */ 
chMTTP! DRMI; 
sendDRM 1= TRUE; 
printf("Merchant: M has not received EM3; So, M will contact 
TTP as M sent EM2 to C but has not received EM3 \n"); 
fi 
:: (sendDRMI= = TRUE) && (quitMerchant == FALSE) -> 
chMTTP? DRM3; 
receiveCorrectPayment = TRUE; 
quitMerchant. = TRUE; 
printf("Merchant: M received correct decryption key from TTP; The 
protocol is fair by the help of TTP \n"); 
break; 
od; 
/* TTP Sends messages: DRM2, DRM3 
Receives messages: DRMI 
proctype TTP(chan chMTTP, chCTTP) 
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do 
chMTTP? DRMI 
chCTTP! DRM2; 
chMTTP! DRM3; 
break; 
od; 
init 
chan chCM = [0] of {mtypeý; 
chan chCTTP = [0] of ýmtypel; 
chan chMTTP = [0] of fmtypel; 
run Customer(chCM, chCTTP); 
run Merchant(chCM, chMTTP); 
run TTP(chMTTP, chCTTP); 
Modelling the ECMH protocol: 
#define TRUE 1 
#define FALSE 0 
1* 
ECMH Protocol messages 
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mtype = JEM1, EM2, EM3, EM4, DRMI, DRM2, DRM3); 
bool quitMerchant, quitCustomer; 
bool receiveCorrectPayment, receiveCorrectProduct; 
/* Customer Sends messages: EMI, EM3, DRMI 
Receives messages: EM2, EM4, DRM3 
*1 
proctype Customer(chan chCM, chCTTP) 
bool sendEM I, sendEM3, sendDRMl; 
sendEM I= FALSE; 
sendEM3 = FALSE; 
sendDRM I= FALSE; 
quitCustomer = TRUE; 
do 
:: (sendEMI == FALSE) -> 
chCM! EMI; 
sendEM I= TRUE; 
quitCustomer = FALSE; 
printf(" Customer: message EM I sent W'); 
:: (sendEM 1== TRUE) && (sendEM3 == FALSE) && (sendDRM 
I== 
FALSE) && (quitCustomer == FALSE) 
if 
chCM? EM2 -> /* Customer receives the encrypted payment 
from Merchant */ 
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printf("Customer: message EM2 received \n"); 
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quitCustomer = FALSE; 
/* Now all possibilities after receiving EM2 by C will be studied 
if 
:: TRUE -> /* EM2 is correct; and C want to complete the exchange by 
sending EM3 to be able to receive EM4*/ 
chCM! EM3; 
sendEM3 = TRUE; 
quitCustomer = FALSE; 
printf(" Customer: message EM3 sent \n"); 
:: TRUE -> /* C contacts TTP before sending EM3 to M; this 
may happen either EM2 is correct or incorrect */ 
chCTTP! DRMI; 
sendDRM I= TRUE; 
quitCustomer = FALSE; 
printf(" Customer: message DRM1 sent to TTP \n"); 
TRUE -> /* The verification of EM2 is ok, but C quits the 
protocol before sending EM3; So no party is hurt i. e. 
no one loose anything */ 
quitCustomer = TRUE; 
printf(" Customer: The verification of EM2 is ok, but C quits the 
protocol before sending EM3; So no party is hurt i. e. no one loose anything"); 
break; 
TRUE -> /* EM2 in incorrect i. e. the verification of EM2 is 
negative; C quits the protocol */ 
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quitCustomer = TRUE; 
printf(" Customer: EM2 in incorrect i. e. the verification of EM2 
is negative; and hence C quits the protocol before sending message EM3 to M \n"); 
break; 
f, 
:: timeout -> /* Nothing is received after sending EM I; it seems that M 
does not want to exchange */ 
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quitCustomer = TRUE; 
printf(" Customer: Nothing is received after sending EM I; it seems that 
M does not want to exchange \n"); 
break; 
f, 
:: (sendEM3 == TRUE) && (sendDRMl == FALSE) && (quitCustomer 
== FALSE) -> /* C sent EM3 and waiting for EM4 */ 
if 
chCM? EM4 -> /* C receives the decryption key from M 
printf(" Customer: message EM4 received \n"); 
quitCustomer = FALSE; 
/* Now all possibilities after receiving EM4 by C will be studied */ 
if 
:: TRUE -> /* EM4 is correct; so, C finishes the protocol*/ 
receiveCorrectProduct = TRUE; 
quitCustomer = TRUE; 
printf(" Customer: message EM4 received; fair protocol \n"); 
break; 
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:: TRUE -> /* EM4 is correct; but C contacts TTP */ 
receiveCorrectProduct = TRUE; 
chCTTP! DRMI; 
sendDRM I= TRUE; 
quitCustomer = FALSE; 
printf("Customer: EM4 is correct; but C contacts TTP \n"); 
:: TRUE -> /* EM4 is incorrect; So, C contacts TTP for resolution 
*1 
chCTTP! DRMI; 
sendDRM I= TRUE; 
quitCustomer = FALSE; 
printf(" Customer: EM4 is incorrect, So, C contacts TTP for 
resolution \n"); 
fi 
:: timeout -> /* Nothing is received after sending EM3; So C must 
contact TTP to resolve dispute as M seems dishonest */ 
chCTTP! DRMI; 
sendDRMl = TRUE; 
quitCustomer = FALSE; 
printf(" Customer: Nothing is received after sending EM3; So C must 
contact TTP to resolve dispute as M seems dishonest \n"); 
f, 
:: (sendDRM 1== TRUE) && (quitCustomer == FALSE) -> /* C sent 
DRM I to TTP and waiting for DRM3 */ 
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chCTTP? DRM3 -> /*C receives the decryption key from TTP 
as a resolution for the fairness */ 
receiveCorrectProduct = TRUE; 
quitCustomer = TRUE; 
printf(" Customer: C received decryption key from TTP; The 
protocol is fair by the help of TTP \n"); 
break; 
f, 
od; 
/* Merchant Sends messages: EM2, EM4 
Receives messages: EM1, EM3, DRM2 
*1 
proctype Merchant(chan chCM, chMTTP) 
bool sendEM2, sendEM4, waitForTTP; 
sendEM2 = FALSE; 
sendEM4 = FALSE; 
waitForTTP = FALSE; 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
do 
:: (sendEM2 FALSE) 
chCM? EMI; 
printf("Merchant: message EM I received \n"); 
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/* Now all possibilities after receiving EM I by M will be studied 
if 
:: TRUE -> /* EMI is correct; and M want to send EM2*/ 
chCM! EM2; 
sendEM2 = TRUE; 
printf("Merchant: message EM2 sent \n"); 
- -. TRUE -> /* EM I is correct, but M does not want to exchange */ 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
printf("Merchant: Verification of EM I is A but Merchant quits the 
protocol before sending message EM2 \n"); 
break; 
TRUE -> /* EM I is incorrect; M quits the protocol 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
printf("Merchant: EM I is incorrect and hence Merchant quits the 
protocol before sending message EM I \n"); 
break; 
f, 
:: (sendEM2 == TRUE) && (sendEM4 == FALSE) && (quitMerchant 
== FALSE) -> 
if 
:: chCM? EM3 -> /* EM3 is received */ 
printf("Merchant: message EM3 received \n"); 
/* Now all possibilities after receiving EM3 by M will be studied*/ 
if 
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:: TRUE -> /* The decryption key is correct and 
M sends EM4 
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to finishes the protocol fairly */ 
receiveCorrectPayment = TRUE; 
chCM! EM4; 
sendEM4 = TRUE; 
waitForTTP = TRUE; 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
printf("Merchant: M decrypts the payment correctly; so, M 
sends EM4 to finish the protocol fairly \n"); 
:: TRUE -> /* The decryption key is correct; but M quits the 
protocol; M is dishonest */ 
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receiveCorrectPayment = TRUE; 
waitForTTP = TRUE 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
printf("Merchant: The decryption key is correct; but M quits the 
protocol; M is dishonest \n"); 
:: TRUE -> /* The decryption key is incorrect; M quits the 
protocol so no party looses anything */ 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
waitForTTP = TRUE; 
printf("Merchant: The decryption key is incorrect; M quits the 
protocol; so no party looses anything \n"); 
fi 
:: timeout -> /* M has not received EM3; So, M will wait 
because C 
might contact TTP before sending EM3 */ 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
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waitForTTP = TRUE; 
f, 
:: ( waitForTTP == TRUE) -> 
if 
chMTTP? DRM2 -> /* M received correct decryption key for 
the payment from TTP; The protocol is fair 
by the help of TTP */ 
receiveCorrectPayment = TRUE; 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
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printf("Merchant: M received correct decryption key from TTP; 
The protocol is fair by the help of TTP \n"); 
break; 
:: timeout 
quitMerchant = TRUE; 
break; 
fi 
od; 
/* TTP Sends messages: DRM2, DRM3 
Receives messages: DRMI 
*1 
proctype TTP(chan chMTTP, chCTTP) 
f 
do 
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chCTTP? DRMI 
chMTTP! DRM2; 
chCTTP! DRM3; 
break; 
od; 
init 
I 
chan chCM = [0] of Imtypel; 
chan chCTTP = [0] of Imtype); 
chan chMTTP = [0] of Imtype); 
run Customer(chCM, chCTTP); 
run Merchant(chCM, chMTTP); 
run TTP(chMTTP, chCTTP); 
a 
244 
